feat(homecore-plugins): enforce plugin signature + capability isolation (ADR-162 P4/P5)
ADR-161 honestly relabelled the manifest's wasm_module_hash / wasm_module_sig / publisher_key as "(P4 — not yet enforced)" and the homecore_permissions claims as deferred P5 authority isolation. This makes both real and tested. P4 (signature/integrity verification, SECURITY): - New `verify` module: SHA-256 module-hash check + Ed25519 signature verification over the digest against publisher_key, with a PluginPolicy trust allowlist and an explicit AllowUnsigned dev escape hatch (loud warn). Secure default rejects unsigned / unknown-publisher / tampered modules. - Reuses the in-repo cog-ha-matter::witness_signing Ed25519 pattern; sha2 is a workspace dep, ed25519-dalek/hex/base64 already in the lock — no new external dep tree (only new edges in homecore-plugins). - WasmtimeRuntime::load_plugin verifies before instantiation; legacy load_wasm retained for trusted/test modules. P5 (authority/capability isolation, SECURITY): - New `permissions` module: PermissionSet distilled from homecore_permissions (state:write:<glob> or bare entity glob). hc_state_set now consults it and returns a typed -3 to the guest on an undeclared write (no host panic). Tests (fail on old code, which had no load_plugin/verify and an unchecked hc_state_set): tampered module rejected; valid sig from trusted key loads; valid sig from untrusted key rejected; unsigned rejected by default and loads only under AllowUnsigned; light.* plugin writes light.kitchen but is denied lock.front_door; no-permission plugin can write nothing. Real deterministic keypair signs real bytes. Manifest doc updated: P4/P5 now ENFORCED (was "not yet enforced"). homecore-plugins --features wasmtime: 32 passed (lib 23, integration 9), 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
This commit is contained in:
ruv
parent
d1328b0299
commit
0ca903b497
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@ -3554,9 +3554,13 @@ name = "homecore-plugins"
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version = "0.1.0-alpha.0"
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dependencies = [
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"async-trait",
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"base64 0.22.1",
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"ed25519-dalek",
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"hex",
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"homecore",
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"serde",
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"serde_json",
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"sha2",
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"thiserror 1.0.69",
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"tokio",
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"uuid",
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@ -50,6 +50,15 @@ serde_json = "1"
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# UUIDs for config entry IDs in host_abi.rs.
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uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
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# ── ADR-162 P4: plugin signature + integrity verification ──────────────────
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# Reuses the same in-repo crypto stack as cog-ha-matter (witness_signing.rs):
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# Ed25519 over a SHA-256 module digest. All four are already in the workspace
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# Cargo.lock (cog-ha-matter / bfld pull them in) — no new external dep tree.
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ed25519-dalek = "2.1"
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sha2 = { workspace = true }
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hex = "0.4"
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base64 = "0.22"
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# Optional Wasmtime runtime (P2, default-off — 30 MB dep).
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# Bumped from 25.0.3 → 42 to remediate RUSTSEC-2026-0095 and RUSTSEC-2026-0096
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# (Cranelift/Winch sandbox-escape CVEs, CVSS 9.0 — iter-11 security sprint HC-03/04).
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@ -25,6 +25,18 @@ pub enum PluginError {
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#[error("plugin setup failed: {0}")]
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SetupFailed(String),
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/// The plugin failed signature/integrity verification (ADR-162 P4):
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/// hash mismatch, bad signature, untrusted publisher, or unsigned
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/// module under a non-dev trust policy.
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#[error("plugin signature rejected: {0}")]
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SignatureRejected(String),
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/// A plugin attempted a host call (e.g. `hc_state_set`) on an entity
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/// it did not declare in `homecore_permissions` (ADR-162 P5 authority
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/// isolation).
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#[error("plugin permission denied: {0}")]
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PermissionDenied(String),
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/// The plugin's `unload` hook returned an error.
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#[error("plugin unload failed: {0}")]
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UnloadFailed(String),
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@ -22,8 +22,16 @@
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//! - Host ABI wiring: `hc_state_get`, `hc_state_set`, `hc_event_fire`, etc.
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//! (P2 — requires ADR-127 state machine API freeze first).
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//! - Config entry lifecycle + hot-load (P3).
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//! - Cog registry distribution + Ed25519 signature verification (P4).
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//! - Permission enforcement (P5).
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//!
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//! ## Now enforced (ADR-162)
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//!
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//! - **Ed25519 signature + SHA-256 integrity verification (P4)** — see
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//! [`verify`]: the plugin load path hashes the real `.wasm` bytes, checks
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//! the manifest `wasm_module_hash`, verifies `wasm_module_sig` against
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//! `publisher_key`, and enforces a [`verify::PluginPolicy`] allowlist.
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//! - **Permission / authority isolation (P5)** — see [`permissions`]: a
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//! plugin's `hc_state_set` writes are gated against the entity domains/
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//! globs it declared in `homecore_permissions`.
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//!
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//! ## Feature flags
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//!
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@ -35,9 +43,11 @@
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pub mod error;
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pub mod host_abi;
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pub mod manifest;
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pub mod permissions;
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pub mod plugin;
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pub mod registry;
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pub mod runtime;
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pub mod verify;
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#[cfg(feature = "wasmtime")]
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pub mod wasmtime_runtime;
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@ -45,9 +55,11 @@ pub mod wasmtime_runtime;
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pub use error::PluginError;
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pub use host_abi::{ConfigEntryJson, StateChangedEventJson};
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pub use manifest::{IotClass, IntegrationType, PluginManifest};
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pub use permissions::PermissionSet;
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pub use plugin::{HomeCorePlugin, PluginId};
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pub use registry::PluginRegistry;
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pub use runtime::{InProcessRuntime, LoadedPlugin, PluginRuntime};
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pub use verify::{verify_module, PluginPolicy};
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#[cfg(feature = "wasmtime")]
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pub use wasmtime_runtime::{WasmPlugin, WasmtimeRuntime};
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@ -85,24 +85,26 @@ pub struct PluginManifest {
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/// [HOMECORE] `sha256:<hex>` hash of the wasm binary.
