fix(security,firmware): secure-by-default Docker auth (#864) + CSI yield recovery (#866)

#864 — Docker no longer exposes the sensing API/stream unauthenticated:
- Add `require_ws_token` middleware gating `/ws/*` (sensing + introspection)
  with the API token via `?token=` (browser) or `Authorization: Bearer`
  (programmatic). Previously /ws/sensing was ungated even with a token set.
- docker-entrypoint.sh now fails closed: auto-generates a strong
  RUVIEW_API_TOKEN when none is supplied and prints it; explicit
  RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 restores the open LAN posture.
- compose/Dockerfile wire the env vars; startup logs + CI smoke test updated
  to assert secure-by-default (401 with no token) and the opt-out path.
- 7 new bearer_auth unit tests (15 total pass).

#866 — CSI callbacks were starving (~3 in 70s, 0pps) under the MGMT-only
promiscuous filter:
- The documented "10 Hz probe injection" never existed — implement it for
  real (csi_inject_probe_request + 10 Hz timer). Validated on ESP32-C6 (COM9):
  probe TX succeeds at 10 Hz, but management-frame CSI stays sparse.
- Re-admit DATA frames (MGMT+DATA) now that the original wDev_ProcessFiq
  SPI-cache crash is mitigated by WiFi RX/TX IRAM opts + the existing 50 Hz
  rate gate. Kconfig CSI_PROMISC_MGMT_ONLY falls back if needed.
- Hardware-validated on COM9: yield 0 -> ~9pps avg (peak 19), presence/motion
  sensing restored, 0 panics over 35s.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

.github/workflows/sensing-server-docker.yml

@@ -115,11 +115,12 @@ jobs:
       #      RUN guard catches missing ones at build time, this re-checks the
       #      pushed artifact post-hoc as belt-and-braces).
       #   2. /health is up.
-      #   3. /api/v1/info returns 200 with no auth (LAN-mode default).
+      #   3. Secure-by-default (#864): with NO token env, the entrypoint
-      #   4. With RUVIEW_API_TOKEN set, /api/v1/info returns 401 without a
+      #      generates one, so /api/v1/info returns 401 without a bearer.
-      #      Bearer header, 200 with the correct one (the #443 auth middleware).
+      #   4. Explicit LAN opt-out (RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1) restores the
+      #      old unauthenticated 200 + serves the UI.
       # ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-      - name: Smoke-test image assets + LAN-mode HTTP
+      - name: Smoke-test image assets + secure-by-default HTTP
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           IMAGE="ghcr.io/ruvnet/wifi-densepose:sha-${GITHUB_SHA::7}"
@@ -128,17 +129,33 @@ jobs:
             'ls /app/ui/observatory.html /app/ui/pose-fusion.html /app/ui/index.html /app/ui/viz.html >/dev/null'
           docker run --rm "$IMAGE" sh -c 'ls -d /app/ui/observatory /app/ui/pose-fusion >/dev/null'
 
-          docker run -d --name sm -p 3000:3000 -e CSI_SOURCE=simulated "$IMAGE"
+          # (a) Secure-by-default: no token env ⇒ entrypoint auto-generates one
-          # Wait up to 30 s for /health.
+          #     ⇒ /api/v1/info is gated (401) even though we passed no token.
+          docker run -d --name secdef -p 3000:3000 -e CSI_SOURCE=simulated "$IMAGE"
           for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
             if curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
             sleep 1
           done
-          curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health
+          curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health >/dev/null
+          code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/info)
+          test "$code" = "401" || { echo "secure-by-default broken: expected 401, got $code (#864)"; exit 1; }
+          # The auto-generated token is printed to the logs for operators.
+          docker logs secdef 2>&1 | grep -q "generated one for you" || \
+            { echo "expected generated-token banner in logs (#864)"; exit 1; }
+          docker stop secdef
+
+          # (b) Explicit opt-out for trusted LAN ⇒ unauthenticated 200 + UI.
+          docker run -d --name lan -p 3000:3000 -e CSI_SOURCE=simulated \
+            -e RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 "$IMAGE"
+          for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+            if curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi
+            sleep 1
+          done
+          curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/health >/dev/null
           curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/info >/dev/null
           curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/ui/observatory.html >/dev/null
           curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/ui/pose-fusion.html >/dev/null
-          docker stop sm
+          docker stop lan
 
