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@ -196,7 +196,8 @@ fields are **never read** for verification (only ever set to `None` in tests).
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re-doc'd **"(P4 — not yet enforced, ADR-161/B5)"** — parsed and round-tripped,
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but no integrity/signature check happens before a plugin runs. No verification
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code was added (that is P4); the doc now matches the code.
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**Grade: doc-honesty (no behavior change).**
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**Grade: doc-honesty (no behavior change).** *(Superseded by ADR-162 §P4:
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the hash/signature gate is now implemented and enforced.)*
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## Negative Results (NO-ACTION positives — audited, found correct, cited not edited)
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@ -213,17 +214,23 @@ touched:
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## Deferred Backlog (Nothing Dropped)
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- **Plugin authority-isolation (P5)** — `homecore_permissions` claims are parsed
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but not enforced at the host-call boundary. **ACCEPTED-FUTURE.**
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- **Plugin signature/hash verification (P4)** — implement the
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- **Plugin authority-isolation (P5)** — ~~`homecore_permissions` claims are parsed
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but not enforced at the host-call boundary.~~ **DONE — ADR-162 §P5.**
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`hc_state_set` now consults a `PermissionSet` distilled from the manifest;
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an undeclared write returns a typed `-3` to the guest.
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- **Plugin signature/hash verification (P4)** — ~~implement the
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`wasm_module_hash`/`wasm_module_sig`/`publisher_key` gate that B5 now honestly
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says is absent. **ACCEPTED-FUTURE.**
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says is absent.~~ **DONE — ADR-162 §P4.** `WasmtimeRuntime::load_plugin` now
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SHA-256-checks the module, Ed25519-verifies the signature against
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`publisher_key`, and enforces a `PluginPolicy` trust allowlist
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(secure-default rejects unsigned/untrusted/tampered modules).
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- **HAP real pairing (P2)** — SRP/HKDF pairing + encrypted sessions; current
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bridge is an accessory-mapping surface. **ACCEPTED-FUTURE (honestly stubbed).**
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- **`RunMode::Queued`/`Restart`/`max` ordering** — `Single`/`Parallel` are
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- **`RunMode::Queued`/`Restart`/`max` ordering** — ~~`Single`/`Parallel` are
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honored; bounded queueing, restart-kill, and `max` concurrency are not yet
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wired (every non-Single mode is parallel). **ACCEPTED-FUTURE** — the
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`engine.rs` doc states exactly this, no over-claim.
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wired (every non-Single mode is parallel).~~ **DONE — ADR-162 §A5.** Restart
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aborts the in-flight task, Queued serializes via a per-automation async mutex,
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and `max: N` caps concurrency via a per-automation semaphore.
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- **Automation YAML load-at-boot** — the engine starts empty; a YAML loader is
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P-next. The bin log states "0 automations registered" honestly.
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@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
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# ADR-162: HOMECORE Plugin Security (Signature + Capability Isolation) & Bounded Automation RunModes — Making ADR-161's Deferred Claims TRUE
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- **Status**: accepted
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- **Date**: 2026-06-12
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- **Deciders**: ruv
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- **Tags**: homecore, homecore-plugins, homecore-automation, plugin-security, wasm-signature-verification, ed25519, capability-isolation, runmode, prove-everything, soundness, honest-labeling
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- **Amends**: ADR-161 (relabelled P4/P5 + §A5 deferrals → now enforced), ADR-128 (plugin manifest), ADR-129 (automation engine)
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## Context
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Beyond-SOTA sweep **Milestone 8**, scoped to `homecore-plugins` and
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`homecore-automation` only, under the project's **prove-everything /
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anti-"AI-slop"** directive.
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ADR-161 (Milestone 7) did the honest thing with three plugin/automation
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items it could not finish in that window: rather than fake them, it **relabelled
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them as deferred** —
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- **P4** (plugin signature verification): the manifest's `wasm_module_hash` /
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`wasm_module_sig` / `publisher_key` were re-doc'd "(P4 — not yet enforced,
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ADR-161/B5)" — parsed and round-tripped, but **never checked** before a
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plugin runs.
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- **P5** (plugin authority isolation): `homecore_permissions` claims were
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parsed but **never consulted**; `hc_state_set` let any plugin write any
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entity, including `lock.*` / `alarm_control_panel.*`.
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- **§A5** (`RunMode`): `Single`/`Parallel` were honored; `Restart`/`Queued`/
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`max: N` were honestly documented as still **unbounded-parallel**.
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### Headline — the deferred security items are now ENFORCED + TESTED
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M8 turns those honest deferrals into real, tested behavior. The plugin trust
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boundary is now sound (a tampered module, an untrusted publisher, or an
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unsigned module is rejected by the secure default), an over-privileged plugin
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write is denied with a typed error, and the bounded run-modes actually bound.
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**Every fix is pinned by a test that FAILS on the pre-M8 code** — each of the
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three RunMode tests was additionally run against a simulated unbounded-parallel
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dispatch and confirmed to panic.