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///
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/// **(P4 — not yet enforced, ADR-161/B5):** this field is parsed and
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/// round-tripped but is NOT verified before execution. The hash/sig
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/// gate lands in P4; until then the presence of this field implies no
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/// integrity guarantee.
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/// **(P4 — ENFORCED, ADR-162):** `verify::verify_module` computes the
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/// SHA-256 of the real `.wasm` bytes on load and rejects the module if
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/// it does not equal this hash (tamper detection). See [`crate::verify`].
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub wasm_module_hash: Option<String>,
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/// [HOMECORE] Ed25519 signature of the wasm binary hash (`ed25519:<base64>`).
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///
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/// **(P4 — not yet enforced, ADR-161/B5):** parsed but never checked.
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/// No signature verification happens before a plugin runs.
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/// **(P4 — ENFORCED, ADR-162):** verified against `publisher_key` over
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/// the SHA-256 module digest before instantiation. A bad/forged/absent
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/// signature is rejected under the secure trust policy (the
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/// `cog-ha-matter::witness_signing` Ed25519 pattern is reused).
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub wasm_module_sig: Option<String>,
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/// [HOMECORE] Ed25519 public key of the plugin publisher.
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///
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/// **(P4 — not yet enforced, ADR-161/B5):** parsed but never used to
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/// verify `wasm_module_sig`.
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/// **(P4 — ENFORCED, ADR-162):** used to verify `wasm_module_sig`, and
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/// checked against the host's [`crate::verify::PluginPolicy`] trust
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/// allowlist — an unknown publisher is rejected by the secure default.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub publisher_key: Option<String>,
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@ -115,6 +117,12 @@ pub struct PluginManifest {
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pub host_imports_required: Vec<String>,
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/// [HOMECORE] Coarse-grained permission claims (glob patterns).
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///
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/// **(P5 — ENFORCED, ADR-162):** `state:write:<glob>` (or a bare entity
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/// glob like `light.*`) grants are parsed into a
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/// [`crate::permissions::PermissionSet` ] and consulted by the
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/// `hc_state_set` host import. A plugin can no longer write an entity it
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/// did not declare; a plugin with no write grants can write nothing.
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#[serde(default)]
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pub homecore_permissions: Vec<PermissionClaim>,
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@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
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//! Plugin authority / capability isolation (ADR-162, P5).
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//!
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//! Wasmtime already gives a plugin **memory** isolation — it cannot read
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//! another plugin's linear memory. It does NOT, by itself, stop a plugin
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//! from using a host import to write any entity it likes. Before this fix
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//! `hc_state_set` happily let any plugin write `lock.front_door` or
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//! `alarm_control_panel.*`, and the manifest's `homecore_permissions`
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//! claims were parsed but **never consulted** (ADR-161 deferred P5).
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//!
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//! This module adds **authority isolation**: a plugin may only write
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//! entities its manifest declared. The host import consults a
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//! [`PermissionSet`] before applying any state write and returns a typed
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//! error to the guest (it does **not** panic the host) on a violation.
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//!
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//! ## Permission grammar
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//!
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//! Each entry in `homecore_permissions` is one of:
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//!
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//! * a bare entity glob — `"light.*"`, `"light.kitchen"`, `"*"`;
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//! * the explicit capability form `"state:write:<glob>"` (the form the
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//! ADR-128 manifest doc shows), e.g. `"state:write:sensor.*"`.
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//!
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//! A glob supports a single trailing `*` (HA-style domain wildcards:
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//! `light.*` matches every `light` entity) and a leading-or-bare `*`
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//! (`*` = everything). Exact strings match exactly. A plugin with **no**
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//! `state:write` entries can write **nothing** — the secure default.
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use crate::manifest::PluginManifest;
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/// The set of entity-write permissions a plugin holds, distilled from its
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/// manifest `homecore_permissions` at load time.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
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pub struct PermissionSet {
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/// Glob patterns the plugin may write (state:write authority). Empty =
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/// the plugin may write nothing.
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write_globs: Vec<String>,
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}
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impl PermissionSet {
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/// Build a permission set from a manifest's `homecore_permissions`.
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///
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/// Only `state:write` authority is modelled here (the host import this
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/// gates is `hc_state_set`). A bare glob (`"light.*"`) is treated as a
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/// write grant; the explicit `"state:write:<glob>"` form is also
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/// accepted. Other capability strings (`state:read:*`, future verbs)
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/// are ignored for write-gating purposes.
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pub fn from_manifest(manifest: &PluginManifest) -> Self {
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let mut write_globs = Vec::new();
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for claim in &manifest.homecore_permissions {
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let claim = claim.trim();
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if let Some(glob) = claim.strip_prefix("state:write:") {
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write_globs.push(glob.trim().to_string());
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} else if claim.starts_with("state:read:") {
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// read authority — not relevant to write gating.
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} else if !claim.is_empty() {
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// Bare glob — treat as a write grant.
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write_globs.push(claim.to_string());
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}
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}
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Self { write_globs }
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}
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/// An all-allowing set (equivalent to a `"*"` grant). Used by the
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/// legacy permission-free `WasmtimeRuntime::load_wasm` path so existing
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/// callers/tests that do not supply a manifest keep working; the
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/// permission-gated path uses [`Self::from_manifest`].
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pub fn allow_all() -> Self {
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Self {
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write_globs: vec!["*".to_string()],
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}
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}
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/// May this plugin write the given entity id (e.g. `"light.kitchen"`)?
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pub fn may_write(&self, entity_id: &str) -> bool {
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self.write_globs.iter().any(|g| glob_matches(g, entity_id))
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}
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/// Number of write-grant globs (0 = can write nothing).
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pub fn write_grant_count(&self) -> usize {
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self.write_globs.len()
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}
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}
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/// Match `entity_id` against a single glob pattern.
