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Author SHA1 Message Date
github-actions[bot] e4c3521eb3
Merge 8b788e5638 into 69e61e3437 2026-06-03 05:56:01 -04:00
rUv 69e61e3437
docs(changelog): record this cycle's behavior-changing fixes (#932)
Per the CLAUDE.md pre-merge checklist (item 5, "Add entry under
[Unreleased]"), several recently-merged PRs landed without CHANGELOG
entries. Backfilling the user/operator-facing ones — most importantly the
MAT triage safety fix:

- #926 (Security/safety): survivor with a heartbeat never triaged Deceased
- #918: per-node HA devices report each node's own presence/motion
- #919: actionable --model load diagnostic (refs #894)
- #920: --export-rvf no longer silently produces a placeholder model
- #929 (Security): bearer scheme matched case-insensitively (RFC 6750)

CI-internal fixes (#925 rust-cache, #930 SAST) are intentionally omitted —
they don't change product behavior. Docs-only.
2026-06-03 11:47:07 +02:00
rUv d9e87e13b4
fix(ci): SAST actually scans the code + drop deprecated flaky semgrep action (#930)
Two real problems in the Static Application Security Testing job:

1. **It scanned a path that no longer exists.** `bandit -r src/` and
   `semgrep … src/` pointed at the repo-root `src/`, but the Python code
   moved to `archive/v1/src/` (64 .py files) when the runtime was rewritten
   in Rust. So the SAST scan matched nothing — a silent no-op (this is also
   why `bandit-results.sarif` was "Path does not exist" on recent runs).
   Fixed both to `archive/v1/src/`.

2. **Deprecated + redundant + flaky semgrep step.** The
   `returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1` step pulled `returntocorp/semgrep-agent:v1`
   from Docker Hub every run (intermittently timing out → red check, e.g. on
   #929) and is EOL. It was redundant: the pip `semgrep --sarif` step is what
   feeds GitHub Security; the action only pushed to the Semgrep cloud app via
   SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN. Removed it and folded its `p/docker` + `p/kubernetes`
   rulesets into the pip semgrep command, so coverage is preserved with no
   Docker pull.

The job stays `continue-on-error: true` (non-gating). YAML validated.
2026-06-03 11:18:49 +02:00
rUv be48143f77
fix(auth): match the Bearer scheme case-insensitively (RFC 6750) (#929)
`require_bearer` parsed the Authorization header with
`strip_prefix("Bearer ")`, which is case-sensitive. Per RFC 6750 §2.1 /
RFC 7235 §2.1 the auth-scheme is case-insensitive, so a correct token sent
as `Authorization: bearer <token>` (or `BEARER`, or with extra whitespace)
was rejected with a confusing "invalid bearer token" 401 — needless friction
when setting up `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN` (the active #864/#924 theme).

Now the scheme is matched with `eq_ignore_ascii_case` and leading token
whitespace trimmed. The token comparison itself is unchanged — still exact
and constant-time (`ct_eq`) — so this does not weaken auth: a wrong token or
a non-Bearer scheme (`Basic …`) still returns 401.

New test `accepts_case_insensitive_bearer_scheme` covers `bearer`/`BEARER`/
extra-space (accept) and wrong-token/`Basic` (still reject). bearer_auth
suite: 9 passed.
2026-06-03 11:07:34 +02:00
rUv c453268002
fix(mat): never triage a survivor with a heartbeat as Deceased (safety) (#926)
Both triage paths in the Mass Casualty Assessment tool classified a
survivor as Deceased (Black) on "no breathing + no movement" while
completely ignoring the heartbeat signal:

- domain `TriageCalculator::calculate` → `combine_assessments(Absent, None)`
  returned Deceased. That branch is in fact only reachable *because* a
  heartbeat makes `has_vitals()` true (breathing+movement absent alone →
  Unknown) — so every "Deceased" was a live person with a pulse.
- detection `EnsembleClassifier::determine_triage` (the path used by
  `classify()`) returned Deceased on `!has_breathing && !has_movement`,
  also ignoring `reading.heartbeat`.