       - name: Smoke-test the bearer-token auth path
         run: |

docker/Dockerfile.rust

@@ -60,9 +60,12 @@ RUN set -e; \
     test -x /app/homecore-server || { echo "FATAL: /app/homecore-server is not executable"; exit 1; }; \
     echo "image assets OK"
 
-# Optional bearer-token auth on /api/v1/*: leave unset for LAN-mode (default),
+# Bearer-token auth on /api/v1/* and /ws/* (#443, #864). Secure-by-default:
-# set to enforce `Authorization: Bearer <token>` (see bearer_auth module, #443).
+# when left unset the entrypoint GENERATES a random token at startup and prints
-#   docker run -e RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32) ...
+# it to the logs, so the sensing API + WebSocket stream are never anonymous out
+# of the box. Pin a known token, or opt into the open LAN posture explicitly:
+#   docker run -e RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32) ...   # pin a token
+#   docker run -e RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 ...             # trusted LAN only
 ENV RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=
 
 # HTTP API

docker/docker-compose.yml

@@ -23,6 +23,15 @@ services:
       - "5005:5005/udp"
     environment:
       - RUST_LOG=info
+      # Bearer-token auth (#864). Secure-by-default: if RUVIEW_API_TOKEN is
+      # unset the container generates a random token at startup — retrieve it
+      # with `docker compose logs sensing-server`. Pin a known token by exporting
+      # RUVIEW_API_TOKEN in your shell / .env, or run open on a trusted, isolated
+      # LAN with RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1.
+      #   REST: Authorization: Bearer <token>
+      #   WS:   ws://<host>:3001/ws/sensing?token=<token>
+      - RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=${RUVIEW_API_TOKEN:-}
+      - RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=${RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED:-}
       # CSI_SOURCE controls the data source for the sensing server.
       # Options: auto (default) — probe for ESP32 UDP then fall back to simulation
       #          esp32          — receive real CSI frames from an ESP32 on UDP port 5005

docker/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -38,6 +38,52 @@ case "${1:-}" in
         ;;
 esac
 
+# ── #864: secure-by-default API auth for the sensing server ──────────────────
+#
+# The sensing server publishes a live RF-sensing REST API and WebSocket stream.
+# Historically the Docker image shipped with RUVIEW_API_TOKEN empty, which makes
+# bearer auth a no-op and exposes `/api/v1/*` and `/ws/sensing` to anyone who can
+# reach the published ports. We now fail closed: if no token is supplied we
+# generate a strong random one and print it, so the stream is never anonymous by
+# default. Operators on a trusted, isolated LAN can opt back into the open
+# posture explicitly with RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1.
+generate_token() {
+    if command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        openssl rand -hex 32
+    elif [ -r /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid ]; then
+        # Two UUIDs (dashes stripped) → 64 hex chars of kernel randomness.
+        printf '%s%s' \
+            "$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)" \
+            "$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)" | tr -d '-'
+    else
+        head -c 32 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n'
+    fi
+}
+
+if [ -z "${RUVIEW_API_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
+    case "${RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED:-}" in
+        1|true|TRUE|yes|YES)
+            echo "WARNING: RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED is set — the sensing API and" >&2
+            echo "         /ws/sensing stream will run UNAUTHENTICATED. Only do this on a" >&2
+            echo "         trusted, isolated network (issue #864)." >&2
+            ;;
+        *)
+            RUVIEW_API_TOKEN="$(generate_token)"
+            export RUVIEW_API_TOKEN
+            echo "============================================================" >&2
+            echo " RuView: no RUVIEW_API_TOKEN supplied — generated one for you:" >&2
+            echo "   RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=${RUVIEW_API_TOKEN}" >&2
+            echo "" >&2
+            echo "   REST: Authorization: Bearer <token>" >&2
+            echo "   WS:   ws://<host>:3001/ws/sensing?token=<token>" >&2
+            echo "" >&2
+            echo " Pin your own with -e RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=..., or run open on a" >&2
+            echo " trusted LAN with -e RUVIEW_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 (issue #864)." >&2
+            echo "============================================================" >&2
+            ;;
+    esac
+fi
+
 # If the first argument looks like a flag (starts with -), prepend the
 # server binary so users can just pass flags:
 #   docker run <image> --source esp32 --tick-ms 500

firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/csi_collector.c

@@ -104,6 +104,23 @@ static uint8_t  s_hop_index   = 0;
 /** Handle for the periodic hop timer. NULL when timer is not running. */
 static esp_timer_handle_t s_hop_timer = NULL;
 
+/** Handle for the periodic probe-request injection timer (RuView#866).
+ * NULL when not running. */
+static esp_timer_handle_t s_probe_timer = NULL;
+
+/* Probe-request injection cadence (RuView#866). The MGMT-only promiscuous
+ * filter (RuView#396) only surfaces management frames, so on a network with no
+ * nearby beaconing APs — or one saturated with DATA traffic that the filter
+ * drops — the CSI callback can starve (3 callbacks in 70 s was observed in
+ * #866). Injecting a broadcast probe request elicits probe *responses* (which
+ * ARE management frames) from every AP in range, giving a controlled, traffic-
+ * independent CSI rate without re-enabling the DATA-frame interrupt storm that
+ * MGMT-only exists to avoid. 100 ms ⇒ ~10 Hz, matching the 20 Hz edge sample
+ * rate once ambient beacons are added. Override at build time via Kconfig. */
+#ifndef CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS
+#define CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS 100
+#endif
+
 /**
  * Serialize CSI data into ADR-018 binary frame format.
  *
@@ -464,19 +481,37 @@ void csi_collector_init(void)
     ESP_ERROR_CHECK(esp_wifi_set_promiscuous(true));
     ESP_ERROR_CHECK(esp_wifi_set_promiscuous_rx_cb(wifi_promiscuous_cb));
 
-    /* MGMT-only promiscuous filter + active probe injection (RuView#396).
+    /* Promiscuous CSI filter (RuView#396 / RuView#866).
      *
-     * DATA frames cause 100-500+ WiFi HW interrupts/sec which crashes Core 0
+     * History: DATA frames once crashed Core 0 in wDev_ProcessFiq (SPI-flash
-     * in wDev_ProcessFiq (SPI flash cache race in ESP-IDF WiFi blob).
+     * cache race in the WiFi blob) under a 100-500+ interrupt/sec storm, so the
-     * MGMT-only gives ~10 Hz (beacons). Probe request injection at 10 Hz
+     * filter was pinned to MGMT-only. But MGMT-only starves on real networks:
-     * adds ~10 Hz probe responses from APs → ~20 Hz total, matching the
+     * the associated AP's beacons do not reliably generate CSI on the C6, and
-     * edge processing designed sample rate of 20 Hz. */
+     * broadcast probe injection (below) transmits fine yet elicits almost no
+     * capturable responses — #866 measured ~3 CSI callbacks in 70 s with 0 pps
+     * yield. Two mitigations for the original crash are now in place and active
+     * (confirmed in the boot log): WiFi RX/TX IRAM optimisations keep the ISR
+     * out of cacheable flash, and wifi_csi_callback() applies a 50 Hz early
+     * rate gate (CSI_MIN_PROCESS_INTERVAL_US) that caps ISR work regardless of
+     * arrival rate. With those guards we re-admit DATA frames so ambient/own
+     * traffic produces a dense, traffic-driven CSI stream. Operators who hit
+     * instability can fall back to MGMT-only via Kconfig.
+     *
+     * Probe injection (csi_collector_start_probe_timer) is retained: it keeps a
+     * ~10 Hz floor of management-frame CSI when the link is otherwise idle. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CSI_PROMISC_MGMT_ONLY
+    uint32_t filter_mask = WIFI_PROMIS_FILTER_MASK_MGMT;
+    const char *filter_desc = "MGMT-only (Kconfig override)";
+#else
+    uint32_t filter_mask = WIFI_PROMIS_FILTER_MASK_MGMT | WIFI_PROMIS_FILTER_MASK_DATA;
+    const char *filter_desc = "MGMT+DATA (50 Hz-gated, RuView#866)";
+#endif
     wifi_promiscuous_filter_t filt = {
-        .filter_mask = WIFI_PROMIS_FILTER_MASK_MGMT,
+        .filter_mask = filter_mask,
     };
     ESP_ERROR_CHECK(esp_wifi_set_promiscuous_filter(&filt));
 
