Three fixes wrapped for the v0.6.5-esp32 release tag:
1. **`sdkconfig.defaults` adds `CONFIG_FREERTOS_TIMER_TASK_STACK_DEPTH=8192`**.
The fix was already in `sdkconfig.defaults.template` (ADR-081, prevents
"stack overflow in task Tmr Svc" bootloop when adaptive_controller emits
feature_state from inside a Timer Svc callback). It was MISSING from the
canonical `sdkconfig.defaults` file used by the build, so any fresh
build picked up the 2 KiB FreeRTOS default and bootlooped on hardware.
Verified on COM7: with the fix, no panics in 30 s of operation; without
it, "***ERROR*** A stack overflow in task Tmr Svc has been detected."
followed by sustained bootloop.
2. **`ota_update.c` extracts `ota_load_psk_from_nvs()` and calls it from
both `ota_update_init()` and `ota_update_init_ex()`.** `main.c:230` uses
the `_ex` variant, but only `ota_update_init()` was loading the PSK
from NVS. Result: `s_ota_psk` stayed empty regardless of NVS contents,
so the RuView#596 fail-closed posture rejected every request — but the
diagnostic warning never printed at boot, leaving operators no signal
about why their OTA uploads were 403'ing. Verified on COM7:
W (3126) ota_update: NVS namespace 'security' not found —
OTA upload endpoint will REJECT all requests until provisioned.
Fail-closed per RuView#596.
3. **`version.txt`: 0.6.4 → 0.6.5**, paired with the v0.6.5-esp32 tag so the
firmware-ci version-guard job (RuView#505 fix-marker) stays happy.
Both validations done end-to-end on hardware (COM7, ESP32-S3 8MB,
provisioned with --edge-tier 2 to also incidentally re-verify #438 is not
reproducible on current main).
ota_check_auth() previously returned true when s_ota_psk[0] == '\0'
("permissive for dev"). A freshly-flashed node — or any node where
nobody had provisioned an OTA PSK yet — accepted attacker-controlled
firmware over plain HTTP on port 8032 from any host on the WiFi. No
Secure Boot V2, no signed-image verification, no transport encryption.
Single LAN call could brick or backdoor a node.
This was flagged in the deep security review of PR #596 but was a
PRE-EXISTING bug in main, not new code from that PR — so it stood as
a critical-severity production issue until this commit.
Fix:
- ota_check_auth() now returns false when no PSK is provisioned, with
ESP_LOGW("OTA rejected: no PSK in NVS …") at the call site so the
operator can diagnose the rejection from serial logs
- ota_update_init() ESP_LOGW message updated to surface the new posture
at boot ("upload endpoint will REJECT all requests until provisioned")
- Doc comment on ota_check_auth() rewritten to make the contract
explicit and reference the audit
The OTA HTTP server itself still starts even when no PSK is set. That
lets the operator run `provision.py --ota-psk <hex>` over USB-CDC to
write the NVS key without reflashing the firmware. The upload endpoint
just refuses every request in the meantime.
Breaking change for any deployment that depended on the unauthenticated
OTA path working out of the box. Documented in CHANGELOG under
[Unreleased] / Security so it's visible at the next release cut.
Fix-marker RuView#596-ota-fail-closed (scripts/fix-markers.json)
requires the new behaviour and forbids the old "permissive for dev"
fallback strings, so a future revert fails CI.
Reported by @ArnonEnbar with a complete reproduction.
broadcast_tick_task() re-emits the cached `latest_update` every tick so
pose WS clients keep getting data even when ESP32 pauses between
frames. The `source` field of that cached update was set to "esp32" at
the moment a fresh ESP32 frame was last decoded (main.rs:3885, :4136).