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///
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/// Supported forms:
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/// * `"*"` → matches anything.
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/// * `"light.*"` → trailing wildcard: any id with the `light.` prefix.
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/// * `"light.kitchen"` → exact match.
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fn glob_matches(pattern: &str, entity_id: &str) -> bool {
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if pattern == "*" {
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return true;
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}
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if let Some(prefix) = pattern.strip_suffix('*') {
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return entity_id.starts_with(prefix);
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}
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pattern == entity_id
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn manifest_with(perms: &[&str]) -> PluginManifest {
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PluginManifest {
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domain: "p".into(),
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name: "P".into(),
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version: "1".into(),
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documentation: None,
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iot_class: None,
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config_flow: false,
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integration_type: None,
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dependencies: vec![],
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requirements: vec![],
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wasm_module: None,
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wasm_module_hash: None,
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wasm_module_sig: None,
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publisher_key: None,
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min_homecore_version: None,
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host_imports_required: vec![],
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homecore_permissions: perms.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
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cog_id: None,
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn domain_glob_allows_same_domain_only() {
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let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["light.*"]));
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assert!(ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
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assert!(ps.may_write("light.bedroom"));
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assert!(!ps.may_write("lock.front_door"));
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assert!(!ps.may_write("alarm_control_panel.home"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn no_permissions_can_write_nothing() {
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let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&[]));
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assert_eq!(ps.write_grant_count(), 0);
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assert!(!ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
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assert!(!ps.may_write("sensor.temp"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn explicit_state_write_form_is_honored() {
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let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["state:write:sensor.*"]));
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assert!(ps.may_write("sensor.temp"));
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assert!(!ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn read_grants_do_not_confer_write() {
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let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["state:read:lock.*"]));
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assert!(!ps.may_write("lock.front_door"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn exact_entity_grant_is_scoped() {
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let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["light.kitchen"]));
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assert!(ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
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assert!(!ps.may_write("light.bedroom"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn wildcard_grants_everything() {
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let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["*"]));
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assert!(ps.may_write("lock.front_door"));
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}
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
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//! Plugin signature & integrity verification (ADR-162, P4).
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//!
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//! ADR-161/B5 honestly relabelled the manifest's `wasm_module_hash` /
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//! `wasm_module_sig` / `publisher_key` fields as "(P4 — not yet enforced)":
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//! they were parsed and round-tripped but **never checked** before a plugin
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//! ran. This module makes that claim TRUE — it is the real verification gate
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//! the plugin load path runs before instantiating any `.wasm` module.
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//!
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//! ## What is verified, in order
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//!
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//! 1. **Module hash** — SHA-256 of the actual `.wasm` bytes must equal the
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//! manifest's `wasm_module_hash` (`sha256:<hex>`). A tampered module
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//! (one byte changed) fails here.
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//! 2. **Ed25519 signature** — `wasm_module_sig` (`ed25519:<base64>`, 64-byte
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//! raw signature) must verify over the **32-byte SHA-256 digest** under
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//! the `publisher_key` (`ed25519:<base64>`, 32-byte raw verifying key).
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//! 3. **Trust policy** — the `publisher_key` must be on the configured
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//! allowlist, unless [`PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned`] is in force (a loud
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//! dev escape hatch).
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//!
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//! The crypto mirrors the in-repo Ed25519 pattern from
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//! `cog-ha-matter::witness_signing` (same `ed25519-dalek` 2.x API, same
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//! deterministic-test-key convention). SHA-256 matches the `sha256:` prefix
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//! the manifest doc already declared for `wasm_module_hash`, and the
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//! `cog-ha-matter` cog manifest's `binary_sha256` hex convention.
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//!
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//! ## Secure default
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//!
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//! [`PluginPolicy::trusted`] (the production constructor) **rejects**:
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//! * an unsigned module (no hash / sig / key),
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//! * a signature from a key not on the allowlist,
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//! * any hash or signature mismatch.
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//!
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//! Only [`PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned`] loosens this, and every load it
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//! waves through emits a `warn`-level log line so it cannot pass silently.
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use base64::Engine as _;
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use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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use crate::error::PluginError;
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use crate::manifest::PluginManifest;
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/// Trust policy governing which plugins may load.
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///
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/// The production path uses [`PluginPolicy::trusted`] with an explicit
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/// allowlist of publisher verifying keys. [`PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned`]
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/// is the dev escape hatch — it loads anything (even unsigned modules) but
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/// logs a loud warning per load.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub enum PluginPolicy {
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/// Secure default: a plugin loads only if its module hash matches, its
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/// Ed25519 signature verifies, AND its publisher key is in this
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/// allowlist. Each entry is the 32-byte raw Ed25519 verifying key.
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Trusted { allowlist: Vec<[u8; 32]> },
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/// Dev-only: skip signature/allowlist enforcement. Hash is still
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/// checked when a `wasm_module_hash` is present (cheap integrity), but
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/// unsigned / unknown-publisher modules are allowed. Every load logs a
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/// loud `warn`.
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AllowUnsigned,
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}
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impl PluginPolicy {
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/// Construct the secure (production) policy from a list of trusted
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/// publisher keys, each encoded as `ed25519:<base64>` (the same form
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/// the manifest `publisher_key` uses).