A survivor with a detectable pulse but no sensed breathing/movement is in
respiratory arrest — the most time-critical *savable* state. Reporting them
Deceased would deprioritize a rescuable person. WiFi-CSI also cannot confirm
death (no airway-repositioning step), so a pulse must override.

Fix: in both paths, if the result would be Deceased but a heartbeat is
present, return Immediate. Total absence of breathing, movement AND heartbeat
is unchanged (domain → Unknown, ensemble → Deceased).

2 safety regression tests added. Full MAT suite: 168 + 6 + 3 passed, 0 failed
(existing test_no_vitals_is_deceased still green — no heartbeat → Deceased).
2026-06-03 09:37:09 +02:00
rUv 6ee21a0941
ci: use Swatinem/rust-cache for the Rust workspace job (reliability) (#925)
The Rust Workspace Tests job manually cached the whole `v2/target` via
actions/cache@v4. For a 38-crate workspace that dir is multi-GB, and several
CI runs this cycle intermittently died at the cache/setup step (after
toolchain install, before "Run Rust tests"), each needing a rerun.

Swatinem/rust-cache@v2 is the de-facto standard Rust CI cache: it caches the
cargo registry/git + a pruned target, evicts stale dependencies, and restores
large workspaces far more reliably and faster than a naive whole-target cache.
`workspaces: v2` points it at the v2/ cargo workspace.

Reliability/speed change — verified by observing subsequent main runs.
2026-06-03 09:12:26 +02:00
rUv 0cfd255730
fix: --export-rvf no longer silently produces a placeholder model (#920)
The --export-rvf handler ran *before* the --train/--pretrain handlers and
unconditionally wrote placeholder sine-wave weights, then returned. So the
documented `--train --dataset … --export-rvf <path>` workflow
(user-guide.md) short-circuited to a PLACEHOLDER model and never trained —
printing "exported successfully" for a non-functional model. Given the
project's anti-"is it fake" stance, silently emitting a fake model is the
wrong default.

Fix:
- Only emit the placeholder container-format demo when --export-rvf is used
  *standalone* (new `export_emits_placeholder_demo` guard). With
  --train/--pretrain, fall through so the real training pipeline runs and
  exports calibrated weights.
- The standalone path now prints a clear WARNING that it writes a
  container-format demo with placeholder weights — not a trained model —
  pointing to --train / a pretrained encoder (#894).
- Docs: flag --export-rvf as a placeholder demo in the flag table, and fix
  the Docker training example to use --save-rvf (consistent with the
  from-source example) instead of the placeholder --export-rvf.

3 unit tests for the guard. Full crate unit suite: 429 + 117 passed, 0 failed.
2026-06-03 08:55:36 +02:00
8 changed files with 201 additions and 33 deletions

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@ -108,16 +108,18 @@ jobs:
- name: Install Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
- name: Cache cargo
uses: actions/cache@v4
# Swatinem/rust-cache replaces a naive `actions/cache` of the whole
# `v2/target`. That manual cache of a 38-crate target dir (multi-GB) was an
# intermittent failure source — several CI runs this cycle died at the
# cache/setup step (after toolchain install, before "Run Rust tests"),
# needing a rerun. rust-cache is purpose-built for Rust: it caches the
# registry + git + a pruned target, evicts stale deps, and restores far more
# reliably (and faster) on large workspaces. `workspaces: v2` points it at
# the v2/ cargo workspace (keys on v2/Cargo.lock, caches v2/target).
- name: Cache cargo (Swatinem/rust-cache)
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
v2/target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('v2/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-
workspaces: v2
- name: Run Rust tests
working-directory: v2

