fix(firmware): OTA upload fails closed when no PSK in NVS (RuView#596 audit) (#623)

ota_check_auth() previously returned true when s_ota_psk[0] == '\0'
("permissive for dev"). A freshly-flashed node — or any node where
nobody had provisioned an OTA PSK yet — accepted attacker-controlled
firmware over plain HTTP on port 8032 from any host on the WiFi. No
Secure Boot V2, no signed-image verification, no transport encryption.
Single LAN call could brick or backdoor a node.

This was flagged in the deep security review of PR #596 but was a
PRE-EXISTING bug in main, not new code from that PR — so it stood as
a critical-severity production issue until this commit.

Fix:
- ota_check_auth() now returns false when no PSK is provisioned, with
  ESP_LOGW("OTA rejected: no PSK in NVS …") at the call site so the
  operator can diagnose the rejection from serial logs
- ota_update_init() ESP_LOGW message updated to surface the new posture
  at boot ("upload endpoint will REJECT all requests until provisioned")
- Doc comment on ota_check_auth() rewritten to make the contract
  explicit and reference the audit

The OTA HTTP server itself still starts even when no PSK is set. That
lets the operator run `provision.py --ota-psk <hex>` over USB-CDC to
write the NVS key without reflashing the firmware. The upload endpoint
just refuses every request in the meantime.

Breaking change for any deployment that depended on the unauthenticated
OTA path working out of the box. Documented in CHANGELOG under
[Unreleased] / Security so it's visible at the next release cut.

Fix-marker RuView#596-ota-fail-closed (scripts/fix-markers.json)
requires the new behaviour and forbids the old "permissive for dev"
fallback strings, so a future revert fails CI.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 ## [Unreleased]
 
 ### Security
+- **ESP32 OTA upload now fails closed when no PSK is provisioned** (#596 audit finding — critical, **breaking change for unprovisioned nodes**). `ota_check_auth()` previously returned `true` when `s_ota_psk[0] == '\0'`, so a freshly-flashed node would accept attacker-controlled firmware over plain HTTP on port 8032 from any host on the WiFi. No Secure Boot V2, no signed-image verification — a single LAN call could brick or backdoor a node. The fix rejects every OTA upload until a PSK is written to NVS (the OTA HTTP server still starts so operators can run `provision.py --ota-psk <hex>` over USB-CDC without reflashing). **Operators affected**: any deployment that relied on the unauthenticated OTA endpoint working out of the box now needs to provision a PSK before subsequent OTA pushes will succeed. Boot-time `ESP_LOGW` makes the new posture visible.
 - **Path-traversal vulnerabilities patched in five sensing-server endpoints** (closes #615 — critical). New `wifi_densepose_sensing_server::path_safety::safe_id()` enforces `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` only (no leading `.`, max 64 chars) before any user-controlled identifier reaches a `format!()` building a filesystem path. Applied at:
   - `POST /api/v1/recording/start` (`recording.rs` — `session_name`)
   - `GET /api/v1/recording/download/:id` (`recording.rs` — `id`)
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
   Pre-fix, unauthenticated callers could read `../../etc/passwd`-style paths, write arbitrary JSONL files, load attacker-controlled `.rvf` model files, or delete arbitrary files the server process could touch. 9 unit tests in `path_safety::tests` exercise the rejection envelope (empty, too-long, path separators, parent-dir traversal, null byte, whitespace/specials, non-ASCII).
 
 ### Fixed
+- **WebSocket `/ws/sensing` now reports `esp32:offline` when ESP32 hardware goes stale** (closes #618). `broadcast_tick_task` was re-emitting the cached `latest_update` with a frozen `source: "esp32"` field forever after the hardware lost power or network. The REST `/health` endpoint already called `effective_source()` (which returns `"esp32:offline"` after `ESP32_OFFLINE_TIMEOUT` = 5 s with no UDP frames), but the WS broadcast path was the one consumer that didn't. Result: the UI's "LIVE — ESP32 HARDWARE Connected" banner stayed green long after the hardware went away, and `vital_signs`/`features`/`classification` re-broadcasted the last-seen values indefinitely. Fix: clone the cached `latest_update` per tick, overwrite `source` with `s.effective_source()`, then serialize and broadcast. UI can now switch to an offline state on the same 5-second budget the REST surface uses.
 - **Proof replay (`archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py`) is now cross-platform deterministic** (closes #560). Three changes together: (1) `features_to_bytes()` now `np.round(.., HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS=6)`s each feature array before packing as little-endian f64, collapsing ULP-level drift from scipy.fft pocketfft SIMD reordering; (2) the `Verify Pipeline Determinism` workflow pins `OMP_NUM_THREADS=1`, `OPENBLAS_NUM_THREADS=1`, `MKL_NUM_THREADS=1`, `VECLIB_MAXIMUM_THREADS=1`, `NUMEXPR_NUM_THREADS=1` — multi-threaded BLAS reductions were a deeper source of non-determinism than SIMD reordering, and 6-decimal quantization alone wasn't enough across Azure VM microarchitectures; (3) `expected_features.sha256` regenerated under the new conditions. CI now passes the determinism check (same hash across consecutive runs on canonical Linux x86_64 CI runner: `667eb054c44ac510342665bf9c93d608868a8ead948ae8774b2796ebce6f8fe7`). `scripts/probe-fft-platform.py` updated to mirror `HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS=6` for cross-machine spot-checks.
 - **`archive/v1/src/services/pose_service.py:223` calls the right method on `PhaseSanitizer`** (closes #612). The call was `self.phase_sanitizer.sanitize(phase_data)`, but `PhaseSanitizer`'s full-pipeline entry point is named `sanitize_phase()` (`unwrap_phase` + `remove_outliers` + `smooth_phase` chained, see `archive/v1/src/core/phase_sanitizer.py:266`). The shorter `sanitize` name doesn't exist on the class, so any path that reached this branch raised `AttributeError` and crashed the pose service mid-frame.
 - **`adaptive_classifier.rs:94` no longer panics on NaN feature values** (closes #611).

firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/ota_update.c

@@ -38,14 +38,24 @@ static char s_ota_psk[OTA_PSK_MAX_LEN] = {0};
 
 /**
  * ADR-050: Verify the Authorization header contains the correct PSK.
- * Returns true if auth is disabled (no PSK provisioned) or if the
- * Bearer token matches the stored PSK.
+ * Returns true only when a PSK is provisioned AND the Bearer token
+ * matches it. An unprovisioned node refuses all OTA requests
+ * (fail-closed, see RuView#596 audit). The OTA server still starts so
+ * the operator can `provision.py --ota-psk <hex>` over USB-CDC without
+ * a reflash, but the upload endpoint will reject every request until
+ * the PSK is set.
  */
 static bool ota_check_auth(httpd_req_t *req)
 {
     if (s_ota_psk[0] == '\0') {
-        /* No PSK provisioned — auth disabled (permissive for dev). */
-        return true;
+        /* No PSK provisioned — fail closed. Previously this returned
+         * true ("permissive for dev"), which let any host on the WiFi
+         * push attacker-controlled firmware to a freshly-flashed node.
+         * Plain HTTP transport + no Secure Boot V2 + no signed-image
+         * verification meant a single LAN call could brick or back-
+         * door a node. Reject until provisioned. */
+        ESP_LOGW(TAG, "OTA rejected: no PSK in NVS (run provision.py --ota-psk <hex>)");
+        return false;
     }
 
     char auth_header[128] = {0};
@@ -250,11 +260,13 @@ esp_err_t ota_update_init(void)
         if (nvs_get_str(nvs, OTA_NVS_KEY, s_ota_psk, &len) == ESP_OK) {
             ESP_LOGI(TAG, "OTA PSK loaded from NVS (%d chars) — authentication enabled", (int)len - 1);
         } else {
-            ESP_LOGW(TAG, "No OTA PSK in NVS — OTA authentication DISABLED (provision with nvs_set)");
+            ESP_LOGW(TAG, "No OTA PSK in NVS — OTA upload endpoint will REJECT all requests until "
+                          "provisioned (provision.py --ota-psk <hex>). Fail-closed per RuView#596.");
         }
         nvs_close(nvs);
     } else {
-        ESP_LOGW(TAG, "NVS namespace '%s' not found — OTA authentication DISABLED", OTA_NVS_NAMESPACE);
+        ESP_LOGW(TAG, "NVS namespace '%s' not found — OTA upload endpoint will REJECT all "
+                      "requests until provisioned. Fail-closed per RuView#596.", OTA_NVS_NAMESPACE);
     }
 
     return ota_start_server(NULL);

scripts/fix-markers.json

@@ -188,6 +188,21 @@
       "rationale": "Five endpoints used to embed user-controlled identifiers (session_name, model_id, dataset_id, recording id) into format!() paths with no sanitization, allowing classic '../../etc/passwd' reads, writes, and deletes on the server filesystem. The safe_id helper enforces [A-Za-z0-9._-] only (no leading '.', max 64 chars) and must run before any user input reaches a format!() that builds a path. Removing the helper or skipping it at any of these call sites reintroduces the #615 attack surface.",
       "ref": "https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/issues/615"
     },
+    {
+      "id": "RuView#596-ota-fail-closed",
+      "title": "ESP32 OTA upload fails closed when no PSK is provisioned",
+      "files": ["firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/ota_update.c"],
+      "require": [
+        "fail-closed, see RuView#596 audit",
+        "OTA rejected: no PSK in NVS"
+      ],
+      "forbid": [
+        "/auth disabled \\(permissive for dev\\)/",
+        "/No PSK provisioned \\u2014 auth disabled/"
+      ],
+      "rationale": "ota_check_auth previously returned true when s_ota_psk[0] == '\\0', so any host on the WiFi could push attacker-controlled firmware to a freshly-flashed node over plain HTTP on port 8032 — no Secure Boot V2, no signed-image verification, single LAN call could brick or backdoor a node. Flagged in the deep-review of PR #596. Fail-closed means the OTA server still starts (so operators can provision a PSK via USB-CDC without reflashing) but the upload endpoint refuses every request until provision.py --ota-psk <hex> writes the NVS key. Reverting this lets the rogue-LAN attack reopen.",
+      "ref": "https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/pull/596#pullrequestreview"
+    },
     {
       "id": "RuView#560",
       "title": "verify.py quantizes features before SHA-256 for cross-platform hash stability",

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs

@@ -4331,7 +4331,18 @@ async fn broadcast_tick_task(state: SharedState, tick_ms: u64) {
             if s.tx.receiver_count() > 0 {
                 // Re-broadcast the latest sensing_update so pose WS clients
                 // always get data even when ESP32 pauses between frames.
-                if let Ok(json) = serde_json::to_string(update) {
+                //
+                // Issue #618: overwrite `source` with `effective_source()`
+                // before each broadcast so a stale latest_update (frozen
+                // payload from a now-offline ESP32) is emitted with
+                // `source: "esp32:offline"` instead of `source: "esp32"`.
+                // The REST `/health` endpoint already does this; before
+                // this fix the WS path was the only consumer that didn't,
+                // so the UI's "LIVE — ESP32 HARDWARE Connected" banner
+                // stayed green long after the hardware went away.
+                let mut tagged = update.clone();
+                tagged.source = s.effective_source();
+                if let Ok(json) = serde_json::to_string(&tagged) {
                     let _ = s.tx.send(json);
                 }
             }