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pub fn trusted(publisher_keys: &[&str]) -> Result<Self, PluginError> {
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let mut allowlist = Vec::with_capacity(publisher_keys.len());
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for k in publisher_keys {
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allowlist.push(decode_verifying_key(k)?.to_bytes());
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}
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Ok(PluginPolicy::Trusted { allowlist })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Secure policy that trusts no publisher at all — every signed or
|
||||
/// unsigned module is rejected. Useful as a strict default.
|
||||
pub fn deny_all() -> Self {
|
||||
PluginPolicy::Trusted { allowlist: vec![] }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn is_dev(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
matches!(self, PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn allows(&self, key: &VerifyingKey) -> bool {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned => true,
|
||||
PluginPolicy::Trusted { allowlist } => {
|
||||
allowlist.iter().any(|k| k == &key.to_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verify a `.wasm` module's integrity and signature against its manifest,
|
||||
/// under the given trust `policy`. Returns `Ok(())` only if the module may
|
||||
/// be instantiated.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// On [`PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned`] this still checks any present hash,
|
||||
/// but waves through missing/untrusted signatures with a loud `warn`.
|
||||
pub fn verify_module(
|
||||
manifest: &PluginManifest,
|
||||
wasm_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
policy: &PluginPolicy,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
|
||||
let signed = manifest.wasm_module_hash.is_some()
|
||||
|| manifest.wasm_module_sig.is_some()
|
||||
|| manifest.publisher_key.is_some();
|
||||
|
||||
if !signed {
|
||||
// No integrity material at all.
|
||||
if policy.is_dev() {
|
||||
eprintln!(
|
||||
"[PLUGIN WARN] loading UNSIGNED plugin `{}` — no wasm_module_hash/sig/publisher_key. \
|
||||
AllowUnsigned dev policy is active; this is INSECURE and must not be used in production.",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Err(PluginError::SignatureRejected(format!(
|
||||
"plugin `{}` is unsigned (no wasm_module_hash/sig/publisher_key) and the trust policy \
|
||||
rejects unsigned modules; set PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned to override in dev",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// (1) Hash check — always enforced when a hash is declared.
|
||||
let digest = sha256_digest(wasm_bytes);
|
||||
if let Some(declared) = &manifest.wasm_module_hash {
|
||||
let expected = parse_sha256(declared)?;
|
||||
if expected != digest {
|
||||
return Err(PluginError::SignatureRejected(format!(
|
||||
"plugin `{}` wasm hash mismatch: module does not match manifest wasm_module_hash \
|
||||
(tampered or wrong binary)",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if !policy.is_dev() {
|
||||
return Err(PluginError::SignatureRejected(format!(
|
||||
"plugin `{}` carries a signature/publisher_key but no wasm_module_hash to bind it to",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// (2) Signature check + (3) allowlist.
|
||||
match (&manifest.wasm_module_sig, &manifest.publisher_key) {
|
||||
(Some(sig_str), Some(key_str)) => {
|
||||
let key = decode_verifying_key(key_str)?;
|
||||
let sig = decode_signature(sig_str)?;
|
||||
key.verify(&digest, &sig).map_err(|_| {
|
||||
PluginError::SignatureRejected(format!(
|
||||
"plugin `{}` Ed25519 signature does not verify over the module hash under \
|
||||
publisher_key",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
if !policy.allows(&key) {
|
||||
if policy.is_dev() {
|
||||
eprintln!(
|
||||
"[PLUGIN WARN] plugin `{}` is validly signed but its publisher_key is NOT on \
|
||||
the trust allowlist; AllowUnsigned dev policy loads it anyway.",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Err(PluginError::SignatureRejected(format!(
|
||||
"plugin `{}` is validly signed but its publisher_key is not on the trust \
|
||||
allowlist (untrusted publisher)",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => {
|
||||
// Hash present but signature/key incomplete.
|
||||
if policy.is_dev() {
|
||||
eprintln!(
|
||||
"[PLUGIN WARN] plugin `{}` has a hash but no complete Ed25519 signature; \
|
||||
AllowUnsigned dev policy loads it anyway.",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
);
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(PluginError::SignatureRejected(format!(
|
||||
"plugin `{}` is missing a complete wasm_module_sig + publisher_key pair; the trust \
|
||||
policy requires a valid signature",
|
||||
manifest.domain
|
||||
)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SHA-256 of `bytes` as a 32-byte digest.
|
||||
fn sha256_digest(bytes: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
|
||||
hasher.update(bytes);
|
||||
hasher.finalize().into()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parse a `sha256:<hex>` manifest hash into a 32-byte digest.
|
||||
fn parse_sha256(s: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], PluginError> {
|
||||
let hex_part = s.strip_prefix("sha256:").ok_or_else(|| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!(
|
||||
"wasm_module_hash must be `sha256:<hex>`, got {s:?}"
|
||||
))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let raw = hex::decode(hex_part).map_err(|e| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!("wasm_module_hash hex decode: {e}"))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
raw.try_into().map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!(
|
||||
"wasm_module_hash must decode to 32 bytes, got {}",
|
||||
v.len()
|
||||
))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Decode an `ed25519:<base64>` 32-byte verifying key.
|
||||
fn decode_verifying_key(s: &str) -> Result<VerifyingKey, PluginError> {
|
||||
let b64 = s.strip_prefix("ed25519:").ok_or_else(|| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!(
|
||||
"publisher_key must be `ed25519:<base64>`, got {s:?}"
|
||||
))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let raw = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
|
||||
.decode(b64)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!("publisher_key base64: {e}")))?;
|
||||
let bytes: [u8; 32] = raw.try_into().map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!(
|
||||
"publisher_key must decode to 32 bytes, got {}",
|
||||
v.len()
|
||||
))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!("publisher_key not a valid Ed25519 point: {e}")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Decode an `ed25519:<base64>` 64-byte signature.
|
||||
fn decode_signature(s: &str) -> Result<Signature, PluginError> {
|
||||
let b64 = s.strip_prefix("ed25519:").ok_or_else(|| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!(
|
||||
"wasm_module_sig must be `ed25519:<base64>`, got {s:?}"
|
||||
))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
let raw = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
|
||||
.decode(b64)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!("wasm_module_sig base64: {e}")))?;
|
||||
let bytes: [u8; 64] = raw.try_into().map_err(|v: Vec<u8>| {
|
||||
PluginError::InvalidManifest(format!(
|
||||
"wasm_module_sig must decode to 64 bytes, got {}",
|
||||
v.len()
|
||||
))
|
||||
})?;
|
||||
Ok(Signature::from_bytes(&bytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Encode a SHA-256 digest as the manifest `sha256:<hex>` form. Exposed so
|
||||
/// tooling (and tests) can produce a manifest hash for real `.wasm` bytes.
