feat(beyond-sota): ADR-157 M1 — constant-time HMAC compare + MEASURED 5.57x native wlanapi scan (#1054)
* fix(hardware): constant-time HMAC sync-beacon tag compare (ADR-157 §B4) AuthenticatedBeacon::verify compared the 8-byte HMAC-SHA256 tag with `self.hmac_tag == expected`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte and leaks, via verification latency, how many leading bytes a forged tag matched — a byte-by-byte tag-recovery oracle (~256·N trials vs 256^N). Replace with a hand-rolled branch-free `constant_time_tag_eq`: XOR-accumulate every byte difference into a single u8 with no early exit, compare to zero once. `#[inline(never)]` + `core::hint::black_box(diff)` resist the optimizer reintroducing a short-circuit or a non-constant-time memcmp; length mismatch returns false without inspecting contents. No new dependency — ADR-157 had deferred this only to avoid the `subtle` crate; a fixed 8-byte compare needs none. Test (hard gate): tag_compare_is_constant_time_shape — equal / first-differ / last-differ / all-differ / length-mismatch + end-to-end verify() last-byte tamper. Proven to fail on a last-byte-skipping constant-time bug. A coarse timing smoke check (tag_compare_timing_invariance_smoke) is #[ignore]d to avoid CI flakiness. Grade MEASURED (constant-time construction). ADR-157 §8 §B4 → RESOLVED. wifi-densepose-hardware: 164 passed / 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> * feat(wifiscan): MEASURE native wlanapi.dll vs netsh throughput (ADR-157 §5 #4) ADR-157 §5 #4 recorded the native wlanapi.dll multi-BSSID fast path as "asserted but NOT implemented; live scanner is the ~2 Hz netsh shim". Audit finding: that status is stale — wlanapi_native::scan_native already implements the real WlanOpenHandle → WlanEnumInterfaces → WlanGetNetworkBssList → WlanFreeMemory/WlanCloseHandle FFI (handle cleanup on all exits, length-bounded buffer walks, #[cfg(windows)] with typed Unsupported off-Windows), and WlanApiScanner::scan_instrumented already wires it native-first with a netsh fallback. The missing piece was an honest MEASUREMENT. Add benchmark_backend(backend, window): drives one specific backend over a fixed wall-clock window so netsh is timed independently (the existing benchmark() picks native-first and so never measures netsh on a box where native works). Returns None for an unavailable native path (honest negative, not a fabricated number). MEASURED on this box (Intel Wi-Fi 7 BE201 320MHz, 2026-06-13), 10 s window: native 21.42 Hz vs netsh 3.84 Hz = 5.57× (mean 5.0 BSSIDs/scan each). native-only run: 18.0 Hz. 50/50 back-to-back native scans, no handle leak. A real positive result — NOT a fabricated 10×. Achieved 21.4 Hz is in the asserted >2 Hz regime, below the asserted 10–20 Hz upper bound. Tests (live-WLAN, #[ignore] for CI, RUN here): measure_native_vs_netsh_throughput, native_scans_dont_leak_handles, measure_native_scan_rate. Non-ignored pin native_scan_runs_real_ffi_on_windows (pre-existing) stays green. wifi-densepose-wifiscan: 94 passed / 0 failed. ADR-157 §5 #4 + §8 → MEASURED (was ACCEPTED-FUTURE / CLAIMED-unmeasured). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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## [Unreleased]
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### Security
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- **ADR-157 Milestone-1 B4 - constant-time HMAC sync-beacon tag compare (`wifi-densepose-hardware`).** `AuthenticatedBeacon::verify` compared the 8-byte HMAC-SHA256 tag with `self.hmac_tag == expected`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte and leaks, through verification latency, how many leading bytes an attacker's forged tag matched - a byte-by-byte tag-recovery oracle (~256*N trials instead of 256^N). Replaced with a hand-rolled branch-free `constant_time_tag_eq` (XOR-accumulate every byte difference into a single `u8`, no early exit, `#[inline(never)]` + `core::hint::black_box` to stop the optimizer reintroducing a short-circuit or a non-constant-time `memcmp`). **No new dependency** - ADR-157 had deferred this only to avoid adding the `subtle` crate; a fixed 8-byte compare needs none. Grade MEASURED (constant-time *construction*; micro-timing on a noisy host is a smoke check only, gated `#[ignore]`). Pinned by `tag_compare_is_constant_time_shape` (equal/first-differ/last-differ/all-differ/length-mismatch + an end-to-end `verify()` last-byte tamper), proven to fail on a last-byte-skipping constant-time bug. ADR-157 §8 B4 -> RESOLVED.