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@ -46,7 +46,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Bandit security scan
run: |
bandit -r src/ -f sarif -o bandit-results.sarif
# The Python codebase lives under archive/v1/src (it moved there when
# the runtime was rewritten in Rust). Scanning `src/` matched nothing,
# so this SAST step was a silent no-op.
bandit -r archive/v1/src/ -f sarif -o bandit-results.sarif
continue-on-error: true
- name: Upload Bandit results to GitHub Security
@ -57,22 +60,20 @@ jobs:
sarif_file: bandit-results.sarif
category: bandit
- name: Run Semgrep security scan
continue-on-error: true
uses: returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1
with:
config: >-
p/security-audit
p/secrets
p/python
p/docker
p/kubernetes
env:
SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN }}
- name: Generate Semgrep SARIF
# Removed the deprecated `returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1` step: it was
# redundant (the pip `semgrep --sarif` below is what feeds GitHub Security;
# the action only pushed to the Semgrep cloud app via SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN) and
# it pulled `returntocorp/semgrep-agent:v1` from Docker Hub on every run,
# which intermittently timed out and turned this check red. The pip semgrep
# (installed above) needs no Docker pull. The action's `p/docker` +
# `p/kubernetes` rulesets are folded into the command below so coverage is
# preserved.
- name: Run Semgrep + generate SARIF
run: |
semgrep --config=p/security-audit --config=p/secrets --config=p/python --sarif --output=semgrep.sarif src/
semgrep \
--config=p/security-audit --config=p/secrets --config=p/python \
--config=p/docker --config=p/kubernetes \
--sarif --output=semgrep.sarif archive/v1/src/
continue-on-error: true
- name: Upload Semgrep results to GitHub Security