After the ESP32 loses power or network, no fresh frame is decoded —
the cached `latest_update` is still re-broadcast every tick with the
stale source: "esp32" baked in. UI's "Sensing" tab keeps showing
"LIVE — ESP32 HARDWARE Connected" with frozen vitals/features/
classification re-broadcast indefinitely. REST `/health` correctly
reports source: "esp32:offline" (via effective_source(), which checks
last_esp32_frame elapsed time against ESP32_OFFLINE_TIMEOUT=5s) — but
the WS broadcast path was the one consumer that didn't call it.
Fix: clone the cached update per tick, overwrite source with
s.effective_source(), then serialize and broadcast. UI now switches to
"esp32:offline" on the same 5s budget as the REST surface.
cargo build -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server --no-default-features:
17s, no errors (1 pre-existing unused-import warning unchanged).
Reported by @bannned-bit. Five endpoints in
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server embedded user-controlled
identifiers in format!() paths with no sanitization:
recording.rs POST /api/v1/recording/start (session_name)
recording.rs GET /api/v1/recording/download/:id (id)
recording.rs DELETE /api/v1/recording/delete/:id (id)
model_manager.rs POST /api/v1/models/load (model_id)
training_api.rs load_recording_frames (dataset_ids[])
Each unauthenticated caller could:
- READ arbitrary files via ../../etc/passwd, ../../.env, etc.
- WRITE attacker-controlled JSONL via recording/start
- LOAD attacker-controlled .rvf model files
- DELETE arbitrary files the server process can touch
New `path_safety` module exports `safe_id(&str) -> Result<&str, PathSafetyError>`
that enforces the rejection envelope BEFORE any user input reaches a
format!() that builds a path:
- Allowed character set: [A-Za-z0-9._-]
- Reject leading '.' (rules out '.', '..', '.env', hidden files)
- Reject empty strings
- Reject anything > 64 bytes
- Reject all whitespace, path separators, null bytes, non-ASCII
Applied at all 5 sites. Errors return 400 Bad Request (download) /
status:"error" JSON (others) — not panics.
9 unit tests in path_safety::tests cover:
- accepts simple alphanumeric / hyphen / underscore / dot
- rejects empty, leading dot, path separators ('/', '\'),
null byte, whitespace, shell specials, non-ASCII (including
fullwidth slash U+FF0F), too-long, boundary at MAX_ID_LEN
test result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed
cargo build -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server --no-default-features: 33s
Fix-marker RuView#615 in scripts/fix-markers.json prevents removing the
guard at any of the 5 call sites. CHANGELOG entry under [Unreleased] /
Security documents the patched endpoints and the rejection envelope.
Severity: critical per reporter — five remotely-reachable paths to read,
write, or delete arbitrary files. Hot per-request paths, not edge cases.
* fix(verify): quantize features before SHA-256 for cross-platform hash stability (#560)
## The bug
archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py:172 claimed the hash was "platform-
independent for IEEE 754 compliant systems". That claim is empirically
false. scipy.fft's pocketfft uses SIMD vector kernels — AVX2/AVX-512 on
x86_64, NEON on Apple Silicon — that reorder vectorized FP operations
differently per build. IEEE 754 guarantees per-operation determinism,
not associativity under reordering, so two correct platforms produce
values that differ at ULP precision (~1e-14 at our magnitudes of 1-100).
The SHA-256 of features_to_bytes() then explodes that ULP-level
divergence into a totally different hash, which is what bug report #560
caught on macOS arm64:
| Platform | numpy/scipy | sha256 (legacy) |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|
| Windows (Intel AVX-512) | 2.4.2 / 1.17.1 | 78b3fb… |
| ruvultra (Linux x86_64) | 1.26.4 / 1.14.1 | 41dc56… |
| ruv-mac-mini (Apple Silicon NEON) | 2.4.4 / 1.17.1 | 9b5e19… |
## The fix
features_to_bytes() now np.round(.., HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS=9)s each
array before packing as little-endian f64. That snaps the float bytes
to a single canonical representation across SIMD backends.