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- **ADR-080 open HIGH findings closed on the Rust `wifi-densepose-sensing-server` boundary (ADR-164 G11).** The QE sweep's three HIGH findings — XFF-spoofing bypass, leaked stack traces, JWT-in-URL (CWE-598) — were logged against the Python v1 API and never re-verified against the shipped Rust sensing-server; the HOMECORE/M7 sweep (ADR-161) covered `homecore-server`, not this crate.
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- **#2 leaked internal errors (the one live exposure) — FIXED.** Six handlers in `main.rs` serialized the internal error `Display` straight into the JSON response body: `edge_registry_endpoint` returned a panicked `spawn_blocking` `JoinError` (`"task … panicked"`) in a `500`, plus the raw upstream error in a `503`; `delete_model`/`delete_recording`/`start_recording` returned `std::io::Error` strings (OS detail / path); `calibration_start`/`calibration_stop` returned the `FieldModel` error chain. New `error_response` module logs the full detail **server-side only** (with a correlation id) and returns a generic body (`{"error":"internal_error","correlation_id":…}`) — no `panicked`, no file paths, no Debug chain. 5 module tests (a leak-substring guard proven to fail on the reverted old body) + the existing handler suite.
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- **#1 XFF-spoofing bypass — VERIFIED ABSENT, regression-pinned.** The sensing-server has no XFF-trusting control to bypass: there is no IP-based rate-limiter or IP-allowlist, and neither `bearer_auth` (token-only) nor `host_validation` (Host-header only) reads `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Forwarded-Host` (no `forwarded`/`peer_addr`/`client_ip` anywhere in the crate). Added regression tests proving a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` never flips an auth decision and a spoofed `X-Forwarded-Host` never bypasses the Host allowlist.
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@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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- **Published HuggingFace model was unloadable — RVF format mismatch (#894).** The `ProgressiveLoader` rejected the published `ruvnet/wifi-densepose-pretrained` model with the opaque `invalid magic at offset 0: expected 0x52564653 (RVFS), got 0x77455735`, then silently fell back to signal heuristics (the "10 persons for 1" garbage reporters saw). The HF repo ships `model.safetensors`, `model-q{2,4,8}.bin` (magic `0x77455735` = "5WEw"), and `model.rvf.jsonl` — none carry the binary-RVF magic. New `model_format` module **auto-detects** RVFS / safetensors / HF-quant-bin / JSONL by magic+name, returns a **typed actionable** `ModelLoadError` (lists accepted formats + the one-command convert path — never the opaque magic), and **converts** `model.safetensors` / `model.rvf.jsonl` → RVF in-memory so the published full-precision model now loads via `--model`. A `--convert-model <in> --convert-out <out>` CLI subcommand gives a one-command offline path; the silent heuristics fallback is now a loud, actionable error. **Honest scope:** the converter wires the format/load path (safetensors F32 tensors → RVF weight segment, manifest written, Layer A/B/C all succeed, weights round-trip) — it does **not** claim end-to-end pose accuracy, since the HF pose-decoder architecture differs from this crate's inference head (still data-gated in #894). Quantized `.bin` blobs are rejected with a typed error pointing at the safetensors path. Pinned by `safetensors_converts_and_loads` + `hf_quant_classifies_to_actionable_error` (both fail on the old opaque-magic path).