|
||||
pub fn encode_sha256(wasm_bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
|
||||
format!("sha256:{}", hex::encode(sha256_digest(wasm_bytes)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Encode an Ed25519 verifying key as the manifest `ed25519:<base64>` form.
|
||||
pub fn encode_verifying_key(key: &VerifyingKey) -> String {
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"ed25519:{}",
|
||||
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(key.to_bytes())
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Encode an Ed25519 signature as the manifest `ed25519:<base64>` form.
|
||||
pub fn encode_signature(sig: &Signature) -> String {
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"ed25519:{}",
|
||||
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(sig.to_bytes())
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deterministic publisher key (mirrors witness_signing's fixed-bytes
|
||||
/// seed convention — DO NOT use in production).
|
||||
fn publisher() -> SigningKey {
|
||||
SigningKey::from_bytes(b"homecore-plugins-pub-test-seed--")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn attacker() -> SigningKey {
|
||||
SigningKey::from_bytes(b"homecore-plugins-attacker-seed--")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Sign `wasm_bytes` with `key` and produce a manifest carrying the real
|
||||
/// hash + signature + publisher key.
|
||||
fn signed_manifest(wasm_bytes: &[u8], key: &SigningKey) -> PluginManifest {
|
||||
let digest = sha256_digest(wasm_bytes);
|
||||
let sig = key.sign(&digest);
|
||||
PluginManifest {
|
||||
domain: "demo".into(),
|
||||
name: "Demo".into(),
|
||||
version: "1.0.0".into(),
|
||||
documentation: None,
|
||||
iot_class: None,
|
||||
config_flow: false,
|
||||
integration_type: None,
|
||||
dependencies: vec![],
|
||||
requirements: vec![],
|
||||
wasm_module: Some("demo.wasm".into()),
|
||||
wasm_module_hash: Some(encode_sha256(wasm_bytes)),
|
||||
wasm_module_sig: Some(encode_signature(&sig)),
|
||||
publisher_key: Some(encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())),
|
||||
min_homecore_version: None,
|
||||
host_imports_required: vec![],
|
||||
homecore_permissions: vec![],
|
||||
cog_id: None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn valid_sig_from_trusted_key_passes() {
|
||||
let wasm = b"\0asm\x01\0\0\0fake module bytes";
|
||||
let key = publisher();
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(wasm, &key);
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
verify_module(&manifest, wasm, &policy).expect("trusted signed module should load");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn tampered_module_is_rejected() {
|
||||
let wasm = b"\0asm\x01\0\0\0fake module bytes";
|
||||
let key = publisher();
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(wasm, &key);
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
// Flip a byte: hash no longer matches.
|
||||
let tampered = b"\0asm\x01\0\0\0FAKE module bytes";
|
||||
let err = verify_module(&manifest, tampered, &policy).unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert!(matches!(err, PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)), "got {err:?}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn valid_sig_from_untrusted_key_is_rejected() {
|
||||
let wasm = b"\0asm\x01\0\0\0fake module bytes";
|
||||
// Signed correctly by the attacker, but the attacker is not trusted.
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(wasm, &attacker());
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&publisher().verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
let err = verify_module(&manifest, wasm, &policy).unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert!(matches!(err, PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)), "got {err:?}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn forged_signature_is_rejected() {
|
||||
// Manifest claims the trusted publisher_key but the signature was
|
||||
// produced by the attacker (a forged sig under a trusted identity).
|
||||
let wasm = b"\0asm\x01\0\0\0fake module bytes";
|
||||
let digest = sha256_digest(wasm);
|
||||
let forged = attacker().sign(&digest);
|
||||
let mut manifest = signed_manifest(wasm, &publisher());
|
||||
manifest.wasm_module_sig = Some(encode_signature(&forged));
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&publisher().verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
let err = verify_module(&manifest, wasm, &policy).unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert!(matches!(err, PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)), "got {err:?}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn unsigned_module_rejected_under_default_policy() {
|
||||
let wasm = b"\0asm\x01\0\0\0unsigned";
|
||||
let manifest = PluginManifest {
|
||||
domain: "u".into(),
|
||||
name: "U".into(),
|
||||
version: "1".into(),
|
||||
documentation: None,
|
||||
iot_class: None,
|
||||
config_flow: false,
|
||||
integration_type: None,
|
||||
dependencies: vec![],
|
||||
requirements: vec![],
|
||||
wasm_module: Some("u.wasm".into()),
|
||||
wasm_module_hash: None,
|
||||
wasm_module_sig: None,
|
||||
publisher_key: None,
|
||||
min_homecore_version: None,
|
||||
host_imports_required: vec![],
|
||||
homecore_permissions: vec![],
|
||||
cog_id: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let err = verify_module(&manifest, wasm, &PluginPolicy::deny_all()).unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert!(matches!(err, PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)), "got {err:?}");
|
||||
// ...but AllowUnsigned loads it (with a warn).
|
||||
verify_module(&manifest, wasm, &PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned)
|
||||
.expect("AllowUnsigned should load an unsigned module");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,16 +30,27 @@ use wasmtime::{Engine, Linker, Module, Store};
|
|||
|
||||
use crate::error::PluginError;
|
||||
use crate::host_abi::{LogLevel, StateChangedEventJson, MAX_ABI_BUFFER_BYTES};
|
||||
use crate::manifest::PluginManifest;
|
||||
use crate::permissions::PermissionSet;
|
||||
use crate::verify::{verify_module, PluginPolicy};
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Store data ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// Per-plugin state stored inside the Wasmtime [`Store`].
