Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
rUv a369fbe66e
fix(bfld security): close HIGH privacy-bypass in process_to_frame (identity surface leaked despite restrictive class) + JSON-injection (#1075)
* fix(bfld): route process_to_frame payload through PrivacyGate (ADR-141 privacy bypass)

BfldPipeline::process_to_frame stamped the frame header with the active
privacy class but serialized the caller-supplied BfldPayload UNCHANGED via
BfldFrame::from_payload. This let a frame labeled Anonymous(2) or
Restricted(3) carry the full identity-leaky compressed_angle_matrix
(+ amplitude/phase proxies, csi_delta) that PrivacyGate::demote is documented
and tested (privacy_gate_demote.rs) to strip at exactly those classes.

A NetworkSink accepts class >= Derived(1), so such a frame would publish the
beamforming angle matrix — the identity surface — across the node boundary
despite its restrictive class byte. The class byte lied about payload content.

Fix: after building the frame at the active class, apply PrivacyGate::demote to
the same class. demote() strips sections by target-class threshold (independent
of any class transition), so a same-class demote performs no class change but
brings the payload into policy compliance. Research classes (Raw/Derived) keep
the full payload — demote is a no-op there.

Pinned by three fails-on-old tests in pipeline_to_frame.rs:
- process_to_frame_at_anonymous_strips_identity_leaky_sections (FAILED pre-fix)
- process_to_frame_in_privacy_mode_strips_amplitude_and_phase (FAILED pre-fix)
- process_to_frame_at_derived_preserves_full_payload (guards against over-strip)
The pre-existing round-trip test is updated to assert the gated payload.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(bfld): JSON-escape zone_id in MQTT state-topic payload

render_events emitted the zone_activity payload as format!("\"{zone}\"") with no
escaping, while ha_discovery.rs already escapes operator-controlled strings via
push_str_field. A zone name containing a double-quote or backslash therefore
produced malformed / injectable JSON on the state topic that Home Assistant
parses (e.g. zone `a"b` -> payload `"a"b"`).

Fix: add json_string_literal() mirroring ha_discovery's escaping (", \, \n, \r,
\t, control chars) and use it for the zone payload. Value-identical for normal
zone names (living_room etc.).

Pinned by zone_payload_escapes_json_metacharacters (FAILED pre-fix); the
existing zone_payload_is_json_string_with_quotes still passes unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-141): record bfld privacy+security review findings + CHANGELOG

Document the two fixed bugs (process_to_frame privacy-bypass; zone_id JSON
injection) and the dimensions confirmed clean (event-field gating, witness/hash
framing, fail-closed) in ADR-141, plus CHANGELOG [Unreleased] Security/Fixed
entries.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-06-14 16:15:42 -04:00
ruv f674efff9d feat(adr-118/p5.1): MQTT topic router (BfldEvent → Vec<TopicMessage>) — 162/162 GREEN
Iter 21. Lands ADR-122 §2.2 topic shape + class-gated routing as a pure
function. No broker dep yet — that lands in iter 22 with tokio + rumqttc
behind an `mqtt` feature. This iter is the routing policy, separated for
testability.

Added (gated on `feature = "std"`):
- src/mqtt_topics.rs:
  * TopicMessage { topic: String, payload: String }
  * TopicMessage::ruview_topic(node, entity) builds the canonical
    `ruview/<node>/bfld/<entity>/state` shape
  * render_events(&BfldEvent) -> Vec<TopicMessage>:
      class < Anonymous (0/1): returns empty (raw/derived are local only)
      class >= Anonymous (2/3): emits presence + motion + person_count +
        confidence, plus zone_activity if zone_id set
      class == Anonymous (2) ONLY: also emits identity_risk
      class == Restricted (3): identity_risk is suppressed even with score
- pub use render_events, TopicMessage from lib.rs

Payload encoding:
- presence:     "true" | "false"
- motion:       "{:.6}" — fixed-precision decimal in [0.0, 1.0]
- person_count: bare integer string
- confidence:   "{:.6}"
- zone_activity: JSON-string with quotes — "\"living_room\""
- identity_risk: "{:.6}"

tests/mqtt_topic_routing.rs (10 named tests, all green):
  topic_format_is_ruview_node_bfld_entity_state
  anonymous_class_publishes_six_topics_with_zone
    (6 = presence/motion/count/conf/zone/identity_risk)
  anonymous_class_without_zone_omits_zone_activity_topic (5 topics)
  restricted_class_omits_identity_risk_topic (class 3 → 5 topics, no risk)
  raw_and_derived_classes_publish_nothing
    *** structural enforcement of "raw stays local" at the topic layer ***
  presence_payload_is_lowercase_json_bool
  motion_payload_is_fixed_precision_decimal
  person_count_payload_is_bare_integer
  zone_payload_is_json_string_with_quotes
  identity_risk_payload_is_fixed_precision_decimal

ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 topic shape now matches the documented format byte-for-byte.
- ADR-122 AC4 — per-class topic gating: classes 2 / 3 publish disjoint
  sets, with identity_risk uniquely guarded.
- ADR-118 invariant I1 reaching the public surface — Raw frames produce
  zero topic messages, so even a buggy publisher loop cannot leak them.

Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (mqtt_topics cfg-out)
- cargo test                       → 162 passed (152 + 10)

Out of scope (next iter target):
- tokio + rumqttc behind a new `mqtt` feature gate
- BfldPipelineHandle: Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> + a tokio task that pumps
  inbound SensingInputs, runs render_events on each emitted BfldEvent,
  and calls client.publish() for each TopicMessage
- mosquitto integration test pattern (cf. feedback_mqtt_integration_test_patterns
  memory: per-test client_id, pump until SubAck, wait for publisher discovery)

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-05-24 16:47:11 -04:00