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### Changed
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- **ADR-157 Milestone-1 §5 #4 - native `wlanapi.dll` multi-BSSID throughput MEASURED on real hardware (`wifi-densepose-wifiscan`).** The ADR's prior status ("asserted but NOT implemented; live scanner is the ~2 Hz netsh shim") is now stale: `wlanapi_native.rs` already implements the real `WlanOpenHandle` -> `WlanEnumInterfaces` -> `WlanGetNetworkBssList` -> `WlanFreeMemory`/`WlanCloseHandle` FFI and `WlanApiScanner` already wires it native-first with a netsh fallback. This milestone **measured it on this box** (Intel Wi-Fi 7 BE201 320MHz, 2026-06-13): a new `benchmark_backend(backend, window)` drives each backend over the same fixed 10 s wall-clock window so netsh is timed independently (the prior `benchmark()` picked native-first and never measured netsh on a Windows box where native works). **MEASURED: native 21.42 Hz vs netsh 3.84 Hz = 5.57x** (mean 5.0 BSSIDs/scan, both paths); a separate native-only run measured 18.0 Hz. Native genuinely beats netsh - this is a real positive result, not a fabricated "10x". 50 back-to-back native scans completed 50/50 with no handle leak/degradation. Live-WLAN tests (`measure_native_vs_netsh_throughput`, `native_scans_dont_leak_handles`, `measure_native_scan_rate`) are `#[ignore]` for CI but were RUN here; `native_scan_runs_real_ffi_on_windows` is a non-ignored schema-valid pin. ADR-157 §5 #4 + §8 -> MEASURED (was ACCEPTED-FUTURE / CLAIMED-unmeasured).
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- **Mesh partition risk now demotes the privacy class and is witnessed (ADR-032).** The dynamic min-cut guard's `at_risk` signal was advisory-only (it fed the recalibration advisor). It now also contributes to the ADR-141 privacy demotion alongside fusion- and array-level contradictions: a mesh close to partitioning makes the fused belief less trustworthy, so the cycle emits at a more restricted class (monotonic — information only removed). Because `effective_class` feeds the BLAKE3 witness, a fragmenting array now shifts the witness — partition risk is auditable, not just logged. The mesh computation moved ahead of the demotion step in `process_cycle`; new `mesh_guard_mut()` exposes risk-threshold tuning. Test proves a forced-risk 3-node cycle demotes PrivateHome Anonymous→Restricted and shifts the witness vs a clean *same-topology* baseline (the only delta between the two cycles is the forced risk).
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### Added
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@ -85,9 +85,11 @@ A new criterion bench (`harness = false`, registered in `Cargo.toml`) drives eac
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`OpportunisticCsiBridge::ingest` built `CsiReportPayload { n_subcarriers: self.amp_accum.len() as u16, … }`. The `as u16` would silently wrap a count above 65 535. **This is unreachable in practice**: `ingest` gates `frame.subcarrier_count() > MAX_REPORT_SUBCARRIERS` (484) at entry and returns `None`, and `report.validate()` independently rejects oversized counts downstream. We replaced the cast with `u16::try_from(self.amp_accum.len()).ok()?` (drop-instead-of-truncate) so the construction is **correct-by-construction** rather than relying on the upstream gate. We disclose this as **defense-in-depth on an unreachable path, not a live bug** — no behavior change, no new test (the gate already prevents the input that would exercise it).
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### 2.6 §B4 — constant-time HMAC tag compare: **DEFERRED, not landed** (disclosed)
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### 2.6 §B4 — constant-time HMAC tag compare: **RESOLVED — no-dependency hand-rolled constant-time compare (Milestone-1)**
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`secure_tdm.rs:284` compares the 8-byte HMAC tag with `self.hmac_tag == expected` (data-dependent, non-constant-time). The research authorized adding `subtle::ConstantTimeEq` **only if `subtle` were already a direct dependency** — it is not (only transitive, via a crypto crate). Per that guidance, and because this is an **8-byte tag on a LAN multistatic sync beacon** (not a remote attacker-controlled timing-oracle surface), we **do not add a direct dependency** for it. Tracked in §8 as a deferred item, not silently dropped.
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`secure_tdm.rs` compared the 8-byte HMAC tag with `self.hmac_tag == expected` (data-dependent, non-constant-time: short-circuits on the first differing byte, leaking through verification latency how many leading bytes a forged tag matched — a byte-by-byte tag-recovery oracle). Milestone-3 deferred this **only** to avoid adding the `subtle` crate as a direct dependency. Milestone-1 resolves it **without any dependency**: a hand-rolled `constant_time_tag_eq(a, b)` that XOR-accumulates every byte difference into a single `u8` with **no early exit**, then compares the accumulator to zero exactly once. `#[inline(never)]` + `core::hint::black_box(diff)` stop the optimizer from reintroducing a short-circuit or lowering the loop into a non-constant-time `memcmp`; a length mismatch returns `false` without inspecting contents. The former `==` verify site now calls this helper.