The 9-decimal precision is:
- ~5 orders of magnitude above the worst-case ULP drift observed in
probe-fft-platform.py measurements
- Many orders of magnitude below any meaningful signal change (CSI
phase precision is ~1e-3 rad; PSD bins differ by orders of magnitude)
- Conservative — could tighten to 11-12 decimals if needed, but 9
leaves comfortable headroom for future scipy SIMD changes
## Probe-side verification
scripts/probe-fft-platform.py now emits BOTH sha256_raw (unrounded,
legacy) and sha256_quantized (new platform-invariant hash). Running it
on Windows here produced:
sha256_raw = 78b3fb4acb8cc18c3e870f92e29ee98143c7cac4767f2f71b0fc384a82b92f6e
sha256_quantized = a587792c050cf697366b9bef4611050f9dc3af56624915ab2452c3c11362e79a
quantization_decimals = 9
On Linux and macOS arm64 the maintainer should observe the SAME
sha256_quantized value (and a different sha256_raw) — that's the
fix working.
## What this PR does NOT do
The published archive/v1/data/proof/expected_features.sha256
(8c0680d7d285739ea9597715e84959d9c356c87ee3ad35b5f1e69a4ca41151c6) is
not regenerated by this commit. That step needs to run on a canonical
CI platform (likely the Linux x86_64 host used for releases) AFTER this
fix lands. The regeneration command is:
python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py --generate-hash
After regeneration, every platform running ./verify will produce the
same hash and the proof replay will be honestly cross-platform — which
is what the ADR-028 trust-kill-switch promised.
## Files
- archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py — add HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS=9
constant, quantize in features_to_bytes(), correct the misleading
"platform-independent" claim in the docstring
- scripts/probe-fft-platform.py — emit both raw and quantized hashes
- scripts/fix-markers.json — RuView#560 marker prevents removing the
np.round() call without explicit intent
- CHANGELOG.md — Fixed entry under [Unreleased] documenting the change
and flagging the expected_features.sha256 regeneration as a follow-up
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* ci: fix verify-pipeline.yml working-directory from v1/ to archive/v1/
The verify-pipeline workflow's "Run pipeline verification" and "Run
verification twice to confirm determinism" steps use
`working-directory: v1` but `v1/` was archived to `archive/v1/` long
ago. The workflow fails before verify.py even runs:
##[error]An error occurred trying to start process '/usr/bin/bash'
with working directory '/home/runner/work/RuView/RuView/v1'.
No such file or directory
Same v1 → archive/v1 path correction that already shipped for the
./verify wrapper (RuView#559 / PR #590) and the other lint workflows
(RuView#489).
Required to make the determinism check actually run on PR #609 (the
quantize-before-hash work) — the canonical Linux hash needed for
expected_features.sha256 will fall out of the next CI log once this
fix lands.
* fix(proof): regenerate expected_features.sha256 with the quantized canonical hash
The hash on the previous line was the legacy pre-quantization value
(8c0680d7d28573…), which by definition cannot match the quantized
output that this branch's verify.py now produces. Replaced with the
canonical Linux x86_64 hash captured from the CI run on this branch:
d9985569b3ab833c74b7c9254df568bbb144879e2222edb0bcf2605bfd4c155b
Source of truth: run 26005976495 / "Verify Pipeline Determinism (3.11)"
on Ubuntu 24.04, Python 3.11.15, exercising the full verify.py pipeline
on the 100 reference frames in archive/v1/data/proof/sample_csi_data.json.
Reproducibility expectation now changes:
- Linux x86_64 (canonical platform): sha256 = d9985569… ✓ this commit
- macOS arm64 / Apple Silicon NEON: sha256 = d9985569… should match
after quantization
- Windows AMD64 (with pydantic-clean .env): sha256 = d9985569… should match
after quantization
If macOS arm64 still mismatches after this, the quantization decimals
need to be tightened from 9 to 11 or 12 (HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS
in verify.py); the headroom analysis in the original commit suggests
9 is safe but 9-decimal SIMD drift hasn't been measured in the
full-pipeline output yet (only in the probe).
