fix(auth): enforce client_id as the audience — Cognitum's stand-in for `aud`

Found by reading cognitum-one/freetokens, a live sibling service whose browser
OAuth landed while this PR was open. Its integration contract states the
platform rule outright:

  "Cognitum access tokens intentionally use custom `client_id` rather than a
   registered JWT `aud` claim."  -- freetokens docs/AUTH_INTEGRATION.md

and `src/auth/oauth.ts` enforces it on every sign-in:

  payload.client_id !== config.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID  -> reject

RuView did not. An earlier revision here removed the `client_id` check and kept
it only for logging, reasoning that clients borrow one another's registrations
(musica shipped as `meta-proxy` while its own was pending) and that scope alone
must therefore carry the boundary. That reasoned from a TRANSITIONAL state:
RuView has its own registered client (identity migration 0017), and the platform
does have an audience mechanism — it is simply spelled `client_id`.

Consequence of the old behaviour: a Cognitum access token minted for ANY product
— meta-proxy, musica, metaharness, freetokens — was accepted by a RuView server
provided it carried a sensing scope. Scope was the only thing standing between
another product's token and this one. Now there are two boundaries, audience and
capability, which is what the platform intends.

- `VerifierConfig.allowed_client_ids`; empty = accept any (explicit opt-out).
- `RUVIEW_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS` env, default `ruview`, `*` to disable with a loud
  warning naming what is being given up. Comma-separated for the migration case
  where a borrowed registration must be accepted alongside our own.
- New `VerifyError::WrongAudience`, checked BEFORE scope, so the failure names
  the real reason rather than blaming the scope.

The existing cross-product test now asserts `WrongAudience` rather than
`MissingScope` — the token is refused for the stronger reason. Three new tests:
a correctly-scoped token from another product is still refused; the empty-list
opt-out accepts anything (pinned so it stays deliberate); multiple allowed
clients work.

This also corrects the module docs and ADR-271, which claimed "scope is the ONLY
capability boundary" — true of the code as written, but not of the platform.

Tests: 85 ruview-auth, 533 sensing-server.

Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE

v2/crates/ruview-auth/src/lib.rs

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
 //! let config = VerifierConfig {
 //!     issuer: "https://auth.cognitum.one".to_string(),
 //!     required_scope: scope::SENSING_READ.to_string(),
+//!     // Audience: Cognitum has no `aud`, so `client_id` carries it.
+//!     allowed_client_ids: vec!["ruview".to_string()],
 //! };
 //!
 //! let principal = verify_access_token("<jwt>", &jwks, &config)?;

v2/crates/ruview-auth/src/verify.rs

@@ -37,11 +37,20 @@
 //! not emit rejects every genuine token, which is exactly what an earlier
 //! revision of this module did.
 //!
-//! The missing `aud` has a real consequence: **scope is the only capability
+//! **`client_id` is Cognitum's stand-in for `aud`.** `cognitum-one/freetokens`
-//! boundary**. `client_id` cannot serve as one, because clients borrow each
+//! (live) documents the contract — *"Cognitum access tokens intentionally use
-//! other's registrations (musica shipped as `meta-proxy` while its own
+//! custom `client_id` rather than a registered JWT `aud` claim"* — and rejects
-//! registration was pending). Hence `required_scope` below is not optional
+//! any token whose `client_id` is not its own. This verifier does the same via
-//! garnish; it is the boundary.
+//! [`VerifierConfig::allowed_client_ids`].
+//!
+//! An earlier revision treated `client_id` as unusable because clients borrow
+//! each other's registrations (musica shipped as `meta-proxy` while its own was
+//! pending) and relied on scope alone. That was reasoning from a transitional
+//! state: RuView has its own registered client, and accepting a token minted for
+//! any Cognitum product is a weaker position than the platform intends.
+//!
+//! So there are now TWO boundaries, not one: audience (`client_id`) and
+//! capability (`scope`). Neither is optional garnish.
 
 use jsonwebtoken::{decode, decode_header, Algorithm, Validation};
 use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -88,6 +97,10 @@ pub enum VerifyError {
     MissingAccountId,
     #[error("token does not carry the required scope {required:?}")]
     MissingScope { required: String },
+    /// Minted for a different Cognitum product. `client_id` is the platform's
+    /// audience mechanism in the absence of `aud`.
+    #[error("token was issued to client {found:?}, which this server does not accept")]
+    WrongAudience { found: String },
 }
 
 /// Identity's access-token claims. Mirrors `AccessTokenClaims` in
@@ -132,6 +145,21 @@ pub struct VerifierConfig {
     pub issuer: String,
     /// The scope a caller must hold for the route being served.
     pub required_scope: String,
+    /// `client_id` values whose tokens this server accepts — the AUDIENCE check.
+    ///
+    /// Cognitum tokens carry no `aud`; the platform uses `client_id` for this
+    /// instead. `freetokens` (cognitum-one/freetokens, live) states the contract
+    /// plainly — *"Cognitum access tokens intentionally use custom `client_id`
+    /// rather than a registered JWT `aud` claim"* — and enforces
+    /// `payload.client_id !== OAUTH_CLIENT_ID` on every request.
+    ///
+    /// Empty means accept any client, which is what an earlier revision did on
+    /// the reasoning that clients borrow each other's registrations (musica
+    /// shipped as `meta-proxy` while its own was pending). That was a
+    /// transitional state, not the model: RuView has its own registered client,
+    /// so leaving this empty means accepting a token minted for ANY Cognitum
+    /// product. Configure it.
+    pub allowed_client_ids: Vec<String>,
 }
 
 /// Verify a raw JWT and produce a [`Principal`].
@@ -171,6 +199,17 @@ pub fn verify_access_token(
     if claims.typ.as_deref() != Some(TYP_ACCESS) {
         return Err(VerifyError::WrongTokenType { found: claims.typ });
     }
+    // AUDIENCE. Cognitum's stand-in for `aud` (see VerifierConfig docs).
+    if !config.allowed_client_ids.is_empty()
+        && !config
+            .allowed_client_ids
+            .iter()
+            .any(|c| c == &claims.client_id)
+    {
+        return Err(VerifyError::WrongAudience {
+            found: claims.client_id,
+        });
+    }
     if claims.setup || claims.workload {
         // Belt and braces alongside the `typ` check: identity stamps these as
         // booleans as well, and a credential that sets either must never be

v2/crates/ruview-auth/tests/verifier_matrix.rs

@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ fn config_for(required_scope: &str) -> VerifierConfig {
     VerifierConfig {
         issuer: TEST_ISSUER.to_string(),
         required_scope: required_scope.to_string(),
+        // Mirrors production: RuView accepts only tokens minted for itself.
+        allowed_client_ids: vec!["ruview".to_string()],
     }
 }
 
@@ -388,12 +390,55 @@ fn g2_a_genuinely_valid_token_from_another_cognitum_product_cannot_reach_the_sen
     c["client_id"] = json!("meta-proxy");
     c["scope"] = json!("inference");
 
+    // Rejected on AUDIENCE now (client_id), which is the stronger of the two
+    // reasons — it fires before scope is even considered.
     assert!(matches!(
         verify(&sign(&c), scope::SENSING_READ),
-        Err(VerifyError::MissingScope { .. })
+        Err(VerifyError::WrongAudience { .. })
     ));
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn a_token_minted_for_another_cognitum_product_is_refused_even_with_the_right_scope() {
+    // The audience check standing alone. Same user, same signature, correct
+    // sensing:read scope — but minted for freetokens, so not for this server.
+    // `cognitum-one/freetokens` enforces the mirror image of this.
+    let mut c = valid_claims();
+    c["client_id"] = json!("freetokens");
+    assert!(matches!(
+        verify(&sign(&c), scope::SENSING_READ),
+        Err(VerifyError::WrongAudience { .. })
+    ));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn an_empty_audience_list_accepts_any_client() {
+    // The documented opt-out (RUVIEW_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS=*). Pinned so the
+    // behaviour is deliberate rather than accidental.
+    let mut c = valid_claims();
+    c["client_id"] = json!("some-other-product");
+    let cfg = VerifierConfig {
+        issuer: TEST_ISSUER.to_string(),
+        required_scope: scope::SENSING_READ.to_string(),
+        allowed_client_ids: vec![],
+    };
+    verify_access_token(&sign(&c), &jwks_serving_test_key(), &cfg)
+        .expect("an empty allowlist means accept any client");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn multiple_allowed_clients_are_honoured() {
+    // Migration case: accepting a borrowed registration alongside our own.
+    let mut c = valid_claims();
+    c["client_id"] = json!("meta-proxy");
+    let cfg = VerifierConfig {
+        issuer: TEST_ISSUER.to_string(),
+        required_scope: scope::SENSING_READ.to_string(),
+        allowed_client_ids: vec!["ruview".into(), "meta-proxy".into()],
+    };
+    verify_access_token(&sign(&c), &jwks_serving_test_key(), &cfg).expect("both accepted");
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn g2_a_read_scoped_session_cannot_reach_the_admin_surface() {
     // The routine case the least-scope rule exists for: a dashboard streaming

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/bearer_auth.rs

@@ -71,6 +71,30 @@ pub const OAUTH_JWKS_URL_ENV: &str = "RUVIEW_OAUTH_JWKS_URL";
 /// The production Cognitum issuer, for operators who just want it on.
 pub const COGNITUM_ISSUER: &str = "https://auth.cognitum.one";
 
+/// Comma-separated `client_id` values whose tokens this server accepts — the
+/// AUDIENCE control. Defaults to [`DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID`].
+///
+/// Cognitum tokens carry no `aud`; `client_id` is the platform's stand-in, and
+/// `cognitum-one/freetokens` enforces exactly this. Set to `*` to accept any
+/// Cognitum client — only sensible while borrowing another product's
+/// registration, and it means any Cognitum token opens this server.
+pub const OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS_ENV: &str = "RUVIEW_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS";
+
+/// RuView's own registered OAuth client (identity migration `0017`).
+pub const DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID: &str = "ruview";
+
+fn allowed_client_ids() -> Vec<String> {
+    match std::env::var(OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS_ENV) {
+        Ok(v) if v.trim() == "*" => Vec::new(), // explicit opt-out
+        Ok(v) if !v.trim().is_empty() => v
+            .split(',')
+            .map(|c| c.trim().to_string())
+            .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
+            .collect(),
+        _ => vec![DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID.to_string()],
+    }
+}
+
 /// Path prefix the middleware protects when auth is enabled.
 pub const PROTECTED_PREFIX: &str = "/api/v1/";
 
@@ -140,6 +164,7 @@ fn is_ws_path(path: &str) -> bool {
 pub struct OAuthState {
     jwks: JwksCache,
     issuer: String,
+    allowed_client_ids: Vec<String>,
 }
 
 impl std::fmt::Debug for OAuthState {
@@ -233,7 +258,17 @@ impl AuthState {
                     key_count,
                     "Cognitum OAuth enabled for /api/v1/*"
                 );
-                Some(Arc::new(OAuthState { jwks, issuer }))
+                let allowed_client_ids = allowed_client_ids();
+                if allowed_client_ids.is_empty() {
+                    tracing::warn!(
+                        "{OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS_ENV}=* — this server accepts a Cognitum token minted \
+                         for ANY product, not just RuView. `client_id` is the platform's stand-in \
+                         for `aud`; disabling it leaves scope as the only boundary."
+                    );
+                } else {
+                    tracing::info!(accepted_clients = ?allowed_client_ids, "OAuth audience restricted");
+                }
+                Some(Arc::new(OAuthState { jwks, issuer, allowed_client_ids }))
             }
             Ok(_) => return Err(OAuthConfigError::EmptyIssuer),
             Err(_) => None,
@@ -445,6 +480,7 @@ pub async fn require_bearer(
         let config = VerifierConfig {
             issuer: oauth.issuer.clone(),
             required_scope: required.to_string(),
+            allowed_client_ids: oauth.allowed_client_ids.clone(),
         };
         match verify_access_token(supplied, &oauth.jwks, &config) {
             Ok(principal) => {
@@ -851,6 +887,7 @@ mod oauth_tests {
         Arc::new(OAuthState {
             jwks: JwksCache::new("https://stub/jwks.json", Box::new(StaticJwks(doc))),
             issuer: ISSUER.to_string(),
+            allowed_client_ids: vec!["ruview".to_string()],
         })
     }