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Wasmtime's `Store<T>` exposes `T` to host functions via `caller.data()`.
|
||||
/// We store the `HomeCore` handle and a list of subscribed entity IDs here.
|
||||
/// We store the `HomeCore` handle, a list of subscribed entity IDs, and the
|
||||
/// plugin's write-permission set (ADR-162 P5 authority isolation).
|
||||
pub struct PluginStoreData {
|
||||
pub hc: HomeCore,
|
||||
pub subscriptions: Vec<String>,
|
||||
/// Entity-write authority distilled from the manifest's
|
||||
/// `homecore_permissions`. Consulted by `hc_state_set`. The
|
||||
/// permission-free [`WasmtimeRuntime::load_wasm`] path installs an
|
||||
/// all-allowing set for backward compatibility; the
|
||||
/// [`WasmtimeRuntime::load_plugin`] path installs the manifest's
|
||||
/// declared set.
|
||||
pub permissions: PermissionSet,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── WasmtimeRuntime ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,14 +70,53 @@ impl WasmtimeRuntime {
|
|||
Ok(Self { engine })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compile and instantiate a WASM plugin from raw bytes.
|
||||
/// Compile and instantiate a WASM plugin from raw bytes, **without**
|
||||
/// signature verification or permission gating (the plugin gets
|
||||
/// all-write authority).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns a [`WasmPlugin`] handle that owns the `Store` and the
|
||||
/// `Instance`. The handle can be used to call into the WASM module.
|
||||
/// Retained for the legacy/test path and first-party trusted modules.
|
||||
/// Production plugin loading should go through [`Self::load_plugin`],
|
||||
/// which verifies the module (ADR-162 P4) and scopes its write
|
||||
/// authority to the manifest (P5).
|
||||
pub fn load_wasm(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
wasm_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
hc: HomeCore,
|
||||
) -> Result<WasmPlugin, PluginError> {
|
||||
self.instantiate(wasm_bytes, hc, PermissionSet::allow_all())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verify and instantiate a WASM plugin from its manifest + raw bytes.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is the secure load path (ADR-162):
|
||||
/// 1. **P4** — [`verify_module`] checks the SHA-256 module hash and
|
||||
/// Ed25519 signature against the manifest under `policy`. A
|
||||
/// tampered module, bad/forged signature, untrusted publisher, or
|
||||
/// (under the secure default) an unsigned module is rejected
|
||||
/// **before** any guest code runs.
|
||||
/// 2. **P5** — the plugin's `homecore_permissions` are distilled into
|
||||
/// a [`PermissionSet`] installed in the store, so `hc_state_set`
|
||||
/// can only write entities the plugin declared.
|
||||
pub fn load_plugin(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
manifest: &PluginManifest,
|
||||
wasm_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
hc: HomeCore,
|
||||
policy: &PluginPolicy,
|
||||
) -> Result<WasmPlugin, PluginError> {
|
||||
// P4: verify before instantiation.
|
||||
verify_module(manifest, wasm_bytes, policy)?;
|
||||
// P5: scope write authority to the manifest's declared permissions.
|
||||
let permissions = PermissionSet::from_manifest(manifest);
|
||||
self.instantiate(wasm_bytes, hc, permissions)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Shared compile + instantiate, installing the given permission set.
|
||||
fn instantiate(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
wasm_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
hc: HomeCore,
|
||||
permissions: PermissionSet,
|
||||
) -> Result<WasmPlugin, PluginError> {
|
||||
let module = Module::new(&self.engine, wasm_bytes)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| PluginError::RuntimeError(format!("WASM compile: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
|
@ -77,6 +127,7 @@ impl WasmtimeRuntime {
|
|||
let store_data = PluginStoreData {
|
||||
hc,
|
||||
subscriptions: Vec::new(),
|
||||
permissions,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut store = Store::new(&self.engine, store_data);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -183,7 +234,9 @@ fn register_hc_state_get(
|
|||
/// Sets the state for the entity whose UTF-8 ID is at `[eid_ptr,eid_ptr+eid_len)`.
|
||||
/// The new state string is at `[state_ptr,state_ptr+state_len)`.
|
||||
/// The attributes JSON is at `[attrs_ptr,attrs_ptr+attrs_len)`.
|
||||
/// Returns 0 on success, negative on error.
|
||||
/// Returns 0 on success, negative on error: -1 (bad memory/args), -2
|
||||
/// (invalid entity id), -3 (permission denied — entity not in the
|
||||
/// plugin's declared `homecore_permissions`, ADR-162 P5).
|
||||
fn register_hc_state_set(
|
||||
linker: &mut Linker<PluginStoreData>,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), PluginError> {
|
||||
|
|
@ -224,6 +277,20 @@ fn register_hc_state_set(
|
|||
Ok(id) => id,
|
||||
Err(_) => return -2,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// ── P5 authority isolation (ADR-162) ──────────────────────
|
||||
// Reject a write to an entity the plugin did not declare in
|
||||
// `homecore_permissions`. Return a typed error code to the
|
||||
// guest (-3); do NOT panic the host.
|
||||
if !caller.data().permissions.may_write(entity_id.as_str()) {
|
||||
eprintln!(
|
||||
"[PLUGIN WARN] denied hc_state_set on `{}` — not in plugin's declared \
|
||||
homecore_permissions (P5 authority isolation)",
|
||||
entity_id.as_str()
|
||||
);
|
||||
return -3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let attrs: serde_json::Value =
|
||||
serde_json::from_str(&attrs_str).unwrap_or(serde_json::json!({}));
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -371,4 +371,259 @@ mod wasmtime_tests {
|
|||
let r = plugin.call_setup("{}").expect("setup");
|
||||
assert_eq!(r, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── ADR-162 P4: signature/integrity verification ────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Each of these FAILS on the pre-ADR-162 code, which had no
|
||||
// `load_plugin` / `verify_module` at all — the manifest hash/sig/key
|
||||
// were parsed and discarded. They drive the real verification gate.