-    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Promiscuous mode enabled (MGMT-only, RuView#396)");
+    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Promiscuous mode enabled (%s)", filter_desc);
 
 #if CONFIG_SOC_WIFI_HE_SUPPORT
     /* Wi-Fi 6 targets (e.g. ESP32-C6): wifi_csi_config_t is wifi_csi_acquire_config_t
@@ -526,6 +561,12 @@ void csi_collector_init(void)
 
     ESP_LOGI(TAG, "CSI collection initialized (node_id=%u, channel=%u)",
              (unsigned)s_node_id, (unsigned)csi_channel);
+
+    /* RuView#866: start active probe injection so CSI keeps flowing even when
+     * the MGMT-only filter would otherwise starve under heavy DATA traffic or
+     * a beacon-sparse environment. Safe to call here — WiFi is started and the
+     * CSI rx callback is registered above. */
+    csi_collector_start_probe_timer();
 }
 
 /* Accessor for other modules that need the authoritative runtime node_id. */
@@ -713,3 +754,103 @@ esp_err_t csi_inject_ndp_frame(void)
 
     return err;
 }
+
+/* ---- RuView#866: active probe-request injection for traffic-independent CSI ---- */
+
+esp_err_t csi_inject_probe_request(void)
+{
+    /*
+     * Broadcast 802.11 probe request (wildcard SSID). Every AP in range answers
+     * with a probe response — a *management* frame that passes the MGMT-only
+     * promiscuous filter (RuView#396) and fires the CSI callback. This gives a
+     * controlled CSI rate that does not depend on ambient beacon/data traffic.
+     *
+     * Layout: 24-byte MAC header + tagged params (wildcard SSID + basic rates).
+     *   FC(2) Dur(2) A1/DA(6) A2/SA(6) A3/BSSID(6) SeqCtl(2) | SSID tag | Rates tag
+     */
+    uint8_t frame[] = {
+        0x40, 0x00,                         /* FC: Type=Mgmt(0), Subtype=ProbeReq(4) */
+        0x00, 0x00,                         /* Duration */
+        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* A1 DA: broadcast */
+        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* A2 SA: own MAC (filled below) */
+        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* A3 BSSID: broadcast */
+        0x00, 0x00,                         /* Sequence control (HW overwrites) */
+        0x00, 0x00,                         /* Tag: SSID, len 0 (wildcard) */
+        0x01, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0b, 0x16, /* Tag: Supported Rates 1/2/5.5/11 Mbps */
+    };
+
+    /* The Wi-Fi driver requires A2 (source) to be this interface's own MAC for
+     * a self-originated management frame, otherwise esp_wifi_80211_tx rejects
+     * it with ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG. */
+    uint8_t mac[6];
+    if (esp_wifi_get_mac(WIFI_IF_STA, mac) == ESP_OK) {
+        memcpy(&frame[10], mac, 6);
+    }
+
+    /* en_sys_seq=true: let the MAC assign the sequence number. */
+    esp_err_t err = esp_wifi_80211_tx(WIFI_IF_STA, frame, sizeof(frame), true);
+
+    /* Observability (RuView#866): track TX outcome so the per-second yield can
+     * be correlated with whether injection is actually reaching the air. The
+     * first few results are logged verbatim; thereafter a periodic summary. */
+    static uint32_t s_probe_ok = 0;
+    static uint32_t s_probe_fail = 0;
+    if (err == ESP_OK) {
+        s_probe_ok++;
+        if (s_probe_ok <= 3 || (s_probe_ok % 100) == 0) {
+            ESP_LOGI(TAG, "probe inject ok #%lu (fail=%lu)",
+                     (unsigned long)s_probe_ok, (unsigned long)s_probe_fail);
+        }
+    } else {
+        s_probe_fail++;
+        if (s_probe_fail <= 3 || (s_probe_fail % 50) == 0) {
