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actix-web
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Follow the original changes

This commit is contained in:
Yuki Okushi 2019-10-20 05:39:58 +09:00
parent cf71cafce9
commit 9586643f3c
3 changed files with 101 additions and 88 deletions
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17
actix-http/src/cookie/secure/key.rs
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use ring::hkdf::{HKDF_SHA256, Algorithm, Prk, KeyType};
use ring::hkdf::{Algorithm, KeyType, Prk, HKDF_SHA256};
use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
use super::private::KEY_LEN as PRIVATE_KEY_LEN;
@ -55,13 +55,16 @@ impl Key {
/// ```
pub fn from_master(master_key: &[u8]) -> Key {
if master_key.len() < 32 {
panic!("bad master key length: expected >= 32 bytes, found {}", master_key.len());
panic!(
"bad master key length: expected >= 32 bytes, found {}",
master_key.len()
);
}
// An empty `Key` structure; will be filled in with HKDF derived keys.
let mut output_key = Key {
signing_key: [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN],
encryption_key: [0; PRIVATE_KEY_LEN]
encryption_key: [0; PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
};
// Expand the master key into two HKDF generated keys.
@ -71,8 +74,12 @@ impl Key {
okm.fill(&mut both_keys).expect("fill keys");
// Copy the key parts into their respective fields.
output_key.signing_key.copy_from_slice(&both_keys[..SIGNED_KEY_LEN]);
output_key.encryption_key.copy_from_slice(&both_keys[SIGNED_KEY_LEN..]);
output_key
.signing_key
.copy_from_slice(&both_keys[..SIGNED_KEY_LEN]);
output_key
.encryption_key
.copy_from_slice(&both_keys[SIGNED_KEY_LEN..]);
output_key
}

161
actix-http/src/cookie/secure/private.rs
View File

@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
use std::str;
use log::warn;
use ring::aead::{Aad, Algorithm, Nonce, AES_256_GCM};
use ring::aead::{OpeningKey, SealingKey};
use ring::OpeningKey::open_in_place;
use ring::SealingKey::seal_in_place;
use ring::aead::{LessSafeKey, UnboundKey};
use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
use super::Key;
@ -55,23 +50,19 @@ impl<'a> PrivateJar<'a> {
}
let ad = Aad::from(name.as_bytes());
let key = OpeningKey::new(ALGO, &self.key).expect("opening key");
let (nonce, sealed) = data.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
let key = LessSafeKey::new(
UnboundKey::new(&ALGO, &self.key).expect("matching key length"),
);
let (nonce, mut sealed) = data.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
let nonce =
Nonce::try_assume_unique_for_key(nonce).expect("invalid length of `nonce`");
let unsealed = open_in_place(&key, nonce, ad, 0, sealed)
let unsealed = key
.open_in_place(nonce, ad, &mut sealed)
.map_err(|_| "invalid key/nonce/value: bad seal")?;
if let Ok(unsealed_utf8) = str::from_utf8(unsealed) {
Ok(unsealed_utf8.to_string())
} else {
warn!(
"Private cookie does not have utf8 content!
It is likely the secret key used to encrypt them has been leaked.
Please change it as soon as possible."
);
Err("bad unsealed utf8")
}
::std::str::from_utf8(unsealed)
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.map_err(|_| "bad unsealed utf8")
}
/// Returns a reference to the `Cookie` inside this jar with the name `name`
@ -156,16 +147,41 @@ Please change it as soon as possible."
self.parent.add_original(cookie);
}
/// Encrypts the cookie's value with
/// authenticated encryption assuring confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.
/// Encrypts the cookie's value with authenticated encryption assuring
/// confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.
fn encrypt_cookie(&self, cookie: &mut Cookie) {
let name = cookie.name().as_bytes();
let value = cookie.value().as_bytes();
let data = encrypt_name_value(name, value, &self.key);
// Create the `LessSafeKey` structure.
let unbound = UnboundKey::new(&ALGO, &self.key).expect("matching key length");
let key = LessSafeKey::new(unbound);
// Base64 encode the nonce and encrypted value.
let sealed_value = base64::encode(&data);
cookie.set_value(sealed_value);
// Create a vec to hold the [nonce | cookie value | tag].
let cookie_val = cookie.value().as_bytes();
let mut data = vec![0; NONCE_LEN + cookie_val.len() + ALGO.tag_len()];
// Split data into three: nonce, input/output, tag. Copy input.
let (nonce, in_out) = data.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
let (in_out, tag) = in_out.split_at_mut(cookie_val.len());
in_out.copy_from_slice(cookie_val);
// Randomly generate the nonce into the nonce piece.
SystemRandom::new()
.fill(nonce)
.expect("couldn't random fill nonce");
let nonce =
Nonce::try_assume_unique_for_key(nonce).expect("invalid `nonce` length");
// Perform the actual sealing operation, using the cookie's name as
// associated data to prevent value swapping.
let ad = Aad::from(cookie.name().as_bytes());
let ad_tag = key
.seal_in_place_separate_tag(nonce, ad, in_out)
.expect("in-place seal");
// Copy the tag into the tag piece.
tag.copy_from_slice(ad_tag.as_ref());
// Base64 encode [none | encrypted value | tag].
cookie.set_value(base64::encode(&data));
}
/// Removes `cookie` from the parent jar.
@ -196,38 +212,9 @@ Please change it as soon as possible."
}
}
fn encrypt_name_value(name: &[u8], value: &[u8], key: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
// Create the `SealingKey` structure.
let key = SealingKey::new(ALGO, key).expect("sealing key creation");
// Create a vec to hold the [nonce | cookie value | overhead].
let overhead = ALGO.tag_len();
let mut data = vec![0; NONCE_LEN + value.len() + overhead];
// Randomly generate the nonce, then copy the cookie value as input.
let (nonce, in_out) = data.split_at_mut(NONCE_LEN);
SystemRandom::new()
.fill(nonce)
.expect("couldn't random fill nonce");
in_out[..value.len()].copy_from_slice(value);
let nonce =
Nonce::try_assume_unique_for_key(nonce).expect("invalid length of `nonce`");
// Use cookie's name as associated data to prevent value swapping.
let ad = Aad::from(name);
// Perform the actual sealing operation and get the output length.
let output_len =
seal_in_place(&key, nonce, ad, in_out, overhead).expect("in-place seal");
// Remove the overhead and return the sealed content.
data.truncate(NONCE_LEN + output_len);
data
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use super::{encrypt_name_value, Cookie, CookieJar, Key};
use super::{Cookie, CookieJar, Key};
#[test]
fn simple() {
@ -244,28 +231,48 @@ mod test {
}
#[test]
fn non_utf8() {
let key = Key::generate();
fn roundtrip_tests() {
// Secret is 'Super secret!' passed through sha256
let secret = b"\x1b\x1c\x6f\x1b\x31\x99\x82\x77\x0e\x05\xb6\x05\x54\x0b\xd9\xea\
\x54\x9f\x9a\x56\xf4\x0f\x97\xdc\x6e\xf2\x89\x86\x91\xe0\xa5\x79";
let key = Key::from_master(secret);
let mut jar = CookieJar::new();
jar.add(Cookie::new(
"signed_with_ring014",
"3tdHXEQ2kf6fxC7dWzBGmpSLMtJenXLKrZ9cHkSsl1w=Tamper-proof",
));
jar.add(Cookie::new(
"encrypted_with_ring014",
"lObeZJorGVyeSWUA8khTO/8UCzFVBY9g0MGU6/J3NN1R5x11dn2JIA==",
));
jar.add(Cookie::new(
"signed_with_ring016",
"3tdHXEQ2kf6fxC7dWzBGmpSLMtJenXLKrZ9cHkSsl1w=Tamper-proof",
));
jar.add(Cookie::new(
"encrypted_with_ring016",
"SU1ujceILyMBg3fReqRmA9HUtAIoSPZceOM/CUpObROHEujXIjonkA==",
));
let name = "malicious";
let mut assert_non_utf8 = |value: &[u8]| {
let sealed = encrypt_name_value(name.as_bytes(), value, &key.encryption());
let encoded = base64::encode(&sealed);
assert_eq!(
jar.private(&key).unseal(name, &encoded),
Err("bad unsealed utf8")
);
jar.add(Cookie::new(name, encoded));
assert_eq!(jar.private(&key).get(name), None);
};
let signed = jar.signed(&key);
assert_eq!(
signed.get("signed_with_ring014").unwrap().value(),
"Tamper-proof"
);
assert_eq!(
signed.get("signed_with_ring016").unwrap().value(),
"Tamper-proof"
);
assert_non_utf8(&[0x72, 0xfb, 0xdf, 0x74]); // rûst in ISO/IEC 8859-1
let mut malicious =
String::from(r#"{"id":"abc123??%X","admin":true}"#).into_bytes();
malicious[8] |= 0b1100_0000;
malicious[9] |= 0b1100_0000;
assert_non_utf8(&malicious);
let private = jar.private(&key);
assert_eq!(
private.get("encrypted_with_ring014").unwrap().value(),
"Tamper-proof"
);
assert_eq!(
private.get("encrypted_with_ring016").unwrap().value(),
"Tamper-proof"
);
}
}

11
actix-http/src/cookie/secure/signed.rs
View File

@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
use ring::digest::{Algorithm, SHA256};
use ring::hmac::{sign, verify, Key};
use ring::hmac::{self, sign, verify, Algorithm, HMAC_SHA256};
use super::Key;
use crate::cookie::{Cookie, CookieJar};
// Keep these in sync, and keep the key len synced with the `signed` docs as
// well as the `KEYS_INFO` const in secure::Key.
static HMAC_DIGEST: &Algorithm = &SHA256;
static HMAC_DIGEST: Algorithm = HMAC_SHA256;
const BASE64_DIGEST_LEN: usize = 44;
pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// This type is only available when the `secure` feature is enabled.
pub struct SignedJar<'a> {
parent: &'a mut CookieJar,
key: Key,
key: hmac::Key,
}
impl<'a> SignedJar<'a> {
@ -31,8 +30,8 @@ impl<'a> SignedJar<'a> {
#[doc(hidden)]
pub fn new(parent: &'a mut CookieJar, key: &Key) -> SignedJar<'a> {
SignedJar {
parent,
key: Key::new(HMAC_DIGEST, key.signing()),
parent: parent,
key: hmac::Key::new(HMAC_DIGEST, key.signing()),
}
}