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@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
- **MQTT multi-node deployments now create one Home-Assistant device per node — closes #898.** After the #872 MQTT wiring landed, the JSON→`VitalsSnapshot` bridge hard-coded a single `node_id` (the MQTT client id) and the publisher used a single `OwnedDiscoveryBuilder`, so every physical node collapsed into one device (`identifiers:["wifi_densepose_wifi-densepose-1"]`), contradicting the "one device per node" docs. The bridge now emits one snapshot per node in the sensing update's `nodes[]` (each with its own `node_id` + RSSI, falling back to a single aggregate snapshot for wifi/simulate sources), and the publisher derives a per-node builder (`OwnedDiscoveryBuilder::for_node`) that publishes discovery + availability lazily on first sight of each `node_id` and routes state to per-node topics — yielding N distinct HA devices with per-node availability/LWT. Unit-tested (distinct nodes → distinct `wifi_densepose_<node>` identifiers); 71 MQTT tests pass.
- **Person count no longer pinned to 1 — addresses #803.** The aggregate occupancy reported by the sensing server was derived from `smoothed_person_score`, an EMA-smoothed *activity* score (amplitude variance / motion / spectral energy). That score saturates near a single occupant — one moving person maxes it out — so it cannot discriminate occupancy *count* and stayed clamped at 1 across S3/C6 and the Python/Docker/Rust servers. Meanwhile the count-aware per-node estimates the ESP32 paths already compute (firmware `n_persons`, and the DynamicMinCut `corr_persons`) were stashed in `NodeState::prev_person_count` and then **discarded** by the aggregator (same dead-wiring class as #872). The aggregator now takes `max(activity_count, node_max)` via a unit-tested `aggregate_person_count` helper, so a node positively estimating 23 occupants is surfaced instead of overwritten. The fix can only ever *raise* the count when a node reports more people, so the single-occupant case is provably never inflated (regression-guarded by test). **Second half:** the pure-CSI per-node path itself clamped its own estimate — the DynamicMinCut occupancy (`estimate_persons_from_correlation`, 03) was mapped to a score via `corr_persons / 3.0`, putting 2 people at 0.667, *just under* the 0.70 up-threshold of `score_to_person_count`, so the per-node count never climbed past 1 (so `node_max` was also stuck at 1 for CSI-only nodes). Replaced it with a threshold-aligned `corr_persons_to_score` mapping (1→0.40, 2→0.74, 3→0.96) whose steady state round-trips back to the same count through the EMA + hysteresis, while still gating transient noise. A convergence test replays the exact EMA loop to prove min-cut=2 now reports 2 (and documents that the old `/3.0` mapping reported 1). Full multi-person accuracy still depends on the underlying estimator quality; this removes the two server-side clamps that masked it. 586 sensing-server tests pass.
- **MQTT publisher now actually runs (`--mqtt`) — closes #872.** The `--mqtt*` flags were defined only in `cli::Args` (dead code, referenced nowhere) while the binary parses a *separate* `main::Args` with no mqtt fields, and `main.rs` never started the `mqtt::` publisher — so MQTT/Home-Assistant integration was completely unwired (`--mqtt` errored as an unexpected argument, and even with the Docker image's `--features mqtt` build the publisher never ran). Earlier attempts chased a Docker *rebuild*; the real cause was disconnected *code*. Extracted the flags into a shared `cli::MqttArgs` (`#[command(flatten)]` into both structs), spawn the publisher on `--mqtt`, and bridge the JSON sensing broadcast into the typed `VitalsSnapshot` stream with a defensive `serde_json::Value` mapping. Verified end-to-end against `mosquitto`: 20 HA auto-discovery entities + live state (presence/person-count/…). 577 (default) / 580 (`--features mqtt`) tests pass.
- **Mass Casualty triage never reports a survivor with a heartbeat as Deceased (safety) — PR #926.** Both triage paths in `wifi-densepose-mat``TriageCalculator::calculate` (`combine_assessments(Absent, None) ⇒ Deceased`) and the detection path `EnsembleClassifier::determine_triage` (`!has_breathing && !has_movement ⇒ Deceased`) — ignored the `heartbeat` field. A survivor with a detectable **pulse** but no sensed breathing/movement (respiratory arrest — the most time-critical *savable* state, Immediate/Red) was therefore reported **Deceased (Black)** and deprioritized for rescue. The domain path was in fact only reachable *because* a heartbeat made `has_vitals()` true, so every "Deceased" was a live person. Both paths now escalate to **Immediate** when a heartbeat is present; total absence of breathing, movement *and* heartbeat is unchanged (domain → `Unknown`, ensemble → `Deceased`). 2 safety regression tests; full MAT suite (177) green.