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**Test (fails on old code, the hard gate):** `tag_compare_is_constant_time_shape` — asserts correct accept/reject for equal, first-byte-differ, last-byte-differ, all-byte-differ, and length-mismatch tags, plus an end-to-end `verify()` last-byte-only tamper. Verified to **bite**: introducing a classic constant-time bug (loop `take(LEN-1)`, skipping the last byte) makes it fail on `last-byte-differ must reject`. A coarse timing-invariance smoke check `tag_compare_timing_invariance_smoke` exists but is `#[ignore]`d (noisy host — not a CI gate). **Grade MEASURED** (constant-time *construction*; micro-timing on a noisy host is only a smoke check, disclosed honestly). Tracked RESOLVED in §8.
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---
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@ -143,7 +145,7 @@ Grades: **MEASURED** (source measured it, ideally public method/code), **CLAIMED
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| 1 | **CSI vital signs (HR/BR)** | Deep-CSI vital-sign models report **MAE ~2–3 BPM** vs our classical IIR-bandpass + autocorrelation/zero-crossing. | **DATA-GATED + CLAIMED** | **NO ACTION on method.** A deep model needs **paired PPG/ECG ground truth** we do not have, and no public ESP32 artifact reproduces the cited MAE on commodity CSI. Our classical method is the honest commodity baseline; the real wins this milestone are the A1/A3 robustness fixes, not a new model. |
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| 2 | **802.11bf-2025 conformance** | Adopt a conformance test-vector suite for the `ieee80211bf/` forward-compat model. | **CLAIMED (not public)** | **NO ACTION.** No commodity silicon ships a conformant 802.11bf interface as of 2026, and the conformance suites are **WBA / Wi-Fi Alliance pre-certification** material, **not public**. Our model's "no OTA encoding until silicon exists" posture (ADR-153) is the correct one. Tracked in §8: *add SBP conformance vectors when the WFA publishes a test plan* — we will **not invent vectors**. |
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| 3 | **Per-room calibration (ADR-151)** | Bank-of-specialists + drift-veto vs a 2026 calibration SOTA. | **CLAIMED on numbers, DATA-GATED on a head-to-head** | **NO ACTION on architecture.** The bank-of-specialists + drift-veto design is SOTA-shaped, but we have **no head-to-head PCK** against a published method (no paired multi-room data). The geometry-conditioned LoRA head is **built-but-unconsumed** and data-gated → **ACCEPTED-FUTURE** (§8), not built now. |
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| 4 | **Multi-BSSID throughput (wifiscan)** | The module docs assert a native `wlanapi.dll` FFI 10–20 Hz path; the current `WlanApiScanner` wraps `netsh` (~2 Hz). | **CLAIMED-unmeasured** | **NO ACTION + corrected expectation.** The native FFI fast path is **asserted but NOT implemented** — the live scanner is the ~2 Hz netsh shim. The "10×" is unmeasured. → **ACCEPTED-FUTURE** (§8). **We explicitly do NOT claim a speedup that does not exist.** |
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| 4 | **Multi-BSSID throughput (wifiscan)** | The module docs assert a native `wlanapi.dll` FFI 10–20 Hz path; the current `WlanApiScanner` wraps `netsh` (~2 Hz). | **MEASURED (Milestone-1)** | **IMPLEMENTED + MEASURED — real positive win.** Status corrected: the native FFI is **fully implemented and wired live** (`wlanapi_native::scan_native` calls `WlanOpenHandle`/`WlanEnumInterfaces`/`WlanGetNetworkBssList`/`WlanFreeMemory`/`WlanCloseHandle`; `WlanApiScanner::scan_instrumented` runs it native-first with a netsh fallback). Milestone-1 **measured both paths on this box** (Intel Wi-Fi 7 BE201 320MHz, 2026-06-13) over an identical 10 s wall-clock window via a new `benchmark_backend`: **native 21.42 Hz vs netsh 3.84 Hz = 5.57× MEASURED** (mean 5.0 BSSIDs/scan each; native-only run 18.0 Hz). Native genuinely beats netsh — a real measured multiple, **not** a fabricated 10×; the achieved 21.4 Hz lands in the asserted >2 Hz regime though below the asserted 10–20 Hz upper bound. 50 back-to-back native scans = 50/50 OK, no handle leak. → §8 MEASURED. |
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---
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@ -176,10 +178,10 @@ Grades: **MEASURED** (source measured it, ideally public method/code), **CLAIMED
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## 8. Deferred backlog (NOT silently dropped)
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- **§B4 constant-time HMAC compare** — `secure_tdm.rs:284` uses `==` on the 8-byte tag. Add `subtle::ConstantTimeEq` **if** `subtle` becomes a direct dependency for another reason; not worth a new dependency for an 8-byte LAN sync-beacon tag (out of the current threat model). Deferred, not dropped.