+            ESP_LOGW(TAG, "probe inject failed: %s (fail #%lu, ok=%lu)",
+                     esp_err_to_name(err), (unsigned long)s_probe_fail,
+                     (unsigned long)s_probe_ok);
+        }
+    }
+    return err;
+}
+
+/** Timer callback: inject one probe request every CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS. */
+static void probe_timer_cb(void *arg)
+{
+    (void)arg;
+    csi_inject_probe_request();
+}
+
+void csi_collector_start_probe_timer(void)
+{
+    if (CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS == 0) {
+        ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Probe injection disabled (interval=0)");
+        return;
+    }
+    if (s_probe_timer != NULL) {
+        ESP_LOGW(TAG, "Probe timer already running");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    esp_timer_create_args_t timer_args = {
+        .callback = probe_timer_cb,
+        .arg      = NULL,
+        .name     = "csi_probe",
+    };
+    esp_err_t err = esp_timer_create(&timer_args, &s_probe_timer);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to create probe timer: %s", esp_err_to_name(err));
+        return;
+    }
+
+    uint64_t period_us = (uint64_t)CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS * 1000;
+    err = esp_timer_start_periodic(s_probe_timer, period_us);
+    if (err != ESP_OK) {
+        ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to start probe timer: %s", esp_err_to_name(err));
+        esp_timer_delete(s_probe_timer);
+        s_probe_timer = NULL;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Probe injection started: %d ms (~%d Hz) to keep CSI alive under MGMT-only filter",
+             CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS,
+             1000 / CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS);
+}

firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/csi_collector.h

@@ -104,6 +104,27 @@ void csi_collector_start_hop_timer(void);
  */
 esp_err_t csi_inject_ndp_frame(void);
 
+/**
+ * Inject a broadcast 802.11 probe request (wildcard SSID) (RuView#866).
+ *
+ * Nearby APs answer with probe responses — management frames that pass the
+ * MGMT-only promiscuous filter and fire the CSI rx callback. This produces a
+ * controlled CSI rate independent of ambient beacon/data traffic, without
+ * re-enabling the DATA-frame interrupt storm that the MGMT-only filter avoids.
+ *
+ * @return ESP_OK on success, or an error code from esp_wifi_80211_tx().
+ */
+esp_err_t csi_inject_probe_request(void);
+
+/**
+ * Start the periodic probe-request injection timer (RuView#866).
+ *
+ * Fires every CONFIG_CSI_PROBE_INJECT_INTERVAL_MS (default 100 ms ⇒ ~10 Hz),
+ * calling csi_inject_probe_request(). Called automatically from
+ * csi_collector_init(); no-op if already running or if the interval is 0.
+ */
+void csi_collector_start_probe_timer(void);
+
 /**
  * Get the recent CSI callback rate (per second).
  *

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/bearer_auth.rs

@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ pub const API_TOKEN_ENV: &str = "RUVIEW_API_TOKEN";
 /// Path prefix the middleware protects when auth is enabled.
 pub const PROTECTED_PREFIX: &str = "/api/v1/";
 
+/// Path prefix for the WebSocket sensing/introspection topics that
+/// [`require_ws_token`] protects when auth is enabled (#864).
+pub const WS_PREFIX: &str = "/ws/";
+
 /// Cheap, cloneable handle to the configured token (or `None`).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
 pub struct AuthState {
@@ -115,6 +119,71 @@ pub async fn require_bearer(
     }
 }
 
