The sensing-server binds to 127.0.0.1 by default with no `Host` header
validation on either router. A foreign page can lower its DNS TTL,
re-resolve to 127.0.0.1 after the browser has accepted the origin, and
then read live pose + vital signs from /api/v1/* + /ws/sensing as
same-origin against the attacker's hostname. When `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN` is
unset (the documented LAN-mode default from #443/#547) the attacker
can also drive state-mutating POSTs (recording/start, models/load,
adaptive/train, calibration/start, sona/activate).
Defense: a small `host_validation` axum middleware that pins the `Host`
header to a configurable allowlist. The loopback names (`localhost`,
`127.0.0.1`, `[::1]`, each with or without a port) are always in the
set, so default 127.0.0.1 deployments keep working from the local
browser without any configuration change. Operators who bind to a
routable address extend the set with one or more `--allowed-host`
flags or a comma-separated `SENSING_ALLOWED_HOSTS` env var.
Reverse-proxy deployments that already canonicalise `Host` opt out
with `--disable-host-validation`.
The layer is wired into both the dedicated WebSocket router on
`--ws-port` (8765) and the main HTTP router on `--http-port` (8080),
so /ws/sensing on either listener is covered. Rejection responses are
`421 Misdirected Request` (the correct status for a request that
arrived at a server that does not consider the supplied `Host`
authoritative); missing `Host` is `400 Bad Request`.
CWE-346 (Origin Validation Error), CWE-350 (Reliance on Reverse DNS).
Severity: high.
Tests: 13 new unit tests on the middleware (loopback defaults,
case-insensitivity, IPv6 bracketing, port stripping, env-var/CLI
merge, foreign-host rejection on /health + /ws/*, disabled-allowlist
escape hatch). Full suite: 220/220 pass under
`cargo test -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server --no-default-features`.
Co-authored-by: Aeon <aeon@aaronjmars.com>
Closes#520, #514, #443.
## #520 / #514 — stale Docker image, missing UI assets
`ruvnet/wifi-densepose:latest` was published before `ui/observatory*` and
`ui/pose-fusion*` were added; users see /app/ui missing those files and the
v0.6+ packet format doesn't reach the server. Two fixes:
1. `docker/Dockerfile.rust` now `RUN`s a build-time guard after `COPY ui/`
that fails the build if `index.html` / `observatory.html` / `pose-fusion.html`
/ `viz.html` (or the `observatory/` / `pose-fusion/` / `components/` /
`services/` directories) are missing, plus an exec-bit check on
`/app/sensing-server`. A stale image can never be silently produced again.
2. New `.github/workflows/sensing-server-docker.yml` rebuilds + pushes on
every change to the Dockerfile, the server crate, the signal/vitals/
wifiscan crates, the workspace manifests, the `ui/` tree, or itself —
plus `v*` tags and manual dispatch. Pushes to both `docker.io/ruvnet/
wifi-densepose` AND `ghcr.io/ruvnet/wifi-densepose` with `latest` +
`vX.Y.Z` + `sha-<short>` tags, then post-push smoke-tests the artifact:
/health, /api/v1/info, the observatory + pose-fusion HTML, AND the
bearer-auth path (no token → 401, wrong → 401, correct → 200). Uses the
`DOCKERHUB_USERNAME`/`DOCKERHUB_TOKEN` repo secrets; ghcr.io rides on
the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN.
## #443 — sensing-server REST API auth model
QE security audit raised that 40+ /api/v1/* routes have no auth layer with
a default `0.0.0.0` bind. New `wifi_densepose_sensing_server::bearer_auth`
module + middleware:
- Env-var-gated: `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN` unset/empty ⇒ middleware is a no-op
(current LAN-mode behaviour preserved — **no default change**); set ⇒
every `/api/v1/*` request must carry `Authorization: Bearer <token>`
or the server returns 401.
- Constant-time byte compare via local `ct_eq` (no new dep).
- `/health*`, `/ws/sensing`, and `/ui/*` are intentionally never gated
(orchestrator probes + local browsers).
- Startup logs which mode is active and warns when auth is ON with a
`0.0.0.0` bind.
- 8 unit tests on the middleware via `tower::ServiceExt::oneshot`
(sensing-server lib tests 191 → 199, 0 failures).
Verified locally: `cargo build --workspace --no-default-features` ✓,
`cargo test -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server --no-default-features` ✓.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
The Rust port lived two directories deep (rust-port/wifi-densepose-rs/)
without any sibling under rust-port/ that warranted the extra level.
Move the whole workspace up to v2/ to match v1/ (Python) at the same
depth and shorten every cd / build command across the repo.
git mv preserves history for all tracked files. 60 files updated for
path references (CI workflows, ADRs, docs, scripts, READMEs, internal
.claude-flow state). Two manual fixes for relative-cd paths in
CLAUDE.md and ADR-043 that became wrong after the depth change
(cd ../.. → cd ..).
Validated:
- cargo check --workspace --no-default-features → clean (after target/
nuke; the gitignored target/ was carried by the OS rename and had
hard-coded old paths in build scripts)
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,539 passed, 0 failed,
8 ignored (same totals as pre-rename)
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 → still streaming live CSI (cb #40300, RSSI -64 dBm)
After-merge follow-up: contributors should `rm -rf v2/target` once and
let cargo regenerate from the new path.
@aaronjmars
ruv