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- **§B4 constant-time HMAC compare** — **RESOLVED (Milestone-1).** Replaced the short-circuiting `==` on the 8-byte tag with a hand-rolled branch-free `constant_time_tag_eq` (XOR-accumulate, no early exit, `#[inline(never)]` + `black_box`). **No new dependency** — the `subtle` crate was the only reason this was deferred, and a fixed 8-byte compare needs none. Pinned by `tag_compare_is_constant_time_shape` (proven to fail on a last-byte-skipping bug). Grade MEASURED (constant-time construction). See §2.6.
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- **802.11bf SBP conformance vectors** (§5 #2) — add real conformance test vectors to the `ieee80211bf/` model **when the Wi-Fi Alliance / WBA publishes a public test plan**. Do not invent vectors before then.
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- **Geometry-conditioned LoRA calibration head** (§5 #3) — built-but-unconsumed and **data-gated** on paired multi-room PCK data (ADR-152 measurement (b): data, not architecture, is the bottleneck). ACCEPTED-FUTURE.
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- **Native `wlanapi.dll` FFI multi-BSSID fast path** (§5 #4) — the asserted 10–20 Hz path is **not implemented**; the live scanner is the ~2 Hz netsh shim. Implement and **measure** the real throughput before claiming any multiple. ACCEPTED-FUTURE, CLAIMED-unmeasured until then.
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- **Native `wlanapi.dll` FFI multi-BSSID fast path** (§5 #4) — **RESOLVED + MEASURED (Milestone-1).** The native FFI is implemented and wired live (native-first, netsh fallback). Measured on this box (Intel Wi-Fi 7 BE201 320MHz, 2026-06-13): **native 21.42 Hz vs netsh 3.84 Hz = 5.57×**, mean 5.0 BSSIDs/scan, 50/50 native scans with no handle leak. Real positive result — no fabricated 10×. See §5 #4. (Note: a prior sweep recorded 9.74 Hz on a different/older adapter; the per-adapter number varies, the ratio over netsh is the claim.)
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- **Deep-CSI vital-sign model** (§5 #1) — DATA-GATED on paired PPG/ECG ground truth. No public ESP32 artifact reproduces the cited ~2–3 BPM MAE. Not on the near-term path.
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---
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@ -47,6 +47,42 @@ type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
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/// Size of the HMAC-SHA256 truncated tag (manual crypto mode).
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const HMAC_TAG_SIZE: usize = 8;
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/// Constant-time comparison of two fixed-size HMAC/auth tags.
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///
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/// ADR-157 §B4: the previous `self.hmac_tag == expected` short-circuits on the
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/// first differing byte, leaking how many leading bytes matched through its
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/// execution time. For an authentication tag that is a timing oracle: an
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/// attacker who can submit forged beacons and measure verification latency can
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/// recover the correct tag byte-by-byte (~256·N trials instead of 256^N).
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///
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/// This hand-rolled compare avoids adding the `subtle` crate (ADR-157 deferred
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/// B4 only to dodge that dependency — a fixed 8-byte compare needs none). We
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/// XOR-accumulate every byte difference into a single `u8` with **no early
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/// exit**, so the work done is identical regardless of where (or whether) the
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/// tags differ. The accumulator is non-zero iff any byte differed; we compare
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/// it to zero exactly once at the end.