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The Ed25519 crypto reuses the in-repo `cog-ha-matter::witness_signing` pattern
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(same `ed25519-dalek` 2.x API, same deterministic-test-key convention). SHA-256
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matches the `sha256:` prefix the manifest already declared and the
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`cog-ha-matter` cog manifest's `binary_sha256` hex convention. No new external
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dependency tree was introduced — `ed25519-dalek` / `sha2` / `hex` / `base64`
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were already in the workspace `Cargo.lock` (cog-ha-matter / bfld pull them in);
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only new dependency *edges* were added to `homecore-plugins`.
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Grading vocabulary (ADR-152 / ADR-158 / ADR-160 / ADR-161):
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- **MEASURED** — reproduced in this worktree, command + failing-on-old test recorded.
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- **ACCEPTED-FUTURE** — deliberately deferred, nothing dropped.
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## Decision — Fixes Landed
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### §P4 — Plugin signature & integrity verification (SECURITY) — MEASURED
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`homecore-plugins/src/manifest.rs` declared `wasm_module_hash` /
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`wasm_module_sig` / `publisher_key` but they were **never read** for
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verification; the load path (`wasmtime_runtime.rs`) instantiated any `.wasm`
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bytes handed to it.
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**Real fix** (`src/verify.rs`, wired into `WasmtimeRuntime::load_plugin`):
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before instantiation the runtime now —
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1. computes the **SHA-256** of the actual `.wasm` bytes and rejects if it ≠ the
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manifest's `wasm_module_hash` (`sha256:<hex>`) — tamper detection;
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2. verifies the **Ed25519** `wasm_module_sig` (`ed25519:<base64>`, 64-byte raw)
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over the 32-byte digest against `publisher_key` (`ed25519:<base64>`, 32-byte
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raw) and rejects on failure;
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3. enforces a configurable **trust policy** — `PluginPolicy::trusted(&[keys])`
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is an allowlist of publisher verifying keys; `PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned`
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is an explicit dev escape hatch that LOGS a loud `warn` on every load it
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waves through. The **secure default rejects unsigned and unknown-publisher
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modules.** `PluginPolicy::deny_all()` trusts no publisher.
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A typed `PluginError::SignatureRejected` is returned (no host panic). The
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legacy permission-free `load_wasm` is retained for first-party/trusted/test
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modules; production loading goes through `load_plugin`.
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**Failing-on-old tests** (`tests/integration.rs`, `--features wasmtime`) — all
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drive `load_plugin`, which **did not exist** on the old code (so the gate is
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genuinely new):
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- `p4_tampered_module_is_rejected` — a byte-flipped `.wasm` → hash mismatch → rejected.
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- `p4_valid_sig_from_trusted_key_loads` — a valid sig from an allowlisted key loads.
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- `p4_valid_sig_from_untrusted_key_is_rejected` — a correctly-signed module from a key NOT on the allowlist is rejected.
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- `p4_unsigned_module_rejected_by_default_loads_only_under_allow_unsigned` — unsigned rejected under `deny_all`, loads (with warn) only under `AllowUnsigned`.
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- Unit (`src/verify.rs`): `valid_sig_from_trusted_key_passes`, `tampered_module_is_rejected`, `valid_sig_from_untrusted_key_is_rejected`, `forged_signature_is_rejected`, `unsigned_module_rejected_under_default_policy`.
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A real deterministic keypair signs real `.wasm` bytes in the tests.
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The manifest doc now reads **"(P4 — ENFORCED, ADR-162)"**. **Grade: MEASURED. Milestone headline.**
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### §P5 — Plugin authority / capability isolation (SECURITY) — MEASURED
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`wasmtime_runtime.rs::hc_state_set` applied any write a plugin requested,
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ignoring the manifest's `homecore_permissions`.
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**Real fix** (`src/permissions.rs` + `hc_state_set`): the manifest's
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`homecore_permissions` (the `state:write:<glob>` form, or a bare entity glob
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like `light.*`) are distilled into a `PermissionSet` installed in the plugin's
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Wasmtime store. The `hc_state_set` host import consults
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`permissions.may_write(entity_id)` before applying a write and returns a typed
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`-3` (permission denied) to the guest on a violation — **the host is not
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panicked.** Wasmtime already gives memory isolation; this adds **authority**
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isolation. A plugin with **no** write grants can write nothing (secure default).
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**Failing-on-old tests** (`tests/integration.rs`, `--features wasmtime`):
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- `p5_declared_light_plugin_may_write_light_but_not_lock` — a `light.*` plugin writes `light.kitchen` (succeeds) but is REJECTED (`-3`, and the entity is not written) when it tries `lock.front_door`.
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- `p5_plugin_with_no_permissions_can_write_nothing` — a plugin with empty `homecore_permissions` cannot write `light.kitchen`.
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- Unit (`src/permissions.rs`): domain-glob, exact-grant, wildcard, read-grants-don't-confer-write, no-permissions, and explicit `state:write:` form.
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The manifest doc now reads **"(P5 — ENFORCED, ADR-162)"**. **Grade: MEASURED.**
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### §A5 — Bounded automation RunModes (Restart / Queued / max) — MEASURED
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`homecore-automation/src/engine.rs` (per ADR-161) honored `Single`/`Parallel`
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but spawned an unbounded parallel task for `Restart`/`Queued`/`max`.