+/// Extract a bearer token from a WebSocket-upgrade request. Browsers cannot set
+/// arbitrary headers on a WS handshake, so the token is accepted via the
+/// `?token=<t>` query parameter in addition to the `Authorization: Bearer`
+/// header that programmatic clients (wscat, curl) can send.
+///
+/// No percent-decoding is applied: generated tokens are URL-safe (hex from
+/// `openssl rand` / UUID concatenation). Operators who pin a custom token
+/// should keep it URL-safe.
+fn ws_supplied_token(request: &Request) -> Option<String> {
+    // 1. Authorization: Bearer <token> — for programmatic clients.
+    if let Some(t) = request
+        .headers()
+        .get(AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .and_then(|s| s.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
+    {
+        return Some(t.to_string());
+    }
+    // 2. ?token=<token> query parameter — the only option browsers have on a
+    //    WebSocket handshake.
+    request.uri().query().and_then(token_from_query)
+}
+
+/// Find the `token` value in a `&`-separated `key=value` query string.
+fn token_from_query(query: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    query.split('&').find_map(|pair| {
+        let mut it = pair.splitn(2, '=');
+        match (it.next(), it.next()) {
+            (Some("token"), Some(v)) => Some(v.to_string()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    })
+}
+
+/// Axum middleware: enforces a valid token on `/ws/*` upgrade requests when
+/// [`AuthState::is_enabled`] returns `true` (#864). Mirrors [`require_bearer`]
+/// but reads the token from `?token=` (browser-friendly) or `Authorization`.
+/// When auth is disabled the middleware is a no-op, preserving the LAN-only
+/// default for non-Docker local runs.
+pub async fn require_ws_token(
+    State(auth): State<AuthState>,
+    request: Request,
+    next: Next,
+) -> Response {
+    let Some(expected) = auth.token.clone() else {
+        return next.run(request).await;
+    };
+    if !request.uri().path().starts_with(WS_PREFIX) {
+        return next.run(request).await;
+    }
+    let ok = ws_supplied_token(&request)
+        .map(|s| ct_eq(s.as_bytes(), expected.as_bytes()))
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+    if ok {
+        next.run(request).await
+    } else {
+        (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "missing or invalid token (append ?token=<RUVIEW_API_TOKEN> to the ws URL, \
+             or send Authorization: Bearer <token>)\n",
+        )
+            .into_response()
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -256,5 +325,82 @@ mod tests {
         // These are documented in the issue body and the README; keep them locked.
         assert_eq!(API_TOKEN_ENV, "RUVIEW_API_TOKEN");
         assert_eq!(PROTECTED_PREFIX, "/api/v1/");
+        assert_eq!(WS_PREFIX, "/ws/");
+    }
+
+    // ── #864: WebSocket token enforcement ────────────────────────────────────
+
+    fn ws_router(auth: AuthState) -> Router {
+        Router::new()
+            .route("/ws/sensing", get(|| async { "stream" }))
+            .route("/ws/introspection", get(|| async { "stream" }))
+            .route("/health", get(|| async { "ok" }))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(auth, require_ws_token))
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn token_from_query_parses_first_match() {
+        assert_eq!(token_from_query("token=abc").as_deref(), Some("abc"));
+        assert_eq!(token_from_query("a=1&token=abc&b=2").as_deref(), Some("abc"));
+        assert_eq!(token_from_query("a=1&b=2").as_deref(), None);
+        assert_eq!(token_from_query("").as_deref(), None);
+        // bare key with no value is not a token
+        assert_eq!(token_from_query("token").as_deref(), None);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ws_unprotected_when_token_unset() {
+        let r = ws_router(AuthState::default());
+        assert_eq!(
+            status(r, "GET", "/ws/sensing", None).await,
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ws_blocks_without_token() {
+        let r = ws_router(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            status(r.clone(), "GET", "/ws/sensing", None).await,
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            status(r, "GET", "/ws/introspection", None).await,
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ws_allows_with_query_token() {
+        let r = ws_router(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            status(r, "GET", "/ws/sensing?token=s3cr3t", None).await,
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ws_allows_with_bearer_header() {
+        let r = ws_router(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            status(r, "GET", "/ws/sensing", Some("s3cr3t")).await,
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ws_blocks_with_wrong_query_token() {
+        let r = ws_router(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            status(r, "GET", "/ws/sensing?token=nope", None).await,
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ws_middleware_never_gates_non_ws_paths() {
+        // /health rides on the same router (dedicated WS port) and must stay open.
+        let r = ws_router(AuthState::from_token("s3cr3t"));
+        assert_eq!(status(r, "GET", "/health", None).await, StatusCode::OK);
     }
 }