|
||||
|
||||
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};
|
||||
use homecore_plugins::manifest::PluginManifest;
|
||||
use homecore_plugins::verify::{encode_sha256, encode_signature, encode_verifying_key};
|
||||
use homecore_plugins::PluginPolicy;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deterministic publisher key (fixed seed — never use in production;
|
||||
/// mirrors the cog-ha-matter witness_signing test-key convention).
|
||||
fn publisher_key() -> SigningKey {
|
||||
SigningKey::from_bytes(b"hc-plugins-integration-pub-seed-")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn untrusted_key() -> SigningKey {
|
||||
SigningKey::from_bytes(b"hc-plugins-integration-evil-seed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A minimal valid module that writes `light.kitchen` on setup, plus a
|
||||
/// `light.*` permission grant. Returns the WAT source.
|
||||
const WRITE_LIGHT_WAT: &str = r#"
|
||||
(module
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_state_get" (func $hc_state_get (param i32 i32 i32 i32) (result i32)))
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_state_set" (func $hc_state_set (param i32 i32 i32 i32 i32 i32) (result i32)))
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_state_subscribe" (func $hc_state_subscribe (param i32 i32) (result i32)))
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_log" (func $hc_log (param i32 i32 i32)))
|
||||
(memory (export "memory") 1)
|
||||
(global $bump (mut i32) (i32.const 512))
|
||||
(data (i32.const 0) "light.kitchen")
|
||||
(data (i32.const 64) "on")
|
||||
(data (i32.const 128) "{}")
|
||||
(func (export "alloc") (param i32) (result i32)
|
||||
(local $p i32)
|
||||
(local.set $p (global.get $bump))
|
||||
(global.set $bump (i32.add (global.get $bump) (local.get 0)))
|
||||
(local.get $p))
|
||||
(func (export "dealloc") (param i32 i32))
|
||||
(func (export "plugin_setup") (param i32 i32) (result i32)
|
||||
(call $hc_state_set
|
||||
(i32.const 0) (i32.const 13) ;; "light.kitchen"
|
||||
(i32.const 64) (i32.const 2) ;; "on"
|
||||
(i32.const 128) (i32.const 2)) ;; "{}"
|
||||
drop
|
||||
(i32.const 0))
|
||||
(func (export "plugin_handle_state_changed") (param i32 i32) (result i32) (i32.const 0))
|
||||
)
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Build a manifest signed by `key` over the SHA-256 of `wasm_bytes`,
|
||||
/// with the given write-permission grants.
|
||||
fn signed_manifest(
|
||||
wasm_bytes: &[u8],
|
||||
key: &SigningKey,
|
||||
perms: &[&str],
|
||||
) -> PluginManifest {
|
||||
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
let digest: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(wasm_bytes).into();
|
||||
let sig = key.sign(&digest);
|
||||
let mut m = PluginManifest::parse_json(
|
||||
r#"{"domain":"demo","name":"Demo","version":"1.0.0"}"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
m.wasm_module = Some("demo.wasm".into());
|
||||
m.wasm_module_hash = Some(encode_sha256(wasm_bytes));
|
||||
m.wasm_module_sig = Some(encode_signature(&sig));
|
||||
m.publisher_key = Some(encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key()));
|
||||
m.homecore_permissions = perms.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect();
|
||||
m
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn p4_valid_sig_from_trusted_key_loads() {
|
||||
let wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LIGHT_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
let key = publisher_key();
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(&wasm, &key, &["light.*"]);
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let rt = WasmtimeRuntime::new().expect("rt");
|
||||
let hc = HomeCore::new();
|
||||
rt.load_plugin(&manifest, &wasm, hc, &policy)
|
||||
.expect("a validly-signed, trusted plugin must load");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn p4_tampered_module_is_rejected() {
|
||||
let wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LIGHT_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
let key = publisher_key();
|
||||
// Manifest signs the original bytes; we then load DIFFERENT bytes.
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(&wasm, &key, &["light.*"]);
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-compile a byte-different module (writes "off" not "on").
|
||||
let tampered_src = WRITE_LIGHT_WAT.replace(r#""on""#, r#""of""#);
|
||||
let tampered = wat::parse_str(&tampered_src).expect("WAT");
|
||||
assert_ne!(wasm, tampered, "test bug: bytes must differ");
|
||||
|
||||
let rt = WasmtimeRuntime::new().expect("rt");
|
||||
let hc = HomeCore::new();
|
||||
match rt.load_plugin(&manifest, &tampered, hc, &policy) {
|
||||
Err(homecore_plugins::PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)) => {}
|
||||
Ok(_) => panic!("tampered module must be rejected (hash mismatch), but it loaded"),
|
||||
Err(e) => panic!("expected SignatureRejected, got {e:?}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn p4_valid_sig_from_untrusted_key_is_rejected() {
|
||||
let wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LIGHT_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
// Correctly signed by the untrusted key — but it is not on the allowlist.
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(&wasm, &untrusted_key(), &["light.*"]);
|
||||
let policy =
|
||||
PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&publisher_key().verifying_key())])
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let rt = WasmtimeRuntime::new().expect("rt");
|
||||
let hc = HomeCore::new();
|
||||
match rt.load_plugin(&manifest, &wasm, hc, &policy) {
|
||||
Err(homecore_plugins::PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)) => {}
|
||||
Ok(_) => panic!("untrusted publisher must be rejected, but it loaded"),
|
||||
Err(e) => panic!("expected SignatureRejected, got {e:?}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn p4_unsigned_module_rejected_by_default_loads_only_under_allow_unsigned() {
|
||||
let wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LIGHT_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
let mut manifest = PluginManifest::parse_json(
|
||||
r#"{"domain":"u","name":"U","version":"1"}"#,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
manifest.wasm_module = Some("u.wasm".into());
|
||||
manifest.homecore_permissions = vec!["light.*".into()];
|
||||
// No hash/sig/key → unsigned.
|
||||
|
||||
let rt = WasmtimeRuntime::new().expect("rt");
|
||||
// Secure default: rejected.