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**Real fix** (`src/runmode.rs`, a per-automation `RunState` the engine owns and
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dispatches through at all three trigger sites — event loop, timer, test hook):
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- **Restart** — aborts the in-flight action task via `tokio::task::AbortHandle`, then starts a fresh one.
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- **Queued** — serializes runs in arrival order via a per-automation async `Mutex`: sequential, never concurrent, nothing dropped.
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- **max: N** — caps concurrency at N via a per-automation `Semaphore`; triggers beyond N **queue** (await a permit) rather than running concurrently. (HA bounded `parallel`/`queued` semantics — chosen and documented as *queue beyond N*, not drop.)
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- `Single`/`IgnoreFirst` re-entrancy guard and `Parallel` preserved.
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`engine.rs` trimmed to **433 lines**; the run-mode machinery lives in the new
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`runmode.rs` (153 lines) to keep both under the 500-line guideline.
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**Failing-on-old tests** (`tests/engine_behaviors.rs`) — each was run against a
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simulated unbounded-parallel dispatch and confirmed to panic:
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- `restart_mode_cancels_prior_run` — prior run is aborted: exactly **1** completion (old: both ran → 2).
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- `queued_mode_runs_sequentially_not_concurrently` — 3 rapid triggers all run, **max observed concurrency = 1** (old: 3).
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- `max_two_caps_concurrency_at_two` — 4 rapid triggers all run, **max observed concurrency ≤ 2** (old: 4).
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**Grade: MEASURED. Restart, Queued, and `max: N` all implemented — no remaining RunMode deferral.**
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## Threat model closed
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| Threat | Before (ADR-161) | After (ADR-162) |
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|--------|------------------|-----------------|
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| **Tampered module** — attacker swaps `.wasm` bytes after signing | loaded unconditionally (hash never checked) | rejected: SHA-256 mismatch |
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| **Untrusted publisher** — valid sig from a key the host doesn't trust | loaded (sig/key never read) | rejected: publisher_key not on allowlist |
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| **Unsigned module** — no integrity material at all | loaded | rejected by secure default; loads only under explicit `AllowUnsigned` (loud warn) |
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| **Over-privileged plugin write** — a `light.*` plugin writes `lock.front_door` / `alarm_control_panel.*` | applied (permissions never consulted) | denied: typed `-3` to guest, write not applied |
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| **Run-mode resource exhaustion** — `max`/`Queued` spawn unbounded tasks | unbounded parallel | bounded: Restart cancels, Queued serializes, `max: N` caps at N |
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## Remaining honest deferral (Nothing Dropped)
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- **Plugin-key provisioning / rotation** — the host's trust allowlist
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(`PluginPolicy::trusted`) is supplied by the caller; sourcing it from the
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Cognitum control-plane key store (as `cog-ha-matter` does for Seed keys) and
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key rotation are **ACCEPTED-FUTURE** (out of M8 scope — same boundary
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`witness_signing` draws).
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- **`InProcessRuntime` (native first-party plugins)** — has no `.wasm` bytes to
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hash, so P4/P5 apply only to the WASM (`wasmtime`) path; native plugins remain
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trusted-by-compilation. Honestly noted, not over-claimed.
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- **HAP real pairing (P2)** — unchanged from ADR-161; out of M8 scope.
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## Reproduction (MEASURED)
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```bash
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cd v2
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# P4/P5 (wasmtime feature needs rustc 1.91+; workspace pins 1.89 for the rest):
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cargo +1.91.1 test -p homecore-plugins --features wasmtime
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# Bounded RunModes:
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cargo test -p homecore-automation --no-default-features
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# Full workspace still builds (1.89 toolchain, no wasmtime):
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cargo build --workspace --no-default-features
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```
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Result at time of writing (all 0 failed):
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- **homecore-plugins** `--features wasmtime` — **32 passed** (lib 23; integration 9). (ADR-161 baseline was 15.)
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- **homecore-automation** `--no-default-features` — **45 passed** (lib 37; `engine_behaviors` 8). (ADR-161 baseline was 42.)
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- Full workspace `cargo build --workspace --no-default-features` succeeds.
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## Consequences
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- A HOMECORE WASM plugin can no longer be loaded with a tampered binary, an
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untrusted publisher, or (by default) no signature at all — the trust boundary
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ADR-161/B5 honestly said was absent is now real (P4).
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- A plugin can no longer write entities outside its declared
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`homecore_permissions`; the lock/alarm escalation path is closed (P5).
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- The automation engine's `Restart`, `Queued`, and `max: N` run-modes are now
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bounded as documented — no run-mode claims a capability the code lacks.
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- No new external dependency tree (reuses the cog-ha-matter Ed25519 stack
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already in the lock); source files kept under the 500-line guideline
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(`engine.rs` 433, `runmode.rs` 153, `verify.rs` 397, `permissions.rs` 168;
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`wasmtime_runtime.rs` non-test source < 500, inline WAT tests as ADR-161 left
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them).
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