- **Per-node Home-Assistant devices now report each node's *own* presence/motion — PR #918.** After the one-device-per-node fan-out landed, the MQTT bridge still applied the *room-level aggregate* `classification` to every node, so in a multi-node deployment a node watching an empty corner inherited another node's "present" (and `motion_level: "absent"` was mis-mapped to full motion). Each node in the broadcast `nodes[]` already carries its own `classification`; the bridge now reads it per node (extracted into a testable `vitals_snapshots_from_sensing_json`), keeping vitals + person count room-level. 4 unit tests.
- **`--model` gives an actionable diagnostic instead of a cryptic magic error — PR #919 (refs #894).** Passing a HuggingFace `ruvnet/wifi-densepose-pretrained` file (`model.safetensors` / `model-q4.bin` / `model.rvf.jsonl`) to `--model` produced `invalid magic at offset 0: … got 0x77455735`, then a silent fall back to heuristics. The load-failure path now detects the format (safetensors / quantized blob / JSONL manifest) and explains that those files are a different format **and** encoder architecture than the RVF binary container the progressive loader expects, pointing to #894. Pure `diagnose_model_load_error` + 4 tests.
- **`--export-rvf` no longer silently produces a placeholder model — PR #920.** The `--export-rvf` handler ran *before* `--train`/`--pretrain` and unconditionally wrote placeholder sine-wave weights, so the documented `--train … --export-rvf <path>` workflow short-circuited to a fake model and never trained (while printing "exported successfully"). It now emits the placeholder **container-format demo** only standalone (with a clear warning), and falls through to real training when `--train`/`--pretrain` is set; docs point to `--save-rvf` for the real model. 3 guard tests.
### Added
- **WiFi-CSI pose: efficiency frontier + per-room calibration service** (ADR-150 §3.23.6). Two beyond-SOTA results on the MM-Fi benchmark, plus the deployment mechanism that resolves real-world generalization:
@ -33,6 +37,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
### Security
- **ESP32 OTA upload now fails closed when no PSK is provisioned** (#596 audit finding — critical, **breaking change for unprovisioned nodes**). `ota_check_auth()` previously returned `true` when `s_ota_psk[0] == '\0'`, so a freshly-flashed node would accept attacker-controlled firmware over plain HTTP on port 8032 from any host on the WiFi. No Secure Boot V2, no signed-image verification — a single LAN call could brick or backdoor a node. The fix rejects every OTA upload until a PSK is written to NVS (the OTA HTTP server still starts so operators can run `provision.py --ota-psk <hex>` over USB-CDC without reflashing). **Operators affected**: any deployment that relied on the unauthenticated OTA endpoint working out of the box now needs to provision a PSK before subsequent OTA pushes will succeed. Boot-time `ESP_LOGW` makes the new posture visible.
- **Bearer-token auth accepts the scheme case-insensitively (RFC 6750) — PR #929.** `require_bearer` parsed the `Authorization` header with a case-sensitive `strip_prefix("Bearer ")`, so a *correct* `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN` sent as `Authorization: bearer <token>` (or `BEARER`, or with extra whitespace) was rejected with a confusing 401 — needless friction when enabling auth. The scheme is now matched with `eq_ignore_ascii_case` (per RFC 6750 §2.1 / RFC 7235 §2.1); the token compare is unchanged — still exact and constant-time (`ct_eq`) — so a wrong token or a non-Bearer scheme (`Basic …`) still returns 401. Audited the surrounding code while here: `ct_eq` correctly rejects length mismatch (no prefix-auth bypass) and the middleware fails closed. New `accepts_case_insensitive_bearer_scheme` test.
- **Path-traversal vulnerabilities patched in five sensing-server endpoints** (closes #615 — critical). New `wifi_densepose_sensing_server::path_safety::safe_id()` enforces `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` only (no leading `.`, max 64 chars) before any user-controlled identifier reaches a `format!()` building a filesystem path. Applied at:
- `POST /api/v1/recording/start` (`recording.rs` — `session_name`)
- `GET /api/v1/recording/download/:id` (`recording.rs` — `id`)