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs

@@ -6103,7 +6103,10 @@ async fn main() {
     // every `/api/v1/*` request must carry `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
     let bearer_auth_state = wifi_densepose_sensing_server::bearer_auth::AuthState::from_env();
     if bearer_auth_state.is_enabled() {
-        info!("API auth: bearer-token enforcement ON for /api/v1/* (RUVIEW_API_TOKEN set)");
+        info!(
+            "API auth: bearer-token enforcement ON for /api/v1/* and /ws/* (RUVIEW_API_TOKEN set). \
+             WebSocket clients pass it as ?token=<token>."
+        );
         if bind_ip.is_unspecified() {
             warn!(
                 "API auth ON but bind-addr is {} — consider --bind-addr 127.0.0.1 for LAN-only deployments",
@@ -6111,8 +6114,9 @@ async fn main() {
             );
         }
     } else {
-        info!(
+        warn!(
-            "API auth: OFF — /api/v1/* is unauthenticated. Set RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=<token> to enforce bearer auth."
+            "API auth: OFF — /api/v1/* and /ws/* sensing streams are UNAUTHENTICATED. \
+             Set RUVIEW_API_TOKEN=<token> to enforce bearer auth (the Docker image does this by default)."
         );
     }
 
@@ -6145,6 +6149,13 @@ async fn main() {
     let ws_app = Router::new()
         .route("/ws/sensing", get(ws_sensing_handler))
         .route("/health", get(health))
+        // #864: gate the live sensing stream with the API token when set. Reads
+        // `?token=` (browser-friendly) or `Authorization: Bearer`. No-op when
+        // RUVIEW_API_TOKEN is unset (LAN-mode default for local non-Docker runs).
+        .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+            bearer_auth_state.clone(),
+            wifi_densepose_sensing_server::bearer_auth::require_ws_token,
+        ))
         .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
             host_allowlist.clone(),
             wifi_densepose_sensing_server::host_validation::require_allowed_host,
@@ -6257,12 +6268,19 @@ async fn main() {
         ))
         // Opt-in bearer-token auth on `/api/v1/*` (#443). When `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN`
         // is unset/empty the middleware is a no-op — the default stays
-        // LAN-mode-friendly. `/health*`, `/ws/sensing`, and `/ui/*` are never
+        // LAN-mode-friendly. `/health*` and `/ui/*` are never gated
-        // gated (orchestrator probes + local browsers).
+        // (orchestrator probes + local browsers loading the static UI).
         .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
             bearer_auth_state.clone(),
             wifi_densepose_sensing_server::bearer_auth::require_bearer,
         ))
+        // #864: gate the live `/ws/*` sensing + introspection streams with the
+        // same token. Browsers pass it as `?token=`; programmatic clients use
+        // `Authorization: Bearer`. No-op when RUVIEW_API_TOKEN is unset.
+        .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
+            bearer_auth_state.clone(),
+            wifi_densepose_sensing_server::bearer_auth::require_ws_token,
+        ))
         // DNS-rebinding defense: applied last so it runs first on the request
         // path (axum layers run outermost-in). Rejects requests whose `Host`
         // header is not in the allowlist before any handler — including