|
||||
match rt.load_plugin(&manifest, &wasm, HomeCore::new(), &PluginPolicy::deny_all()) {
|
||||
Err(homecore_plugins::PluginError::SignatureRejected(_)) => {}
|
||||
Ok(_) => panic!("unsigned module must be rejected under the secure default"),
|
||||
Err(e) => panic!("expected SignatureRejected, got {e:?}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Dev escape hatch: loads (with a loud warn).
|
||||
rt.load_plugin(
|
||||
&manifest,
|
||||
&wasm,
|
||||
HomeCore::new(),
|
||||
&PluginPolicy::AllowUnsigned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.expect("AllowUnsigned dev policy must load an unsigned module");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── ADR-162 P5: authority / capability isolation ────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// FAILS on the pre-ADR-162 code, where `hc_state_set` ignored
|
||||
// `homecore_permissions` entirely and let any plugin write any entity.
|
||||
|
||||
/// Module that writes `lock.front_door` on setup (an over-privileged
|
||||
/// write a `light.*` plugin must NOT be allowed to perform).
|
||||
const WRITE_LOCK_WAT: &str = r#"
|
||||
(module
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_state_get" (func $hc_state_get (param i32 i32 i32 i32) (result i32)))
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_state_set" (func $hc_state_set (param i32 i32 i32 i32 i32 i32) (result i32)))
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_state_subscribe" (func $hc_state_subscribe (param i32 i32) (result i32)))
|
||||
(import "env" "hc_log" (func $hc_log (param i32 i32 i32)))
|
||||
(memory (export "memory") 1)
|
||||
(global $bump (mut i32) (i32.const 512))
|
||||
(data (i32.const 0) "lock.front_door")
|
||||
(data (i32.const 64) "unlocked")
|
||||
(data (i32.const 128) "{}")
|
||||
(func (export "alloc") (param i32) (result i32)
|
||||
(local $p i32)
|
||||
(local.set $p (global.get $bump))
|
||||
(global.set $bump (i32.add (global.get $bump) (local.get 0)))
|
||||
(local.get $p))
|
||||
(func (export "dealloc") (param i32 i32))
|
||||
;; plugin_setup returns the hc_state_set result code so the host test can
|
||||
;; assert the guest saw the typed permission-denied error (-3).
|
||||
(func (export "plugin_setup") (param i32 i32) (result i32)
|
||||
(call $hc_state_set
|
||||
(i32.const 0) (i32.const 15) ;; "lock.front_door"
|
||||
(i32.const 64) (i32.const 8) ;; "unlocked"
|
||||
(i32.const 128) (i32.const 2))) ;; "{}"
|
||||
(func (export "plugin_handle_state_changed") (param i32 i32) (result i32) (i32.const 0))
|
||||
)
|
||||
"#;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn p5_declared_light_plugin_may_write_light_but_not_lock() {
|
||||
let key = publisher_key();
|
||||
let trusted = PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
let rt = WasmtimeRuntime::new().expect("rt");
|
||||
|
||||
// (a) A `light.*` plugin writing `light.kitchen` → ALLOWED.
|
||||
let light_wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LIGHT_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
let light_manifest = signed_manifest(&light_wasm, &key, &["light.*"]);
|
||||
let hc_a = HomeCore::new();
|
||||
let plugin_a = rt
|
||||
.load_plugin(&light_manifest, &light_wasm, hc_a.clone(), &trusted)
|
||||
.expect("light plugin loads");
|
||||
let r = plugin_a.call_setup("{}").expect("setup");
|
||||
assert_eq!(r, 0, "write to declared light.kitchen should succeed");
|
||||
let kitchen = homecore::EntityId::parse("light.kitchen").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
hc_a.states().get(&kitchen).expect("light.kitchen written").state,
|
||||
"on"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// (b) The SAME `light.*` plugin attempting to write `lock.front_door`
|
||||
// → REJECTED with the typed -3 code, and the lock is NOT written.
|
||||
let lock_wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LOCK_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
let lock_manifest = signed_manifest(&lock_wasm, &key, &["light.*"]);
|
||||
let hc_b = HomeCore::new();
|
||||
let plugin_b = rt
|
||||
.load_plugin(&lock_manifest, &lock_wasm, hc_b.clone(), &trusted)
|
||||
.expect("module loads (verification ok); the WRITE is what's gated");
|
||||
let denied = plugin_b.call_setup("{}").expect("setup runs without trapping host");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
denied, -3,
|
||||
"over-privileged write to lock.front_door must return -3 (permission denied)"
|
||||
);
|
||||
let lock = homecore::EntityId::parse("lock.front_door").unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
hc_b.states().get(&lock).is_none(),
|
||||
"lock.front_door must NOT have been written by a light-only plugin"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn p5_plugin_with_no_permissions_can_write_nothing() {
|
||||
let key = publisher_key();
|
||||
let trusted = PluginPolicy::trusted(&[&encode_verifying_key(&key.verifying_key())]).unwrap();
|
||||
let rt = WasmtimeRuntime::new().expect("rt");
|
||||
|
||||
let wasm = wat::parse_str(WRITE_LIGHT_WAT).expect("WAT");
|
||||
// No permissions declared at all.
|
||||
let manifest = signed_manifest(&wasm, &key, &[]);
|
||||
let hc = HomeCore::new();
|
||||
let plugin = rt
|
||||
.load_plugin(&manifest, &wasm, hc.clone(), &trusted)
|
||||
.expect("module loads; the write is gated");
|
||||
// WRITE_LIGHT_WAT drops the host-import result and returns 0, so we
|
||||
// assert the denial via the side-effect: the write must NOT land.
|
||||
plugin.call_setup("{}").expect("setup runs without trapping host");
|
||||
let kitchen = homecore::EntityId::parse("light.kitchen").unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
hc.states().get(&kitchen).is_none(),
|
||||
"no-permission plugin must not write light.kitchen (P5 authority isolation)"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue