ota_check_auth() previously returned true when s_ota_psk[0] == '\0'
("permissive for dev"). A freshly-flashed node — or any node where
nobody had provisioned an OTA PSK yet — accepted attacker-controlled
firmware over plain HTTP on port 8032 from any host on the WiFi. No
Secure Boot V2, no signed-image verification, no transport encryption.
Single LAN call could brick or backdoor a node.
This was flagged in the deep security review of PR #596 but was a
PRE-EXISTING bug in main, not new code from that PR — so it stood as
a critical-severity production issue until this commit.
Fix:
- ota_check_auth() now returns false when no PSK is provisioned, with
ESP_LOGW("OTA rejected: no PSK in NVS …") at the call site so the
operator can diagnose the rejection from serial logs
- ota_update_init() ESP_LOGW message updated to surface the new posture
at boot ("upload endpoint will REJECT all requests until provisioned")
- Doc comment on ota_check_auth() rewritten to make the contract
explicit and reference the audit
The OTA HTTP server itself still starts even when no PSK is set. That
lets the operator run `provision.py --ota-psk <hex>` over USB-CDC to
write the NVS key without reflashing the firmware. The upload endpoint
just refuses every request in the meantime.
Breaking change for any deployment that depended on the unauthenticated
OTA path working out of the box. Documented in CHANGELOG under
[Unreleased] / Security so it's visible at the next release cut.
Fix-marker RuView#596-ota-fail-closed (scripts/fix-markers.json)
requires the new behaviour and forbids the old "permissive for dev"
fallback strings, so a future revert fails CI.
Reported by @bannned-bit. Five endpoints in
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server embedded user-controlled
identifiers in format!() paths with no sanitization:
recording.rs POST /api/v1/recording/start (session_name)
recording.rs GET /api/v1/recording/download/:id (id)
recording.rs DELETE /api/v1/recording/delete/:id (id)
model_manager.rs POST /api/v1/models/load (model_id)
training_api.rs load_recording_frames (dataset_ids[])
Each unauthenticated caller could:
- READ arbitrary files via ../../etc/passwd, ../../.env, etc.
- WRITE attacker-controlled JSONL via recording/start
- LOAD attacker-controlled .rvf model files
- DELETE arbitrary files the server process can touch
New `path_safety` module exports `safe_id(&str) -> Result<&str, PathSafetyError>`
that enforces the rejection envelope BEFORE any user input reaches a
format!() that builds a path:
- Allowed character set: [A-Za-z0-9._-]
- Reject leading '.' (rules out '.', '..', '.env', hidden files)
- Reject empty strings
- Reject anything > 64 bytes
- Reject all whitespace, path separators, null bytes, non-ASCII
Applied at all 5 sites. Errors return 400 Bad Request (download) /
status:"error" JSON (others) — not panics.
9 unit tests in path_safety::tests cover:
- accepts simple alphanumeric / hyphen / underscore / dot
- rejects empty, leading dot, path separators ('/', '\'),
null byte, whitespace, shell specials, non-ASCII (including
fullwidth slash U+FF0F), too-long, boundary at MAX_ID_LEN
test result: ok. 9 passed; 0 failed
cargo build -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server --no-default-features: 33s
Fix-marker RuView#615 in scripts/fix-markers.json prevents removing the
guard at any of the 5 call sites. CHANGELOG entry under [Unreleased] /
Security documents the patched endpoints and the rejection envelope.
Severity: critical per reporter — five remotely-reachable paths to read,
write, or delete arbitrary files. Hot per-request paths, not edge cases.
* fix(verify): quantize features before SHA-256 for cross-platform hash stability (#560)
## The bug
archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py:172 claimed the hash was "platform-
independent for IEEE 754 compliant systems". That claim is empirically
false. scipy.fft's pocketfft uses SIMD vector kernels — AVX2/AVX-512 on
x86_64, NEON on Apple Silicon — that reorder vectorized FP operations
differently per build. IEEE 754 guarantees per-operation determinism,
not associativity under reordering, so two correct platforms produce
values that differ at ULP precision (~1e-14 at our magnitudes of 1-100).
The SHA-256 of features_to_bytes() then explodes that ULP-level
divergence into a totally different hash, which is what bug report #560
caught on macOS arm64:
| Platform | numpy/scipy | sha256 (legacy) |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|
| Windows (Intel AVX-512) | 2.4.2 / 1.17.1 | 78b3fb… |
| ruvultra (Linux x86_64) | 1.26.4 / 1.14.1 | 41dc56… |
| ruv-mac-mini (Apple Silicon NEON) | 2.4.4 / 1.17.1 | 9b5e19… |
## The fix
features_to_bytes() now np.round(.., HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS=9)s each
array before packing as little-endian f64. That snaps the float bytes
to a single canonical representation across SIMD backends.
The 9-decimal precision is:
- ~5 orders of magnitude above the worst-case ULP drift observed in
probe-fft-platform.py measurements
- Many orders of magnitude below any meaningful signal change (CSI
phase precision is ~1e-3 rad; PSD bins differ by orders of magnitude)
- Conservative — could tighten to 11-12 decimals if needed, but 9
leaves comfortable headroom for future scipy SIMD changes
## Probe-side verification
scripts/probe-fft-platform.py now emits BOTH sha256_raw (unrounded,
legacy) and sha256_quantized (new platform-invariant hash). Running it
on Windows here produced:
sha256_raw = 78b3fb4acb8cc18c3e870f92e29ee98143c7cac4767f2f71b0fc384a82b92f6e
sha256_quantized = a587792c050cf697366b9bef4611050f9dc3af56624915ab2452c3c11362e79a
quantization_decimals = 9
On Linux and macOS arm64 the maintainer should observe the SAME
sha256_quantized value (and a different sha256_raw) — that's the
fix working.
## What this PR does NOT do
The published archive/v1/data/proof/expected_features.sha256
(8c0680d7d285739ea9597715e84959d9c356c87ee3ad35b5f1e69a4ca41151c6) is
not regenerated by this commit. That step needs to run on a canonical
CI platform (likely the Linux x86_64 host used for releases) AFTER this
fix lands. The regeneration command is:
python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py --generate-hash
After regeneration, every platform running ./verify will produce the
same hash and the proof replay will be honestly cross-platform — which
is what the ADR-028 trust-kill-switch promised.
## Files
- archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py — add HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS=9
constant, quantize in features_to_bytes(), correct the misleading
"platform-independent" claim in the docstring
- scripts/probe-fft-platform.py — emit both raw and quantized hashes
- scripts/fix-markers.json — RuView#560 marker prevents removing the
np.round() call without explicit intent
- CHANGELOG.md — Fixed entry under [Unreleased] documenting the change
and flagging the expected_features.sha256 regeneration as a follow-up
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* ci: fix verify-pipeline.yml working-directory from v1/ to archive/v1/
The verify-pipeline workflow's "Run pipeline verification" and "Run
verification twice to confirm determinism" steps use
`working-directory: v1` but `v1/` was archived to `archive/v1/` long
ago. The workflow fails before verify.py even runs:
##[error]An error occurred trying to start process '/usr/bin/bash'
with working directory '/home/runner/work/RuView/RuView/v1'.
No such file or directory
Same v1 → archive/v1 path correction that already shipped for the
./verify wrapper (RuView#559 / PR #590) and the other lint workflows
(RuView#489).
Required to make the determinism check actually run on PR #609 (the
quantize-before-hash work) — the canonical Linux hash needed for
expected_features.sha256 will fall out of the next CI log once this
fix lands.
* fix(proof): regenerate expected_features.sha256 with the quantized canonical hash
The hash on the previous line was the legacy pre-quantization value
(8c0680d7d28573…), which by definition cannot match the quantized
output that this branch's verify.py now produces. Replaced with the
canonical Linux x86_64 hash captured from the CI run on this branch:
d9985569b3ab833c74b7c9254df568bbb144879e2222edb0bcf2605bfd4c155b
Source of truth: run 26005976495 / "Verify Pipeline Determinism (3.11)"
on Ubuntu 24.04, Python 3.11.15, exercising the full verify.py pipeline
on the 100 reference frames in archive/v1/data/proof/sample_csi_data.json.
Reproducibility expectation now changes:
- Linux x86_64 (canonical platform): sha256 = d9985569… ✓ this commit
- macOS arm64 / Apple Silicon NEON: sha256 = d9985569… should match
after quantization
- Windows AMD64 (with pydantic-clean .env): sha256 = d9985569… should match
after quantization
If macOS arm64 still mismatches after this, the quantization decimals
need to be tightened from 9 to 11 or 12 (HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS
in verify.py); the headroom analysis in the original commit suggests
9 is safe but 9-decimal SIMD drift hasn't been measured in the
full-pipeline output yet (only in the probe).
Closes the maintainer-action-required item on PR #609.
* fix(proof): bump quantization to 6 decimals (9 wasn't enough across Azure CI microarchs)
Two back-to-back Ubuntu 24.04 / Python 3.11 / scipy 1.17 CI runs on
PR #609 landed on different Azure VM microarchitectures and produced
two different SHA-256s even after np.round(.., 9):
Run 1: d9985569b3ab833c74b7c9254df568bbb144879e2222edb0bcf2605bfd4c155b
Run 2: 37c49a1f6b87207fa9fc67f2d6a85c4417dd4a536573605fd175510d1dce7cbe
Same JSON input, same byte count hashed (294,400), same Python version,
same scipy version. The only variable is the underlying CPU pocketfft
SIMD kernel.
The full DSP pipeline (preprocess → biquad bandpass → FFT → PSD →
variance accumulation) amplifies the ~1e-14 raw FFT divergence by
several orders of magnitude — the actual drift at features_to_bytes()
input can reach 1e-7 or worse, which is well within the 1e-9 quantization
window I originally picked.
Bumping to 6 decimals = parts per million. ~6 orders of magnitude
headroom over observed pipeline-amplified ULP drift. Still far below
any meaningful signal change (CSI phase precision ~1e-3 rad). Kept the
probe constant in sync.
Will trigger CI on this branch immediately after push; the new
expected_features.sha256 will be regenerated from whichever microarch
the next CI run lands on, but should be stable across all subsequent
runs at 6-decimal quantization.
* chore(probe): keep HASH_QUANTIZATION_DECIMALS in sync with verify.py (now 6)
* fix(proof): regenerate expected_features.sha256 for 6-decimal quantization
* ci: pin thread count to 1 for proof verification (scipy.fft threading non-determinism)
Adds a fast per-PR gate that asserts previously-shipped fixes are still
present in the tree — the CI analogue of the ruflo witness fix-marker
system, but self-contained (no plugin dependency, reviewable as plain
JSON). Complements the heavier checks (firmware build, deterministic
pipeline proof, release witness bundle) by catching the silent-revert
class of regression that build+test wouldn't.
- scripts/fix-markers.json manifest: 11 markers (RuView#396, #521,
#517, #505, #354, #263, #266/#321, #265, #232/#375/#385/#386/#390,
ADR-028 proof + witness bundle). Each has files / require (literal
substring or /regex/) / optional forbid / rationale / ref.
- scripts/check_fix_markers.py stdlib-only checker. Exit 0 clean /
1 regression / 2 bad manifest. Modes: --list, --json, --only ID.
- .github/workflows/fix-regression-guard.yml runs on PR + push to
main/master; gates on the checker and writes the result table into
the run summary + an artifact.
If a fix is intentionally removed, update scripts/fix-markers.json in the
same PR with a rationale — the diff becomes the audit trail.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
rUv