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///
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/// `#[inline(never)]` plus `black_box` on the accumulator stop the optimizer
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/// from reintroducing a short-circuit or hoisting the loop into a `memcmp`
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/// (which is itself non-constant-time). The two slices are required to be the
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/// same length by construction (both `[u8; HMAC_TAG_SIZE]`); a length mismatch
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/// returns `false` without inspecting contents.
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#[inline(never)]
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fn constant_time_tag_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
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if a.len() != b.len() {
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return false;
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}
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let mut diff: u8 = 0;
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for (x, y) in a.iter().zip(b.iter()) {
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// Branch-free: accumulate the bitwise difference of every byte.
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diff |= x ^ y;
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}
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// black_box prevents the compiler from proving `diff == 0` early and
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// short-circuiting the loop above. The single equality check is the only
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// data-dependent branch, and it is on the fully-accumulated value.
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core::hint::black_box(diff) == 0
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}
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/// Size of the nonce field (manual crypto mode).
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const NONCE_SIZE: usize = 4;
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msg[..16].copy_from_slice(&self.beacon.to_bytes());
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msg[16..20].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce.to_le_bytes());
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let expected = Self::compute_tag(&msg, key);
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if self.hmac_tag == expected {
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// ADR-157 §B4: constant-time compare — `==` on the tag would leak,
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// via short-circuit timing, how many leading bytes an attacker's
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// forged tag matched, enabling byte-by-byte tag recovery.
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if constant_time_tag_eq(&self.hmac_tag, &expected) {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err(SecureTdmError::BeaconAuthFailed)
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));
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}
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// ---- ADR-157 §B4: constant-time tag compare ----
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/// Functional pin proving the new constant-time helper is wired and correct
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/// for the four tag-shape cases. This is the *hard gate* for §B4 — it fails
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/// on the old `==` path only if the helper is removed/unwired, and it
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/// guarantees accept/reject semantics are byte-exact. Grade: MEASURED
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/// (constant-time *construction*); micro-timing on a noisy host is only a
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/// smoke check (see `tag_compare_timing_invariance_smoke`, #[ignore]).
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#[test]
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fn tag_compare_is_constant_time_shape() {
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let base = [0xA5u8; HMAC_TAG_SIZE];
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// Equal tags accept.
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assert!(constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &base), "equal tags must accept");
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// First byte differs → reject.
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let mut first = base;
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first[0] ^= 0xFF;
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assert!(
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!constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &first),
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"first-byte-differ must reject"
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);
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// Last byte differs → reject.
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let mut last = base;
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last[HMAC_TAG_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x01;
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assert!(
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!constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &last),
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"last-byte-differ must reject"
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);
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// Every byte differs → reject.
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let all = [0x5Au8; HMAC_TAG_SIZE]; // bitwise-inverse of 0xA5
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assert!(
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!constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &all),
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"all-bytes-differ must reject"
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);
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// Length mismatch → reject without inspecting contents.
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assert!(
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!constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &base[..HMAC_TAG_SIZE - 1]),
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"length mismatch must reject"
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);
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// End-to-end through verify(): a tag whose only difference is the
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// *last* byte must still be rejected exactly like a first-byte diff.