Closes the maintainer-action-required item on PR #609.
* fix(proof): bump quantization to 6 decimals (9 wasn't enough across Azure CI microarchs)
Two back-to-back Ubuntu 24.04 / Python 3.11 / scipy 1.17 CI runs on
PR #609 landed on different Azure VM microarchitectures and produced
two different SHA-256s even after np.round(.., 9):
Run 1: d9985569b3ab833c74b7c9254df568bbb144879e2222edb0bcf2605bfd4c155b
Run 2: 37c49a1f6b87207fa9fc67f2d6a85c4417dd4a536573605fd175510d1dce7cbe
Same JSON input, same byte count hashed (294,400), same Python version,
same scipy version. The only variable is the underlying CPU pocketfft
SIMD kernel.
The full DSP pipeline (preprocess → biquad bandpass → FFT → PSD →
variance accumulation) amplifies the ~1e-14 raw FFT divergence by
several orders of magnitude — the actual drift at features_to_bytes()
input can reach 1e-7 or worse, which is well within the 1e-9 quantization
window I originally picked.
Bumping to 6 decimals = parts per million. ~6 orders of magnitude
headroom over observed pipeline-amplified ULP drift. Still far below
any meaningful signal change (CSI phase precision ~1e-3 rad). Kept the
probe constant in sync.
Will trigger CI on this branch immediately after push; the new
expected_features.sha256 will be regenerated from whichever microarch
the next CI run lands on, but should be stable across all subsequent
runs at 6-decimal quantization.
* chore(probe): keep HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS in sync with verify.py (now 6)
* fix(proof): regenerate expected_features.sha256 for 6-decimal quantization
* ci: pin thread count to 1 for proof verification (scipy.fft threading non-determinism)
Reported by @bannned-bit. archive/v1/src/services/pose_service.py:223:
sanitized_phase = self.phase_sanitizer.sanitize(phase_data)
PhaseSanitizer exposes the full-pipeline entry point as `sanitize_phase`
(unwrap_phase + remove_outliers + smooth_phase), not `sanitize`. The
shorter name doesn't exist on the class, so any path that reaches this
branch raises AttributeError mid-frame and crashes the pose service.
archive/v1/src/core/phase_sanitizer.py:266 is the canonical name:
def sanitize_phase(self, phase_data: np.ndarray) -> np.ndarray:
"""Sanitize phase data through complete pipeline."""
One-line rename. No other call sites use the wrong name; verified with
grep -rn 'phase_sanitizer\.sanitize\b' archive/v1/src/.
This is v1 archived code, but the proof verify path still exercises it
(./verify reaches into archive/v1/src/), so the bug was a latent
regression risk for the trust-kill-switch flow.
Reported by @bannned-bit. v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/
adaptive_classifier.rs:94 did:
sorted.sort_by(|a, b| a.partial_cmp(b).unwrap());
f64::partial_cmp returns None on NaN, so `.unwrap()` panics. CSI data
from real ESP32 hardware can produce NaN (silent DSP div-by-zero,
empty buffer, etc.), and this code path runs on every frame in the
classify() hot path — a single NaN frame kills the entire sensing
server process.
Fix swaps for unwrap_or(Ordering::Equal), matching the pattern the
same file already uses at lines 149-150 and 155 (those sites were
already NaN-safe; this site was an oversight).
Scoped audit: greped the v2/ tree for `partial_cmp(b).unwrap()`. The
other 3 hits are in #[cfg(test)] blocks (spectrogram.rs:269,
depth.rs:234, connectivity.rs:477) where panic-on-NaN is acceptable
because test inputs are controlled. Only adaptive_classifier.rs:94
was a production-path crash.
Severity: critical per reporter — runtime panic on real-world data.
Patch: 1-line behavioural change + comment.
When two render frames land in the same performance.now() tick,
`currentTime - lastFrameTime === 0`, so `fps = 1000 / 0 = Infinity`,
and `averageFps = averageFps * 0.9 + Infinity * 0.1 = Infinity` poisons
the EMA forever after a single zero-dt tick. The UI then displays
"Infinity FPS" until reload.
Floor deltaTime at 1 ms before the division. That caps displayed FPS at
1000 (far above any real render rate so the cap is never observed in
practice) but keeps the EMA finite.
Reported in #519 ("Bug 2 — FPS shows Infinity") by @kapilsoni2013 on a
3-node ESP32-S3-WROOM multi-node setup with edge-tier 1 + 2.
Each of these crates was a single-line doc-comment placeholder:
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-api/src/lib.rs: //! WiFi-DensePose REST API (stub)
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-db/src/lib.rs: //! WiFi-DensePose database layer (stub)
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-config/src/lib.rs: //! WiFi-DensePose configuration (stub)
with empty [dependencies] in their Cargo.toml and zero references from any
source file or Cargo.toml in the workspace (verified by `grep -rln
wifi-densepose-api/-db/-config` across `v2/`). They were reserved early for
an envisioned REST/database/config split that never materialised.
The functionality these would have provided is covered today by:
- REST/WS: wifi-densepose-sensing-server (Axum)
- Config: per-crate config + CLI args in sensing-server and desktop
- DB: no persistent state; system is real-time
Removal prevents `cargo` from listing dead crates, shipping empty published
artifacts to crates.io, or wasting reviewer attention. If any of these names
is needed in the future, reintroduce them with a real implementation.
Per the issue reporter (@bannned-bit / Matad0r) #578 explicitly listed
"OR be removed from workspace members until implementation starts" as an
acceptable resolution.
Updated:
- `v2/Cargo.toml`: drop the three members (with inline comment explaining why)
- `v2/Cargo.lock`: regenerated by cargo check
- `CLAUDE.md`: drop the three rows from the crate table and the publishing
order list
- `CHANGELOG.md`: add an `[Unreleased] / Removed` entry
Verified:
- `cd v2 && cargo check --workspace --no-default-features` -> finished
in 48s, no errors (warnings unchanged)
Docker Desktop on Windows demultiplexes inbound UDP from multiple source
IPs onto a single virtual socket, silently dropping packets from all but
one ESP32 node. This makes multi-node sensing setups appear to work
(WebSocket connects, packets flow on the host) while only one node's CSI
ever reaches the container.
Adds scripts/udp-relay.py (stdlib only) which collapses multi-source UDP
to a single loopback source so Docker's forwarding accepts every packet.
Verified locally: 6 packets from 3 distinct source ports all arrive at
the receiver from a single relay socket.
Updates docker/docker-compose.yml with an inline comment pointing
Windows users at the relay + 5006:5005 mapping. Linux/macOS hosts are
unaffected and need no changes.
Also documents the workaround alongside fixes for #188 (UI 404 from
relative --ui-path) and #438 (boot loop on --edge-tier 1/2 against
pre-v0.4.3.1 firmware) as new sections 9-11 of docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md.
Supersedes the docs-only PR #413.
Closes#374, #386
Refs #188, #438, #301
* firmware/esp32-csi-node: fix IDF 6 build (PSA SHA-256, explicit REQUIRES)
- rvf_parser: use psa_hash_* / psa_hash_compute; mbedTLS 4 has no public
mbedtls/sha256.h on the IDF include path.
- main/CMakeLists: declare REQUIRES for WiFi, netif, HTTP, OTA, drivers, lwip,
mbedtls per ESP-IDF v6 component dependency checks; optional wasm3 when
CONFIG_WASM_ENABLE.
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* firmware/esp32-csi-node: fix CSI config for Wi-Fi 6 (ESP32-C6)
When CONFIG_SOC_WIFI_HE_SUPPORT is set, wifi_csi_config_t is the
wifi_csi_acquire_config_t bitfield layout. The legacy bool fields
(lltf_en, htltf_en, ...) only apply to ESP32-S3-class targets.
Initialize acquire fields for HE targets; add MAC v3-only members when
CONFIG_SOC_WIFI_MAC_VERSION_NUM >= 3.
Verified: idf.py build for esp32c6 and esp32s3 (ESP-IDF v6.1).
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* firmware/esp32-csi-node: pin edge DSP task for unicore (ESP32-C6)
edge_processing_init used xTaskCreatePinnedToCore(..., core 1). ESP32-C6
runs FreeRTOS unicore (portNUM_PROCESSORS == 1), so core 1 trips the
xTaskCreatePinnedToCore range assert right after CSI init.
Use core 1 only when SMP is available; otherwise pin to core 0.
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* firmware/esp32-csi-node: provision NVS with chip auto-detect
provision.py always passed --chip esp32s3 to esptool, so flashing NVS on
ESP32-C6 failed. Default --chip to auto (esptool v5) and add an explicit
--chip override. Use write-flash instead of deprecated write_flash.
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* v2: pin Rust 1.89 for sensing-server dependency chain
ruvector-core 2.0.5, hnsw_rs 0.3.4, and mmap-rs 0.7 require newer Cargo/rustc
than 1.82 (edition2024 manifest, is_multiple_of, stable avx512f target_feature
on x86_64). Add v2/rust-toolchain.toml so cargo build -p
wifi-densepose-sensing-server picks a compatible toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* sensing-server: default UI path for cwd v2/ and coalesce fallbacks
The previous default ../../ui resolves to a non-existent directory when
the binary is run from v2/ (common), so /ui/* returned 404 and the
dashboard appeared broken. Default to ../ui and try ../ui, ./ui,
../../ui when the configured path is missing.
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Tata <chaitanya@dotstarconsulting.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
`vendor/midstream` is a git submodule of RuView but no `v2/crates/*` depends
on a `midstreamer-*` crate and no Rust source uses one — i.e. it is vendored
but not consumed, the same state `vendor/rvcsi` was in before ADR-097.
ADR-098 evaluates whether to change that. The candidate seams (from the
prompt) were:
1. Streaming / pub-sub for the WS fan-out (today: `tokio::sync::broadcast`
at `wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs:4769`).
2. CSI → DSP → event pipeline (today: rvcsi-events::EventPipeline, just
adopted by ADR-097).
3. Multi-source merging / TDM for the ESP32 mesh (ADR-029, ADR-073).
4. Backpressure / flow control between the UDP receiver and downstream
consumers (firmware `stream_sender` ENOMEM; host-side bounded
broadcast channel).
Reading all six midstream workspace crates end-to-end
(`vendor/midstream/crates/{temporal-compare,nanosecond-scheduler,
temporal-attractor-studio,temporal-neural-solver,strange-loop,
quic-multistream}/src/*.rs` — ~3,455 LOC) shows midstream's identity
unambiguously: `Cargo.toml:16` calls itself "Real-time LLM streaming with
inflight analysis", the README frames it as analyzing *LLM token streams*
in real time, and zero hits across the workspace for `csi|wifi|sensing|
sensor`. midstream's abstractions are LLM-token / dashboard-telemetry
shaped; RuView's pipeline is RF-frame / event-detector shaped.
Decisions:
D1 — WS fan-out: keep `tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<String>(256)`.
midstream offers no equivalent in-process broadcast primitive.
D2 — CSI pipeline: keep `rvcsi-events::EventPipeline` (deterministic,
single-frame-at-a-time, replayable per ADR-095 D9). midstream's
attractor / LTL crates operate on multi-dimensional trajectories,
not validated single CSI frames.
D3 — TDM / aggregator: keep `wifi-densepose-hardware::aggregator` +
firmware-side TDM. midstream has no UDP merger and no cross-device
wall-clock scheduler.
D4 — Backpressure: the firmware ENOMEM rate-limit and the bounded host
`broadcast` channel are correct at each end; midstream's QUIC
primitives don't help the actual UDP+WS topology.
D5 — Carve-out: `midstreamer-temporal-compare` (DTW / LCS / Levenshtein)
is a plausible future-evaluation option if a *second* DTW use case
appears in RuView. RuvSense already has one (`gesture.rs`).
D6 — Carve-out: `midstreamer-scheduler` (deadline-aware, EDF / LLF /
RM) is a plausible future option if the cluster-Pi aggregator ever
takes over real-time scheduling. Today that lives in firmware.
D7 — Submodule: keep `vendor/midstream` pinned at `30fe5eb` as reference
material; do not advance the pin per-release (unlike vendor/rvcsi
under ADR-097 D7) because there is no in-build consumer.
D8 — Docs: cross-reference, don't import. ADR-098 added to
`docs/adr/README.md`.
Status: Rejected (with named re-evaluation triggers in §6 — second DTW use
case, host-side real-time scheduler, midstream gains a CSI adapter, or a
QUIC-to-external-client requirement that WS can't service).
* docs(tutorials): add Pi 5 + Hailo cluster rvcsi tutorial
Field-tested walkthrough for building a 4-node Raspberry Pi 5 + 2×
Hailo-8 multistatic Wi-Fi CSI cognitive RF observer using rvcsi. Built
against the v0-appliance v0.5.0-cognitive-rf-observer milestone — 446k+
observed fingerprints, 16 stable RF states, 2nd-order Markov running at
39% top-1 ceiling (1.06× over 1st-order, 16× chance baseline).
Covers:
- Pi 5 + Hailo hardware bring-up (BOM ~$580 + workstation)
- nexmon_csi native ARM build recipe (cross-compile is a dead end)
- Per-node services + per-host topology (15 expected services across 4 hosts)
- Workstation pipeline: 3 daemons + 7 timers, brain HTTP + SQLite
- 12 brain categories from spatial-vitals through rfmem-fleet
- cog-query CLI: 34 subcommands, 4 JSON modes, --post for 2
- Calibration recipe: walk → cluster → warm-start IDs → Markov chain
- 13-axis anomaly detector w/ composite info score (1.0–8.0)
- Fleet-health triad: check-drift + replica-status + fleet-status
- Troubleshooting table for the painful lessons (clock skew, cp -r footgun,
self-loop dominance in Markov argmax, etc.)
Pairs with a detailed cookbook gist (linked from intro + steps 3, 4,
and the Reference section):
https://gist.github.com/ruvnet/88e7b053c41cb4f4af7a7ec4af873017
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* docs(tutorials): clarify rvcsi naming + add ADR-207 cutover note
Two amendments per ADR-207's "naming defect — fix immediately regardless"
action item:
1. Intro callout: when the tutorial was first written, "rvcsi" was a
naming convention only (no upstream library dep). As of 2026-05-13
the v0-appliance accepted ADR-207 Option D and shipped a Rust
binary built on the real rvcsi-runtime. Both stacks can coexist on
a mixed cluster during cutover.
2. Per-node services section: explicit note that cog-csi-emitter +
cog-csi-adapter + cog-rvcsi-stream are being consolidated into one
cog-rvcsi-pi Rust binary, with deploy + rollback commands and
scope (per-Pi cutover, mixed clusters OK).
The tutorial's overall instructions remain correct for both pre- and
post-cutover deployments — fleet-status, the operator surface, and
the architectural model are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
rUv
Mathew005
Grzegorz Malopolski
OrbisAI Security
dependabot[bot]
Chaitanya Tata
Timothy Schwarz