View File

@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ The Rust sensing server binary accepts the following flags:
| `--dataset` | (none) | Path to dataset directory (MM-Fi or Wi-Pose) |
| `--dataset-type` | `mmfi` | Dataset format: `mmfi` or `wipose` |
| `--epochs` | `100` | Training epochs |
| `--export-rvf` | (none) | Export RVF model container and exit |
| `--export-rvf` | (none) | Export a **placeholder** RVF container-format demo and exit — **not a trained model**. For a real model use `--train` (+ `--save-rvf`) or download a pretrained encoder. |
| `--save-rvf` | (none) | Save model state to RVF on shutdown |
| `--model` | (none) | Load a trained `.rvf` model for inference |
| `--load-rvf` | (none) | Load model config from RVF container |
@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ docker run --rm \
-v $(pwd)/output:/output \
--entrypoint /app/sensing-server \
ruvnet/wifi-densepose:latest \
--train --dataset /data --epochs 100 --export-rvf /output/model.rvf
--train --dataset /data --epochs 100 --save-rvf /output/model.rvf
```
The pipeline runs 10 phases:

View File

@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ impl EnsembleClassifier {
let has_movement = reading.movement.movement_type != MovementType::None;
if !has_breathing && !has_movement {
// SAFETY: a detectable heartbeat means the survivor is ALIVE. No
// sensed breathing/movement *with* a pulse is respiratory arrest —
// the most time-critical savable state (Immediate), never Deceased.
// Only the total absence of breathing, movement AND heartbeat is
// reported Deceased.
if reading.heartbeat.is_some() {
return TriageStatus::Immediate;
}
return TriageStatus::Deceased;
}
@ -295,6 +303,27 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(result.recommended_triage, TriageStatus::Deceased);
}
/// SAFETY regression: heartbeat present but no sensed breathing/movement is
/// respiratory arrest — Immediate, never Deceased. Only the *total* absence
/// of breathing, movement AND heartbeat (the test above) is Deceased.
#[test]
fn test_heartbeat_with_no_breathing_or_movement_is_immediate() {
// breathing: None, heartbeat: Some(72 bpm), movement: None
let reading = make_reading(None, Some(72.0), MovementType::None);
let classifier = EnsembleClassifier::new(EnsembleConfig {
min_ensemble_confidence: 0.0,
..EnsembleConfig::default()
});
let result = classifier.classify(&reading);
assert_eq!(
result.recommended_triage,
TriageStatus::Immediate,
"a survivor with a pulse must never be triaged Deceased"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_ensemble_confidence_weighting() {
let classifier = EnsembleClassifier::new(EnsembleConfig {

View File

@ -104,7 +104,20 @@ impl TriageCalculator {
let movement_status = Self::assess_movement(vitals);
// Step 4: Combine assessments
Self::combine_assessments(breathing_status, movement_status)
let status = Self::combine_assessments(breathing_status, movement_status);
// Step 5: SAFETY OVERRIDE — a detectable heartbeat means the survivor is
// ALIVE. `combine_assessments` only sees breathing + movement, so a
// person with a pulse but no *sensed* breathing/movement (respiratory
// arrest, or breathing too shallow for CSI to pick up) would otherwise
// be reported Deceased and deprioritized for rescue. No breathing + a
// pulse is the most time-critical *savable* state, so escalate to
// Immediate rather than ever calling a survivor with a heartbeat dead.
if status == TriageStatus::Deceased && vitals.heartbeat.is_some() {
return TriageStatus::Immediate;
}
status
}
/// Assess breathing status
@ -217,7 +230,9 @@ enum MovementAssessment {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::domain::{BreathingPattern, ConfidenceScore, MovementProfile};
use crate::domain::{
BreathingPattern, ConfidenceScore, HeartbeatSignature, MovementProfile, SignalStrength,
};
use chrono::Utc;
fn create_vitals(
@ -233,6 +248,29 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// SAFETY regression: a survivor with a detectable heartbeat but no sensed
/// breathing or movement is in respiratory arrest — Immediate (Red), and
/// must NEVER be reported Deceased. (Before the fix, `combine_assessments`
/// ignored heartbeat and returned Deceased; that path was in fact only
/// reachable *because* a heartbeat made `has_vitals()` true.)
#[test]
fn heartbeat_with_no_breathing_or_movement_is_immediate_not_deceased() {
let vitals = VitalSignsReading {
breathing: None,
heartbeat: Some(HeartbeatSignature {
rate_bpm: 72.0,
variability: 0.1,
strength: SignalStrength::Moderate,
}),
movement: MovementProfile::default(),
timestamp: Utc::now(),
confidence: ConfidenceScore::new(0.8),
};
let status = TriageCalculator::calculate(&vitals);
assert_eq!(status, TriageStatus::Immediate, "pulse present ⇒ alive");
assert_ne!(status, TriageStatus::Deceased);
}
#[test]
fn test_no_vitals_is_unknown() {
let vitals = create_vitals(None, MovementProfile::default());

View File

@ -100,7 +100,17 @@ pub async fn require_bearer(
.headers()
.get(AUTHORIZATION)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "));
// RFC 6750 §2.1 / RFC 7235 §2.1: the auth-scheme ("Bearer") is
// case-insensitive. Match it as such (and tolerate extra leading
// whitespace before the token) so a correct token isn't rejected