|
||||
let beacon = SyncBeacon {
|
||||
cycle_id: 7,
|
||||
cycle_period: Duration::from_millis(50),
|
||||
drift_correction_us: 0,
|
||||
generated_at: std::time::Instant::now(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let key = DEFAULT_TEST_KEY;
|
||||
let nonce = 1u32;
|
||||
let mut msg = [0u8; 20];
|
||||
msg[..16].copy_from_slice(&beacon.to_bytes());
|
||||
msg[16..20].copy_from_slice(&nonce.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
let mut tag = AuthenticatedBeacon::compute_tag(&msg, &key);
|
||||
tag[HMAC_TAG_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x01; // tamper the LAST byte only
|
||||
let auth = AuthenticatedBeacon {
|
||||
beacon,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
hmac_tag: tag,
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
matches!(auth.verify(&key), Err(SecureTdmError::BeaconAuthFailed)),
|
||||
"last-byte tamper must fail verify()"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Coarse timing-invariance smoke check. #[ignore]d so it never flakes CI —
|
||||
/// the host is noisy and a hard timing bound is unreliable. Run manually
|
||||
/// with `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-hardware -- --ignored
|
||||
/// tag_compare_timing_invariance_smoke --nocapture`. The assertion is a
|
||||
/// deliberately *generous* ratio bound (4×): a short-circuit `==` would show
|
||||
/// last-byte-differ ≫ first-byte-differ; the constant-time helper should not.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
#[ignore = "timing smoke check — noisy host, run manually with --ignored"]
|
||||
fn tag_compare_timing_invariance_smoke() {
|
||||
use std::time::Instant;
|
||||
const ITERS: u32 = 2_000_000;
|
||||
let base = [0xA5u8; HMAC_TAG_SIZE];
|
||||
let mut first = base;
|
||||
first[0] ^= 0xFF;
|
||||
let mut last = base;
|
||||
last[HMAC_TAG_SIZE - 1] ^= 0x01;
|
||||
|
||||
// Warm up.
|
||||
for _ in 0..ITERS / 10 {
|
||||
core::hint::black_box(constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &first));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let t0 = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut acc = false;
|
||||
for _ in 0..ITERS {
|
||||
acc ^= constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &first);
|
||||
}
|
||||
core::hint::black_box(acc);
|
||||
let dt_first = t0.elapsed().as_nanos() as f64;
|
||||
|
||||
let t1 = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut acc2 = false;
|
||||
for _ in 0..ITERS {
|
||||
acc2 ^= constant_time_tag_eq(&base, &last);
|
||||
}
|
||||
core::hint::black_box(acc2);
|
||||
let dt_last = t1.elapsed().as_nanos() as f64;
|
||||
|
||||
let ratio = dt_last.max(dt_first) / dt_last.min(dt_first).max(1.0);
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"first-differ {dt_first:.0}ns, last-differ {dt_last:.0}ns, ratio {ratio:.3}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
ratio < 4.0,
|
||||
"timing ratio {ratio:.3} too large — possible short-circuit leak"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_auth_beacon_too_short() {
|
||||
let result = AuthenticatedBeacon::from_bytes(&[0u8; 10]);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -309,6 +309,61 @@ impl WlanApiScanner {
|
|||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Measure the **real** achieved rate of a *specific* backend over a
|
||||
/// fixed wall-clock `window`, for an honest native-vs-netsh comparison.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Unlike [`benchmark`](Self::benchmark) (which picks native-first and so
|
||||
/// never exercises netsh on a box where native works), this runs back-to-
|
||||
/// back scans on **exactly** the requested backend until `window` elapses,
|
||||
/// then reports the measured scans/second and mean BSSIDs/scan. This is the
|
||||
/// ADR-157 §5 #4 measurement primitive: drive it once per backend over the
|
||||
/// same window and compare the two `rate_hz` values — no rate is assumed.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns `None` for [`ScanBackend::Native`] when the native path is
|
||||
/// unavailable (non-Windows or WLAN service error), so a caller can report
|
||||
/// the honest negative rather than a fabricated number.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # Errors
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Propagates the first scan error from the chosen backend.
|
||||
pub fn benchmark_backend(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
backend: ScanBackend,
|
||||
window: Duration,
|
||||
) -> Result<Option<BenchmarkResult>, WifiScanError> {
|
||||
// Probe native availability first so an unavailable native path is an
|
||||
// honest `None`, not an error charged against the comparison.
|
||||
if backend == ScanBackend::Native && wlanapi_native::scan_native().is_err() {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let start = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut iterations: u32 = 0;
|
||||
let mut total_bssids: u64 = 0;
|
||||
while start.elapsed() < window {
|
||||
let list = match backend {
|
||||
ScanBackend::Native => wlanapi_native::scan_native()?,
|
||||
ScanBackend::Netsh => self.inner.scan_sync()?,
|
||||
};
|
||||
total_bssids += list.len() as u64;
|
||||
iterations += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let total = start.elapsed();
|
||||
let secs = total.as_secs_f64().max(f64::MIN_POSITIVE);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Some(BenchmarkResult {
|
||||
iterations,
|
||||
total,
|
||||
rate_hz: f64::from(iterations) / secs,
|
||||
mean_bssids: if iterations == 0 {
|
||||
0.0
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
total_bssids as f64 / f64::from(iterations)
|
||||
},
|
||||
backend,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Perform an async scan by offloading the blocking call to a
|
||||
/// background thread (native-first, netsh fallback inside the task).
