wifi-densepose/v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/src
rUv 9f80b66ae3
harden(cog-ha-matter crypto): domain-separate witness signing + verify_strict (signing chain otherwise sound — P2 crypto core verified) (#1080)
* fix(cog-ha-matter): domain-separate witness signing chain + verify_strict (ADR-116 §2.2)

Crypto review of the SHA-256 + Ed25519 witness chain that ADR-262 P2
reuses. The sibling wifi-densepose-engine bug class (unframed
concatenation of operator-influenceable strings into a signed digest)
is ABSENT here — canonical_bytes already length-prefixes kind/payload.
Two real hardening gaps fixed:

- CHM-WIT-01: add a versioned domain-separation tag
  (WITNESS_DOMAIN_TAG = b"cog-ha-matter/witness-event/v1\0") to
  canonical_bytes so the witness SHA-256 preimage / Ed25519 message
  cannot be replayed as a message for another signing context that
  shares key infrastructure (notably the manifest binary_signature).
  Completes the engine review's "domain-tag + length-prefix" rule.
  Witness bytes change by design (prior on-disk hashes/sigs invalidated);
  no in-repo crate consumes these bytes programmatically.

- CHM-WIT-02: verify_signature uses VerifyingKey::verify_strict (rejects
  non-canonical encodings + small-order keys) for the audit-uniqueness
  property. Key stays caller-pinned (not read from the event).

Pinned by fails-on-old tests: canonical_bytes_is_domain_separated,
canonical_bytes_starts_with_domain_tag_then_prev_hash,
witness_preimage_cannot_collide_with_a_bare_manifest_digest,
signature_commits_to_domain_tag_not_bare_fields; key-pinning guarded by
verify_uses_strict_path_and_pins_caller_key. cog-ha-matter 64 -> 68
tests, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(cog-ha-matter): record ADR-116 crypto review findings (CHM-WIT-01/02)

CHANGELOG [Unreleased] Security entry + ADR-116 §4.1 review notes:
engine-class signed-digest collision confirmed ABSENT (length-prefixing
already correct), domain-separation tag added, verify_strict hardening,
and the clean dimensions (verify-before-trust, key-handling,
determinism, fail-closed parsing) with byte-layout evidence.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-06-14 19:04:09 -04:00
..
lib.rs cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): Ed25519 signing layer for witness chain 2026-05-23 18:22:15 -04:00
main.rs cog-ha-matter (ADR-116): P4 — mDNS wired into main, broker deferred 2026-05-23 18:36:14 -04:00
manifest.rs feat(cog-ha-matter): P2 scaffold + ADR-116 P1 research-dossier fold-in 2026-05-23 17:48:08 -04:00
mdns.rs cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): MdnsService -> mdns-sd ServiceInfo bridge 2026-05-23 18:28:10 -04:00
runtime.rs cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): live mDNS responder + handle 2026-05-23 18:31:38 -04:00
witness.rs harden(cog-ha-matter crypto): domain-separate witness signing + verify_strict (signing chain otherwise sound — P2 crypto core verified) (#1080) 2026-06-14 19:04:09 -04:00
witness_signing.rs harden(cog-ha-matter crypto): domain-separate witness signing + verify_strict (signing chain otherwise sound — P2 crypto core verified) (#1080) 2026-06-14 19:04:09 -04:00