// just because a client sent `bearer`/`BEARER`. The token compare
// below stays exact + constant-time.
.and_then(|s| {
let (scheme, token) = s.split_once(' ')?;
scheme
.eq_ignore_ascii_case("Bearer")
.then(|| token.trim_start())
});
let ok = supplied
.map(|s| ct_eq(s.as_bytes(), expected.as_bytes()))
.unwrap_or(false);
@ -185,6 +195,31 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn accepts_case_insensitive_bearer_scheme() {
// RFC 6750 §2.1 / RFC 7235 §2.1: the auth-scheme is case-insensitive.
// A correct token must authenticate regardless of scheme casing or
// extra whitespace; a wrong token must still be rejected.
async fn req_status(auth_value: &str) -> StatusCode {
let r = wrap(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));
let mut req = Request::builder()
.method("GET")
.uri("/api/v1/info")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap();
req.headers_mut()
.insert(AUTHORIZATION, auth_value.parse().unwrap());
r.oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
}
assert_eq!(req_status("Bearer s3cr3t").await, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(req_status("bearer s3cr3t").await, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(req_status("BEARER s3cr3t").await, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(req_status("Bearer s3cr3t").await, StatusCode::OK); // extra space
// Scheme leniency must NOT weaken the token check.
assert_eq!(req_status("bearer nope").await, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
assert_eq!(req_status("Basic s3cr3t").await, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn enabled_blocks_api_with_wrong_bearer() {
let r = wrap(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));

View File

@ -5619,6 +5619,16 @@ fn diagnose_model_load_error(path: &std::path::Path, data: &[u8], err: &str) ->
)
}
/// Whether `--export-rvf` should emit the placeholder container-format demo.
///
/// It must only do so **standalone**. Combined with `--train`/`--pretrain` the
/// real model is produced by the training pipeline, so short-circuiting here
/// would silently skip training and write placeholder weights — the #894 bug
/// where the documented `--train … --export-rvf` workflow produced a fake model.
fn export_emits_placeholder_demo(export_set: bool, train: bool, pretrain: bool) -> bool {
export_set && !train && !pretrain
}
// ── Main ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// If `--ui-path` points nowhere (wrong cwd), try common repo layouts relative to cwd.
@ -5662,9 +5672,24 @@ async fn main() {
return;
}
// Handle --export-rvf mode: build an RVF container package and exit
if let Some(ref rvf_path) = args.export_rvf {
eprintln!("Exporting RVF container package...");
// Handle --export-rvf: writes a CONTAINER-FORMAT DEMO with placeholder
// weights — it is NOT a trained model. Only short-circuit when standalone:
// combined with --train/--pretrain the real model is exported by the
// training pipeline, and short-circuiting here would silently skip training
// and write placeholder weights (#894 — the documented `--train …
// --export-rvf` workflow produced a placeholder and never trained).
if export_emits_placeholder_demo(args.export_rvf.is_some(), args.train, args.pretrain) {
let rvf_path = args
.export_rvf
.as_ref()
.expect("export_emits_placeholder_demo implies export_rvf is set");
eprintln!(
"WARNING: --export-rvf writes a CONTAINER-FORMAT DEMO with placeholder \
weights it is NOT a trained model. Train one with \
`--train --dataset <DIR>` (which exports a calibrated .rvf to the \
models/ directory), or download a pretrained encoder. See issue #894."
);
eprintln!("Exporting RVF container package (placeholder weights)...");
use rvf_pipeline::RvfModelBuilder;
let mut builder = RvfModelBuilder::new("wifi-densepose", "1.0.0");
@ -5713,6 +5738,13 @@ async fn main() {
}
}
return;
} else if args.export_rvf.is_some() {
// --export-rvf alongside --train/--pretrain: don't emit a placeholder.
// Fall through so training runs; it exports the real calibrated model.
eprintln!(
"Note: --export-rvf is ignored in training mode — the trained model \
is exported by the training pipeline to the models/ directory."
);
}
// Handle --pretrain mode: self-supervised contrastive pretraining (ADR-024)
@ -7310,3 +7342,29 @@ mod model_load_diagnostic_tests {
assert!(msg.contains("wifi-densepose-train"), "{msg}");
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod export_rvf_mode_tests {
use super::export_emits_placeholder_demo;
#[test]
fn standalone_export_emits_placeholder() {
// --export-rvf alone → the container-format demo (placeholder weights).
assert!(export_emits_placeholder_demo(true, false, false));
}
#[test]
fn export_with_train_does_not_short_circuit() {
// #894: `--train --export-rvf` must NOT emit a placeholder + skip
// training — it must fall through to the real training pipeline.
assert!(!export_emits_placeholder_demo(true, true, false));
assert!(!export_emits_placeholder_demo(true, false, true));
assert!(!export_emits_placeholder_demo(true, true, true));
}
#[test]
fn no_export_flag_never_emits() {
assert!(!export_emits_placeholder_demo(false, false, false));
assert!(!export_emits_placeholder_demo(false, true, false));
}
}