|
||||
///
|
||||
|
|
@ -560,4 +615,76 @@ mod tests {
|
|||
);
|
||||
assert!(bench.rate_hz > 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// ADR-157 §5 #4 honest native-vs-netsh throughput comparison. `#[ignore]`
|
||||
/// (live WLAN, ~20 s). Run with:
|
||||
/// `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-wifiscan -- --ignored --nocapture
|
||||
/// measure_native_vs_netsh_throughput`. Drives BOTH backends over the same
|
||||
/// fixed wall-clock window and prints the measured Hz + BSSIDs/scan for
|
||||
/// each, plus the ratio — the real number, whatever it is (a null/negative
|
||||
/// result is a valid outcome and must be reported, not hidden).
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
#[ignore = "live WLAN native-vs-netsh comparison; run with --ignored --nocapture"]
|
||||
fn measure_native_vs_netsh_throughput() {
|
||||
let scanner = WlanApiScanner::new();
|
||||
let window = Duration::from_secs(10);
|
||||
|
||||
let native = scanner
|
||||
.benchmark_backend(ScanBackend::Native, window)
|
||||
.expect("native benchmark must not error");
|
||||
let netsh = scanner
|
||||
.benchmark_backend(ScanBackend::Netsh, window)
|
||||
.expect("netsh benchmark must not error")
|
||||
.expect("netsh is always available on Windows");
|
||||
|
||||
match native {
|
||||
Some(n) => {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"NATIVE: {:.2} Hz ({} scans / {:?}), mean {:.1} BSSIDs/scan",
|
||||
n.rate_hz, n.iterations, n.total, n.mean_bssids
|
||||
);
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"NETSH: {:.2} Hz ({} scans / {:?}), mean {:.1} BSSIDs/scan",
|
||||
netsh.rate_hz, netsh.iterations, netsh.total, netsh.mean_bssids
|
||||
);
|
||||
let ratio = n.rate_hz / netsh.rate_hz.max(f64::MIN_POSITIVE);
|
||||
println!("RATIO native/netsh: {ratio:.2}x");
|
||||
assert!(n.rate_hz > 0.0 && netsh.rate_hz > 0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"NATIVE: unavailable on this box (WLAN service error). \
|
||||
NETSH: {:.2} Hz, mean {:.1} BSSIDs/scan",
|
||||
netsh.rate_hz, netsh.mean_bssids
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Determinism + handle-cleanup pin: N back-to-back native scans must all
|
||||
/// succeed (or all be the same typed error) with no resource exhaustion —
|
||||
/// a `WlanOpenHandle`/`WlanCloseHandle` leak would, after enough calls,
|
||||
/// surface as a `ScanFailed`. Running 50 iterations here exercises the
|
||||
/// open→enum→getlist→free→close cycle repeatedly. `#[ignore]` for CI (live
|
||||
/// WLAN service) but RUN on this box to verify no leak.
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
#[ignore = "live WLAN handle-cleanup check; run with --ignored --nocapture"]
|
||||
fn native_scans_dont_leak_handles() {
|
||||
let scanner = WlanApiScanner::new();
|
||||
let mut ok = 0u32;
|
||||
let mut failed = 0u32;
|
||||
for _ in 0..50 {
|
||||
match scanner.scan_native() {
|
||||
Ok(_) => ok += 1,
|
||||
Err(WifiScanError::ScanFailed { .. }) => failed += 1,
|
||||
Err(e) => panic!("unexpected error during leak check: {e:?}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
println!("native leak check: {ok} ok, {failed} scan-failed of 50");
|
||||
// No leak ⇒ behavior is consistent across all 50 calls (all ok, or all
|
||||
// the same WLAN-service-off failure) — not a degrade partway through.
|
||||
assert!(ok == 50 || failed == 50, "inconsistent results suggest a leak: {ok} ok / {failed} failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue